typo fixes from unbound-1.5.7rc1

24 files changed, 40 insertions, 40 deletions

diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/doc/unbound-control.8.in b/usr.sbin/unbound/doc/unbound-control.8.in
index 5d37478a477..ee38618bc55 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/doc/unbound-control.8.in
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/doc/unbound-control.8.in
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ therefore not flushed.  The option must end with a ':' and whitespace
 must be between the option and the value.  Some values may not have an
 effect if set this way, the new values are not written to the config file,
 not all options are supported.  This is different from the set_option call
-in libunbound, where all values work because unbound has not been inited.
+in libunbound, where all values work because unbound has not been initialized.
 .IP
 The values that work are: statistics\-interval, statistics\-cumulative,
 do\-not\-query\-localhost, harden\-short\-bufsize, harden\-large\-queries,
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/doc/unbound.conf.5.in b/usr.sbin/unbound/doc/unbound.conf.5.in
index 32f8b20fc12..2e07ddb835b 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/doc/unbound.conf.5.in
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/doc/unbound.conf.5.in
@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ Instruct the validator to remove data from the additional section of secure
 messages that are not signed properly. Messages that are insecure, bogus,
 indeterminate or unchecked are not affected. Default is yes. Use this setting
 to protect the users that rely on this validator for authentication from 
-protentially bad data in the additional section.
+potentially bad data in the additional section.
 .TP
 .B val\-log\-level: \fI<number>
 Have the validator print validation failures to the log.  Regardless of
@@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ If set to 0, all queries are dropped for domains where the limit is
 exceeded.  If set to another value, 1 in that number is allowed through
 to complete.  Default is 10, allowing 1/10 traffic to flow normally.
 This can make ordinary queries complete (if repeatedly queried for),
-and enter the cache, whilst also mitigiting the traffic flow by the
+and enter the cache, whilst also mitigating the traffic flow by the
 factor given.
 .TP 5
 .B ratelimit\-for\-domain: \fI<domain> <number qps>
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iter_scrub.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iter_scrub.c
index cc05867c0a4..5faaa3733e7 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iter_scrub.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iter_scrub.c
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ scrub_sanitize(sldns_buffer* pkt, struct msg_parse* msg,
 	 * children of the originating zone. The idea here is that, 
 	 * as far as we know, the server that we contacted is ONLY 
 	 * authoritative for the originating zone. It, of course, MAY 
-	 * be authoriative for any other zones, and of course, MAY 
+	 * be authoritative for any other zones, and of course, MAY 
 	 * NOT be authoritative for some subdomains of the originating 
 	 * zone. */
 	prev = NULL;
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iter_utils.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iter_utils.c
index bc94ef68224..58e62fbeb27 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iter_utils.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iter_utils.c
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ iter_filter_unsuitable(struct iter_env* iter_env, struct module_env* env,
 			return -1; /* server is lame */
 		else if(rtt >= USEFUL_SERVER_TOP_TIMEOUT)
 			/* server is unresponsive,
-			 * we used to return TOP_TIMOUT, but fairly useless,
+			 * we used to return TOP_TIMEOUT, but fairly useless,
 			 * because if == TOP_TIMEOUT is dropped because
 			 * blacklisted later, instead, remove it here, so
 			 * other choices (that are not blacklisted) can be
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ iter_fill_rtt(struct iter_env* iter_env, struct module_env* env,
 	return got_it;
 }
 
-/** filter the addres list, putting best targets at front,
+/** filter the address list, putting best targets at front,
  * returns number of best targets (or 0, no suitable targets) */
 static int
 iter_filter_order(struct iter_env* iter_env, struct module_env* env,
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iterator.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iterator.c
index 96918fa9788..8ff32fc9179 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iterator.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/iterator/iterator.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ next_state(struct iter_qstate* iq, enum iter_state nextstate)
 /**
  * Transition an event to its final state. Final states always either return
  * a result up the module chain, or reactivate a dependent event. Which
- * final state to transtion to is set in the module state for the event when
+ * final state to transition to is set in the module state for the event when
  * it was created, and depends on the original purpose of the event.
  *
  * The response is stored in the qstate->buf buffer.
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ target_count_increase(struct iter_qstate* iq, int num)
 /**
  * Generate a subrequest.
  * Generate a local request event. Local events are tied to this module, and
- * have a correponding (first tier) event that is waiting for this event to
+ * have a corresponding (first tier) event that is waiting for this event to
  * resolve to continue.
  *
  * @param qname The query name for this request.
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/ltmain.sh b/usr.sbin/unbound/ltmain.sh
index 63ae69dc6fe..6fdf4ba8178 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/ltmain.sh
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/ltmain.sh
@@ -4394,7 +4394,7 @@ EOF
         {
           /* however, if there is an option in the LTWRAPPER_OPTION_PREFIX
              namespace, but it is not one of the ones we know about and
-             have already dealt with, above (inluding dump-script), then
+             have already dealt with, above (including dump-script), then
              report an error. Otherwise, targets might begin to believe
              they are allowed to use options in the LTWRAPPER_OPTION_PREFIX
              namespace. The first time any user complains about this, we'll
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/sldns/parseutil.h b/usr.sbin/unbound/sldns/parseutil.h
index dfa1c2a2b14..c5238bc10a9 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/sldns/parseutil.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/sldns/parseutil.h
@@ -56,13 +56,13 @@ time_t sldns_mktime_from_utc(const struct tm *tm);
 
