summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authortedu <tedu@openbsd.org>2014-03-24 17:17:12 +0000
committertedu <tedu@openbsd.org>2014-03-24 17:17:12 +0000
commit9111a76658caf7862a4b5b782a1d3085eb6535f1 (patch)
tree8cdd43d31e04e044264364f51cfd83b7db54db71
parentOnly need to call tlb_probe() once per pair, instead of once per page. (diff)
downloadwireguard-openbsd-9111a76658caf7862a4b5b782a1d3085eb6535f1.tar.xz
wireguard-openbsd-9111a76658caf7862a4b5b782a1d3085eb6535f1.zip
The secret of steel has always carried with it a mystery. You must learn
its riddle, Conan. You must learn its discipline. For no one, no one in this world can you trust. Not men, not women, not beasts.
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/DISCLAIMER18
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/Makefile32
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/clean_exit.c40
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/diag.c72
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/eval.c134
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/hosts_access.3139
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/hosts_access.5512
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/hosts_access.c511
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/hosts_ctl.c36
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/hosts_options.5236
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/misc.c113
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/options.c629
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/percent_m.c42
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/percent_x.c84
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/refuse.c30
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/rfc1413.381
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/rfc931.c267
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/shell_cmd.c91
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/shlib_version2
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/socket.c278
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/tcpd.h208
-rw-r--r--lib/libwrap/update.c117
22 files changed, 0 insertions, 3672 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/DISCLAIMER b/lib/libwrap/DISCLAIMER
deleted file mode 100644
index 2d06cb8a2b3..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/DISCLAIMER
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-$OpenBSD: DISCLAIMER,v 1.1 2001/06/04 07:33:53 deraadt Exp $
-
-/************************************************************************
-* Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema. All rights reserved. Some individual
-* files may be covered by other copyrights.
-*
-* This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at
-* Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991,
-* 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995.
-*
-* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-* modification, are permitted provided that this entire copyright notice
-* is duplicated in all such copies.
-*
-* This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied
-* warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of
-* merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose.
-************************************************************************/
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/Makefile b/lib/libwrap/Makefile
deleted file mode 100644
index aa1ca5a263d..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/Makefile
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2013/11/13 22:37:00 deraadt Exp $
-
-LIB= wrap
-SRCS= hosts_access.c options.c shell_cmd.c rfc931.c eval.c \
- hosts_ctl.c refuse.c percent_x.c clean_exit.c \
- socket.c update.c misc.c diag.c percent_m.c
-HDRS= tcpd.h
-
-# Configuration options for libwrap.
-CFLAGS+=-DPROCESS_OPTIONS -DFACILITY=LOG_AUTH -DSEVERITY=LOG_INFO \
- -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=10 -DHOSTS_ACCESS -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME \
- -DHOSTS_DENY=\"/etc/hosts.deny\" -DHOSTS_ALLOW=\"/etc/hosts.allow\" \
- -DNETGROUP -DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -D_TCPD_PRIVATE
-CFLAGS+=-DINET6
-
-MAN= hosts_access.3 hosts_access.5 hosts_options.5 rfc1413.3
-MLINKS+=hosts_access.5 hosts.allow.5
-MLINKS+=hosts_access.5 hosts.deny.5
-MLINKS+=hosts_access.3 hosts_ctl.3
-MLINKS+=hosts_access.3 request_init.3
-MLINKS+=hosts_access.3 request_set.3
-
-includes:
- @cd ${.CURDIR}; for i in $(HDRS); do \
- j="cmp -s $$i ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/$$i || \
- ${INSTALL} ${INSTALL_COPY} -o ${BINOWN} -g ${BINGRP} -m 444 $$i \
- ${DESTDIR}/usr/include"; \
- echo $$j; \
- eval "$$j"; \
- done
-
-.include <bsd.lib.mk>
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/clean_exit.c b/lib/libwrap/clean_exit.c
deleted file mode 100644
index ef20a166be5..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/clean_exit.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clean_exit.c,v 1.3 2009/10/27 23:59:30 deraadt Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * clean_exit() cleans up and terminates the program. It should be called
- * instead of exit() when for some reason the real network daemon will not or
- * cannot be run. Reason: in the case of a datagram-oriented service we must
- * discard the not-yet received data from the client. Otherwise, inetd will
- * see the same datagram again and again, and go into a loop.