 /**
  * The function interprets time as the number of seconds since epoch
- * with respect to now using serial arithmitics (rfc1982).
+ * with respect to now using serial arithmetics (rfc1982).
  * That number of seconds is then converted to broken-out time information.
  * This is especially usefull when converting the inception and expiration
  * fields of RRSIG records.
  *
  * \param[in] time number of seconds since epoch (midnight, January 1st, 1970)
- *            to be intepreted as a serial arithmitics number relative to now.
+ *            to be intepreted as a serial arithmetics number relative to now.
  * \param[in] now number of seconds since epoch (midnight, January 1st, 1970)
  *            to which the time value is compared to determine the final value.
  * \param[out] result the struct with the broken-out time information
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c
index 92bfa842877..f6f90e20115 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
  * signed yet; avoids attacks on system clock).  The
  * last-successful-RFC5011-probe (if available) has to be more than 30 days
  * in the past (otherwise, RFC5011 should have worked).  This keeps
- * unneccesary https traffic down.  If the main certificate is expired, it
+ * unnecessary https traffic down.  If the main certificate is expired, it
  * fails.
  *
  * The dates on the keys in the xml are checked (uses the libexpat xml
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/config_file.h b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/config_file.h
index 99b15e06ebc..04803b38e30 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/config_file.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/config_file.h
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ struct config_file {
 	struct config_str2list* local_zones;
 	/** local zones nodefault list */
 	struct config_strlist* local_zones_nodefault;
-	/** local data RRs configged */
+	/** local data RRs configured */
 	struct config_strlist* local_data;
 	/** unblock lan zones (reverse lookups for 10/8 and so on) */
 	int unblock_lan_zones;
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/locks.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/locks.c
index 509895d0280..adfb6c062fc 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/locks.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/locks.c
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ void ub_thread_create(ub_thread_t* thr, void* (*func)(void*), void* arg)
 		0, /* default flags, run immediately */
 		NULL); /* do not store thread identifier anywhere */
 #else
-	/* the begintheadex routine setups for the C lib; aligns stack */
+	/* the beginthreadex routine setups for the C lib; aligns stack */
 	*thr=(ub_thread_t)_beginthreadex(NULL, 0, (void*)func, arg, 0, NULL);
 #endif
 	if(*thr == NULL) {
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/rbtree.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/rbtree.c
index a898f13f022..ee5446f6cb5 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/rbtree.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/rbtree.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void rbtree_insert_fixup(rbtree_t *rbtree, rbnode_t *node);
 static void rbtree_delete_fixup(rbtree_t* rbtree, rbnode_t* child, rbnode_t* child_parent);
 
 /*
- * Creates a new red black tree, intializes and returns a pointer to it.
+ * Creates a new red black tree, initializes and returns a pointer to it.
  *
  * Return NULL on failure.
  *
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/rtt.h b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/rtt.h
index d6da9860650..07e65ee1d3d 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/rtt.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/rtt.h
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ int rtt_notimeout(const struct rtt_info* rtt);
 void rtt_update(struct rtt_info* rtt, int ms);
 
 /**
- * Update the statistics with a new timout expired observation.
+ * Update the statistics with a new timeout expired observation.
  * @param rtt: round trip statistics structure.
  * @param orig: original rtt time given for the query that timed out.
  * 	Used to calculate the maximum responsible backed off time that
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/storage/lookup3.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/storage/lookup3.c
index de288587bdb..ddcb56e7470 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/storage/lookup3.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/storage/lookup3.c
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ uint32_t hashlittle( const void *key, size_t length, uint32_t initval)
      * rest of the string.  Every machine with memory protection I've seen
      * does it on word boundaries, so is OK with this.  But VALGRIND will
      * still catch it and complain.  The masking trick does make the hash
-     * noticably faster for short strings (like English words).
+     * noticeably faster for short strings (like English words).
      */
 #ifndef VALGRIND
 
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ void hashlittle2(
      * rest of the string.  Every machine with memory protection I've seen
      * does it on word boundaries, so is OK with this.  But VALGRIND will
      * still catch it and complain.  The masking trick does make the hash
-     * noticably faster for short strings (like English words).
+     * noticeably faster for short strings (like English words).
      */
 #ifndef VALGRIND
 
@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ uint32_t hashbig( const void *key, size_t length, uint32_t initval)
      * rest of the string.  Every machine with memory protection I've seen
      * does it on word boundaries, so is OK with this.  But VALGRIND will
      * still catch it and complain.  The masking trick does make the hash
-     * noticably faster for short strings (like English words).
+     * noticeably faster for short strings (like English words).
      */
 #ifndef VALGRIND
 
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ void driver2()
     {
       for (j=0; j<8; ++j)   /*------------------------ for each input bit, */
       {
-	for (m=1; m<8; ++m) /*------------ for serveral possible initvals, */
+	for (m=1; m<8; ++m) /*------------ for several possible initvals, */
 	{
 	  for (l=0; l<HASHSTATE; ++l)
 	    e[l]=f[l]=g[l]=h[l]=x[l]=y[l]=~((uint32_t)0);
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/tube.h b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/tube.h
index 9ec50af3849..6cc60502b34 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/tube.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/tube.h
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct tube {
 
 	/** background write queue, commpoint to write results back */
 	struct comm_point* res_com;
-	/** are we curently writing a result, 0 if not, else bytecount into
+	/** are we currently writing a result, 0 if not, else bytecount into
 	 * the res_list first entry. */
 	size_t res_write;
 	/** list of outstanding results to be written back */
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/winsock_event.h b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/winsock_event.h
index f6426574347..d386a699fa5 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/util/winsock_event.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/util/winsock_event.h
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct event {
 	int stick_events;
 
 	/** true if this event is a signaling WSAEvent by the user. 
-	 * User created and user closed WSAEvent. Only signaled/unsigneled,
+	 * User created and user closed WSAEvent. Only signaled/unsignaled,
 	 * no read/write/distinctions needed. */
 	int is_signal;
 	/** used during callbacks to see which events were just checked */
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/autotrust.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/autotrust.c
index e63b086e6a0..e3769b1fcba 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/autotrust.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/autotrust.c
@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ int autr_process_prime(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	if(!verify_dnskey(env, ve, tp, dnskey_rrset)) {
 		verbose(VERB_ALGO, "autotrust: dnskey did not verify.");
 		/* only increase failure count if this is not the first prime,
-		 * this means there was a previous succesful probe */
+		 * this means there was a previous successful probe */
 		if(tp->autr->last_success) {
 			tp->autr->query_failed += 1;
 			autr_write_file(env, tp);
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_neg.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_neg.c
index b1ff8d9a1ba..ab31f483ef4 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_neg.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_neg.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  *
  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
  * The functions help with aggressive negative caching.
- * This creates new denials of existance, and proofs for absence of types
+ * This creates new denials of existence, and proofs for absence of types
  * from cached NSEC records.
  */
 #include "config.h"
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_neg.h b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_neg.h
index 967d1a70f9c..bf3a2471c78 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_neg.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_neg.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  *
  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
  * The functions help with aggressive negative caching.
- * This creates new denials of existance, and proofs for absence of types
+ * This creates new denials of existence, and proofs for absence of types
  * from cached NSEC records.
  */
 
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec.c
index bdfe3c8fa18..13ba6cd6baa 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * validator/val_nsec.c - validator NSEC denial of existance functions.
+ * validator/val_nsec.c - validator NSEC denial of existence functions.
  *
  * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  *
  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
  * The functions help with NSEC checking, the different NSEC proofs
- * for denial of existance, and proofs for presence of types.
+ * for denial of existence, and proofs for presence of types.
  */
 #include "config.h"
 #include "validator/val_nsec.h"
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 		return sec_status_insecure;
 	}
 