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* clean_exit - clean up and exit */
-
-void clean_exit(request)
-struct request_info *request;
-{
-
- /*
- * In case of unconnected protocols we must eat up the not-yet received
- * data or inetd will loop.
- */
-
- if (request->sink)
- request->sink(request->fd);
-
- /*
- * Be kind to the inetd. We already reported the problem via the syslogd,
- * and there is no need for additional garbage in the logfile.
- */
-
- sleep(5);
- exit(0);
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/diag.c b/lib/libwrap/diag.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 9601e165a4c..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/diag.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: diag.c,v 1.6 2011/05/30 18:48:33 martynas Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * Routines to report various classes of problems. Each report is decorated
- * with the current context (file name and line number), if available.
- *
- * tcpd_warn() reports a problem and proceeds.
- *
- * tcpd_jump() reports a problem and jumps.
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-/* System libraries */
-
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <setjmp.h>
-
-/* Local stuff */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-struct tcpd_context tcpd_context;
-jmp_buf tcpd_buf;
-
-static void tcpd_diag(int, char *, char *, va_list)
- __attribute__((__format__(__printf__, 3, 0)));
-
-/* tcpd_diag - centralize error reporter */
-
-static void tcpd_diag(severity, tag, format, ap)
-int severity;
-char *tag;
-char *format;
-va_list ap;
-{
- char fmt[BUFSIZ];
-
- if (tcpd_context.file)
- snprintf(fmt, sizeof fmt, "%s: %s, line %d: %s",
- tag, tcpd_context.file, tcpd_context.line, format);
- else
- snprintf(fmt, sizeof fmt, "%s: %s", tag, format);
- vsyslog(severity, fmt, ap);
-}
-
-/* tcpd_warn - report problem of some sort and proceed */
-
-/* PRINTFLIKE1 */
-void tcpd_warn(char *format, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
-
- va_start(ap, format);
- tcpd_diag(LOG_ERR, "warning", format, ap);
- va_end(ap);
-}
-
-/* tcpd_jump - report serious problem and jump */
-
-/* PRINTFLIKE1 */
-void tcpd_jump(char *format, ...)
-{
- va_list ap;
-
- va_start(ap, format);
- tcpd_diag(LOG_ERR, "error", format, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- longjmp(tcpd_buf, AC_ERROR);
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/eval.c b/lib/libwrap/eval.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 3151d85df45..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/eval.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: eval.c,v 1.4 2009/10/27 23:59:30 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * Routines for controlled evaluation of host names, user names, and so on.
- * They are, in fact, wrappers around the functions that are specific for
- * the sockets or TLI programming interfaces. The request_info and host_info
- * structures are used for result cacheing.
- *
- * These routines allows us to postpone expensive operations until their
- * results are really needed. Examples are hostname lookups and double
- * checks, or username lookups. Information that cannot be retrieved is
- * given the value "unknown" ("paranoid" in case of hostname problems).
- *
- * When ALWAYS_HOSTNAME is off, hostname lookup is done only when required by
- * tcpd paranoid mode, by access control patterns, or by %letter expansions.
- *
- * When ALWAYS_RFC931 mode is off, user lookup is done only when required by
- * access control patterns or %letter expansions.
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-/* System libraries. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-/* Local stuff. */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
- /*
- * When a string has the value STRING_UNKNOWN, it means: don't bother, I
- * tried to look up the data but it was unavailable for some reason. When a
- * host name has the value STRING_PARANOID it means there was a name/address
- * conflict.