-	/* NSEC proof did not conlusively point to DS or no DS */
+	/* NSEC proof did not conclusively point to DS or no DS */
 	return sec_status_unchecked;
 }
 
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec.h b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec.h
index f680d08c0ae..c031c9a3b85 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * validator/val_nsec.h - validator NSEC denial of existance functions.
+ * validator/val_nsec.h - validator NSEC denial of existence functions.
  *
  * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  *
  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
  * The functions help with NSEC checking, the different NSEC proofs
- * for denial of existance, and proofs for presence of types.
+ * for denial of existence, and proofs for presence of types.
  */
 
 #ifndef VALIDATOR_VAL_NSEC_H
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ struct key_entry_key;
 /**
  * Check DS absence.
  * There is a NODATA reply to a DS that needs checking.
- * NSECs can prove this is not a delegation point, or sucessfully prove
+ * NSECs can prove this is not a delegation point, or successfully prove
  * that there is no DS. Or this fails.
  *
  * @param env: module env for rrsig verification routines.
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.c
index 80ca4d0ba36..26d7f2df4ab 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * validator/val_nsec3.c - validator NSEC3 denial of existance functions.
+ * validator/val_nsec3.c - validator NSEC3 denial of existence functions.
  *
  * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  *
  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
  * The functions help with NSEC3 checking, the different NSEC3 proofs
- * for denial of existance, and proofs for presence of types.
+ * for denial of existence, and proofs for presence of types.
  */
 #include "config.h"
 #include <ctype.h>
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.h b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.h
index d619d672d12..69ba78d8323 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_nsec3.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * validator/val_nsec3.h - validator NSEC3 denial of existance functions.
+ * validator/val_nsec3.h - validator NSEC3 denial of existence functions.
  *
  * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
  *
  * This file contains helper functions for the validator module.
  * The functions help with NSEC3 checking, the different NSEC3 proofs
- * for denial of existance, and proofs for presence of types.
+ * for denial of existence, and proofs for presence of types.
  *
  * NSEC3
  *                      1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int nsec3_hash_cmp(const void* c1, const void* c2);
  * Used internally by the nsec3 proof functions in this file.
  * published to enable unit testing of hash algorithms and cache.
  *
- * @param table: the cache table. Must be inited at start.
+ * @param table: the cache table. Must be initialised at start.
  * @param region: scratch region to use for allocation.
  * 	This region holds the tree, if you wipe the region, reinit the tree.
  * @param buf: temporary buffer.
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_utils.h b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_utils.h
index cdb87697e1c..051824abaf8 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_utils.h
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/val_utils.h
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset);
  * Find DS denial message in cache.  Saves new qstate allocation and allows
  * the validator to use partial content which is not enough to construct a
  * message for network (or user) consumption.  Without SOA for example,
- * which is a common occurence in the unbound code since the referrals contain
+ * which is a common occurrence in the unbound code since the referrals contain
  * NSEC/NSEC3 rrs without the SOA element, thus do not allow synthesis of a
  * full negative reply, but do allow synthesis of sufficient proof.
  * @param env: query env with caches and time.
diff --git a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/validator.c b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/validator.c
index f8b429e52b5..db4383bedcd 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/validator.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/unbound/validator/validator.c
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ validate_nodata_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
 	/* Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to
 	 * validate. */
 	/* (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here --
-	 * instead, they are chased down into indiviual CNAME validations,
+	 * instead, they are chased down into individual CNAME validations,
 	 * and at the end of the cname chain a POSITIVE, or CNAME_NOANSWER 
 	 * validation.) */
 	
@@ -1597,7 +1597,7 @@ processFindKey(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id)
 		target_key_name) != 0) {
 		/* check if there is a cache entry : pick up an NSEC if
 		 * there is no DS, check if that NSEC has DS-bit unset, and
-		 * thus can disprove the secure delagation we seek.
+		 * thus can disprove the secure delegation we seek.
 		 * We can then use that NSEC even in the absence of a SOA
 		 * record that would be required by the iterator to supply
 		 * a completely protocol-correct response. 
@@ -1829,7 +1829,7 @@ processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
  * @return  true if there is no DLV.
  * 	false: processing is finished for the validator operate().
  * 	This function may exit in three ways:
- *         o	no DLV (agressive cache), so insecure. (true)
+ *         o	no DLV (aggressive cache), so insecure. (true)
  *         o	error - stop processing (false)
  *         o	DLV lookup was started, stop processing (false)
  */