- */
-char unknown[] = STRING_UNKNOWN;
-char paranoid[] = STRING_PARANOID;
-
-/* eval_user - look up user name */
-
-char *eval_user(request)
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- if (request->user[0] == 0) {
- strlcpy(request->user, unknown, sizeof(request->user));
- if (request->sink == 0 && request->client->sin && request->server->sin)
- rfc931(request->client->sin, request->server->sin, request->user);
- }
- return (request->user);
-}
-
-/* eval_hostaddr - look up printable address */
-
-char *eval_hostaddr(host)
-struct host_info *host;
-{
- if (host->addr[0] == 0) {
- strlcpy(host->addr, unknown, sizeof(host->addr));
- if (host->request->hostaddr != 0)
- host->request->hostaddr(host);
- }
- return (host->addr);
-}
-
-/* eval_hostname - look up host name */
-
-char *eval_hostname(host)
-struct host_info *host;
-{
- if (host->name[0] == 0) {
- strlcpy(host->name, unknown, sizeof(host->name));
- if (host->request->hostname != 0)
- host->request->hostname(host);
- }
- return (host->name);
-}
-
-/* eval_hostinfo - return string with host name (preferred) or address */
-
-char *eval_hostinfo(host)
-struct host_info *host;
-{
- char *hostname;
-
-#ifndef ALWAYS_HOSTNAME /* no implicit host lookups */
- if (host->name[0] == 0)
- return (eval_hostaddr(host));
-#endif
- hostname = eval_hostname(host);
- if (HOSTNAME_KNOWN(hostname)) {
- return (host->name);
- } else {
- return (eval_hostaddr(host));
- }
-}
-
-/* eval_client - return string with as much about the client as we know */
-
-char *eval_client(request)
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- static char both[2 * STRING_LENGTH];
- char *hostinfo = eval_hostinfo(request->client);
-
-#ifndef ALWAYS_RFC931 /* no implicit user lookups */
- if (request->user[0] == 0)
- return (hostinfo);
-#endif
- if (STR_NE(eval_user(request), unknown)) {
- snprintf(both, sizeof both, "%s@%s", request->user, hostinfo);
- return (both);
- } else {
- return (hostinfo);
- }
-}
-
-/* eval_server - return string with as much about the server as we know */
-
-char *eval_server(request)
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- static char both[2 * STRING_LENGTH];
- char *host = eval_hostinfo(request->server);
- char *daemon = eval_daemon(request);
-
- if (STR_NE(host, unknown)) {
- snprintf(both, sizeof both, "%s@%s", daemon, host);
- return (both);
- } else {
- return (daemon);
- }
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.3 b/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.3
deleted file mode 100644
index 1b22f15db68..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.3
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: hosts_access.3,v 1.15 2007/05/31 19:19:39 jmc Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1997, Jason Downs. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
-.\" OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
-.\" WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
-.\" DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
-.\" INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
-.\" (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-.\" SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
-.\" CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: May 31 2007 $
-.Dt HOSTS_ACCESS 3
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm hosts_access ,
-.Nm hosts_ctl ,
-.Nm request_init ,
-.Nm request_set
-.Nd tcp wrapper access control library
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Fd #include <sys/types.h>
-.Fd #include <tcpd.h>
-.Vt extern int allow_severity;
-.Vt extern int deny_severity;
-.Ft struct request_info *
-.Fn request_init "struct request_info *request" "int key" value ... 0
-.Ft struct request_info *
-.Fn request_set "struct request_info *request" "int key" value ... 0
-.Ft int
-.Fn hosts_access "struct request_info *request"
-.Ft int
-.Fn hosts_ctl "char *daemon" "char *client_name" "char *client_addr" "char *client_user"
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-The routines described in this document are part of the
-.Nm libwrap.a
-library.
-They implement a rule-based access control language with
-optional shell commands that are executed when a rule fires.
-.Pp
-.Fn request_init
-initializes a structure with information about a client
-request.
-.Fn request_set
-updates an already initialized request structure.
-Both functions take a
-variable-length list of key-value pairs and return their first argument.
-The argument lists are terminated with a zero key value.
-All string-valued arguments are copied.
-The expected keys (and corresponding value types) are:
-.Bl -tag -width XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
-.It "RQ_FILE (int)"
-The file descriptor associated with the request.
-.It "RQ_CLIENT_NAME (char *)"
-The client host name.
-.It "RQ_CLIENT_ADDR (char *)"
-A printable representation of the client network address.
-.It "RQ_CLIENT_SIN (struct sockaddr_in *)"
-An internal representation of the client network address and port.
-The contents of the structure are not copied.
-.It "RQ_SERVER_NAME (char *)"
-The hostname associated with the server endpoint address.
-.It "RQ_SERVER_ADDR (char *)"
-A printable representation of the server endpoint address.
-.It "RQ_SERVER_SIN (struct sockaddr_in *)"
-An internal representation of the server endpoint address and port.
-The contents of the structure are not copied.
-.It "RQ_DAEMON (char *)"
-The name of the daemon process running on the server host.
-.It "RQ_USER (char *)"
-The name of the user on whose behalf the client host makes the request.
-.El
-.Pp
-.Fn hosts_access
-consults the access control tables described in the
-.Xr hosts_access 5
-manual page.
-When internal endpoint information is available, host names
-and client user names are looked up on demand, using the request structure
-as a cache.
-.Fn hosts_access
-returns zero if access should be denied.
-.Pp
-.Fn hosts_ctl
-is a wrapper around the
-.Fn request_init
-and
-.Fn hosts_access
-routines with a perhaps more convenient interface (though it does not
-pass on enough information to support automated client username
-lookups).
-The client host address, client host name and username
-arguments should contain valid data or STRING_UNKNOWN.
-.Fn hosts_ctl
-returns zero if access should be denied.
-.Pp
-The
-.Fa allow_severity
-and
-.Fa deny_severity
-variables determine
-how accepted and rejected requests may be logged.
-They must be provided
-by the caller and may be modified by rules in the access control tables.
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width /etc/hosts.allow -compact
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
-Access control table (allow list)
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
-Access control table (deny list)
-.El
-.Sh DIAGNOSTICS
-Problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
-.Xr hosts_options 5
-.Sh AUTHORS
-.Bd -unfilled -offset indent
-Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
-Department of Mathematics and Computing Science
-Eindhoven University of Technology
-Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513,
-5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
-.Ed
-.\" @(#) hosts_access.3 1.8 96/02/11 17:01:26
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.5 b/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.5
deleted file mode 100644
index 33729542003..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.5
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,512 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: hosts_access.5,v 1.25 2013/07/16 07:15:39 jmc Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1997, Jason Downs. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
-.\" OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
-.\" WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
-.\" DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
-.\" INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
-.\" (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-.\" SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
-.\" CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2013 $
-.Dt HOSTS_ACCESS 5
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm hosts_access ,
-.Nm hosts.deny ,
-.Nm hosts.allow
-.Nd tcp wrapper format of host access control files
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-This manual page describes a simple access control language that is
-based on client (host name/address, user name), and server (process
-name, host name/address) patterns.
-Examples are given at the end.
-The impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
-quick introduction.
-.Pp
-An extended version of the access control language is described in the
-.Xr hosts_options 5
-document.
-.\" The extensions are turned on at
-.\" program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS.
-.Pp
-In the following text,
-.Ar daemon
-is the process name of a network daemon process, and
-.Ar client
-is the name and/or address of a host requesting service.
-Network daemon process names are specified in the inetd configuration file.
-.Sh ACCESS CONTROL FILES
-The access control software consults two files.
-The search stops at the first match:
-.Bl -bullet -width XXX
-.It
-Access will be granted when a (daemon,client) pair matches an entry in
-the
-.Pa /etc/hosts.allow
-file.
-.It
-Otherwise, access will be denied when a (daemon,client) pair matches an
-entry in the
-.Pa /etc/hosts.deny
-file.
-.It
-Otherwise, access will be granted.
-.El
-.Pp
-A non-existent access control file is treated as if it were an empty
-file.
-Thus, access control can be turned off by providing no access control files.
-.Sh ACCESS CONTROL RULES
-Each access control file consists of zero or more lines of text.
-These lines are processed in order of appearance.
-The search terminates when a match is found.
-.Bl -bullet -width XXX
-.It
-A newline character is ignored when it is preceded by a backslash
-character.
-This permits you to break up long lines so that they are easier to edit.
-.It
-Blank lines or lines that begin with a
-.Sq #
-character are ignored.
-This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
-are easier to read.
-.It
-All other lines should satisfy the following format, things between []
-being optional:
-.Pp
-.Dl daemon_list\ \&: client_list [\ \&: shell_command\ \&]
-.El
-.Pp
-.Ar daemon_list
-is a list of one or more daemon process names
-.Pf ( Va argv[0]
-values) or wildcards (see below).
-.Pp
-.Ar client_list
-is a list of one or more host names, host addresses, patterns or wildcards (see
-below) that will be matched against the client host name or address.
-When a client_list item needs to include colon characters (for IPv6 addresses),
-the item needs to be wrapped with square brackets.
-.Pp
-The more complex forms
-.Ar daemon@host
-and
-.Ar user@host
-are
-explained in the sections on server endpoint patterns and on client
-username lookups, respectively.
-.Pp
-List elements should be separated by blanks and/or commas.
-.Pp
-With the exception of YP netgroup lookups, all access control
-checks are case insensitive.
-.Sh PATTERNS
-The access control language implements the following patterns:
-.Bl -bullet -width XXX
-.It
-A string that begins with a
-.Sq \&.
-character.
-A host name is matched if
-the last components of its name match the specified pattern.
-For example, the pattern
-.Sq .tue.nl
-matches the host name
-.Sq wzv.win.tue.nl .
-.It
-A string that ends with a
-.Sq \&.
-character.
-A host address is matched if its first numeric fields match the given string.
-For example, the pattern
-.Sq 131.155.
-matches the address of (almost) every host on the Eind\%hoven University
-network (131.155.x.x).
-.It
-A string that begins with an
-.Sq @
-character is treated as a YP netgroup name.
-A host name is matched if it is a host member of the specified netgroup.
-Netgroup matches are not supported for daemon process names or for client
-user names.
-.It
-An expression of the form
-.Sq n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m
-is interpreted as a
-.Sq net/mask
-pair.
-A host address is matched if
-.Sq net
-is equal to the bitwise AND of the address and the
-.Sq mask .
-For example, the net/mask
-pattern
-.Sq 131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0
-matches every address in the range
-.Sq 131.155.72.0
-through
-.Sq 131.155.73.255 .
-Note that the
-.Sq m.m.m.m
-portion must always be specified.
-.It
-An expression of the form
-.Sq ipv6-addr/ipv6-mask
-is interpreted as a masked IPv6 address match,
-just like a masked IPv4 address match (see above).
-Note that the
-.Sq ipv6-mask
-portion must always be specified.
-.It
-An expression of the form
-.Sq ipv6-addr/prefixlen
-is interpreted as a masked IPv6 address match
-(with mask specified by numeric prefixlen),
-just like a masked IPv4 address match (see above).
-Note that the
-.Sq prefixlen
-portion must always be specified.
-.El
-.Sh WILDCARDS
-The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
-.Bl -tag -width XXXXXXX
-.It ALL
-The universal wildcard, always matches.
-.It LOCAL
-Matches any host whose name does not contain a dot character.
-.It UNKNOWN
-Matches any user whose name is unknown, and matches any host whose name
-or address are unknown.
-This pattern should be used with care:
-host names may be unavailable due to temporary name server problems.
-A network address will be unavailable when the software cannot figure out
-what type of network it is talking to.
-.It KNOWN
-Matches any user whose name is known, and matches any host whose name
-and address are known.
-This pattern should be used with care:
-host names may be unavailable due to temporary name server problems.
-A network address will be unavailable when the software cannot figure out
-what type of network it is talking to.
-.\" .IP PARANOID
-.\" Matches any host whose name does not match its address.
-.\" When tcpd is built with -DPARANOID (default mode), it drops requests
-.\" from such clients even before looking at the access control tables.
-.\" Build without -DPARANOID when you want more control over such requests.
-.El
-.Sh OPERATORS
-.Ss EXCEPT
-Intended use is of the form:
-.Sq list_1 EXCEPT list_2 ;
-this construct matches anything that matches
-.Ar list_1
-unless it matches
-.Ar list_2 .
-The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
-client_lists.
-The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control
-language would permit the use of parentheses,
-.Sq a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c
-would parse as
-.Sq (a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c)) .
-.Sh SHELL COMMANDS
-If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that
-command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section).
-The result is executed by a
-.Pa /bin/sh
-child process with standard
-input, output and error connected to
-.Pa /dev/null .
-Specify an
-.Sq &
-at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has completed.
-.Pp
-Shell commands should not rely on the PATH setting of the inetd.
-Instead, they should use absolute path names, or they should begin with
-an explicit PATH=whatever statement.
-.Pp
-The
-.Xr hosts_options 5
-document describes an alternative language
-that uses the shell command field in a different and incompatible way.
-.Sh % EXPANSIONS
-The following expansions are available within shell commands:
-.Bl -tag -width XXXXXXX
-.It "%a (%A)"
-The client (server) host address.
-.It %c
-Client information: user@host, user@address, a host name, or just an
-address, depending on how much information is available.
-.It %d
-The daemon process name
-.Pf ( Va argv[0]
-value).
-.It "%h (%H)"
-The client (server) host name or address, if the host name is
-unavailable.
-.It "%n (%N)"
-The client (server) host name (or "unknown" or "paranoid").
-.It %p
-The daemon process ID.
-.It %s
-Server information: daemon@host, daemon@address, or just a daemon name,
-depending on how much information is available.
-.It %u
-The client user name (or "unknown").
-.It %%
-Expands to a single
-.Sq %
-character.
-.El
-.Pp
-Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
-underscores.
-.Sh SERVER ENDPOINT PATTERNS
-In order to distinguish clients by the network address that they
-connect to, use patterns of the form:
-.Pp
-.Dl process_name@host_pattern\ \&: client_list ...
-.Pp
-Patterns like these can be used when the machine has different internet
-addresses with different internet hostnames.
-Service providers can use
-this facility to offer FTP, GOPHER or WWW archives with internet names
-that may even belong to different organizations.
-See also the
-.Sq twist
-option in the
-.Xr hosts_options 5
-document.
-Many systems can have more than one internet address on one physical
-interface; with other systems you may have to resort to SLIP or PPP
-pseudo interfaces that live in a dedicated network address space.
-.Pp
-The host_pattern obeys the same syntax rules as host names and
-addresses in client_list context.
-Usually, server endpoint information
-is available only with connection-oriented services.
-.Sh CLIENT USERNAME LOOKUP
-When the client host supports the RFC 931 protocol or one of its
-descendants (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) the wrapper programs can retrieve
-additional information about the owner of a connection.
-Client username information, when available, is logged together with the
-client host name, and can be used to match patterns like:
-.Pp
-.Dl daemon_list\ \&: ... user_pattern@host_pattern ...
-.Pp
-The daemon wrappers can be configured at compile time to perform
-rule-driven username lookups (default) or to always interrogate the
-client host.
-In the case of rule-driven username lookups, the above
-rule would cause username lookup only when both the
-.Ar daemon_list
-and the
-.Ar host_pattern
-match.
-.Pp
-A user pattern has the same syntax as a daemon process pattern, so the
-same wildcards apply (netgroup membership is not supported).
-One should not get carried away with username lookups, though.
-.Bl -bullet -width XXX
-.It
-The client username information cannot be trusted when it is needed
-most, i.e., when the client system has been compromised.
-In general, ALL and (UN)KNOWN are the only user name patterns that make sense.
-.It
-Username lookups are possible only with TCP-based services, and only
-when the client host runs a suitable daemon; in all other cases the
-result is "unknown".
-.\" .It
-.\" A well-known UNIX kernel bug may cause loss of service when username
-.\" lookups are blocked by a firewall. The wrapper README document
-.\" describes a procedure to find out if your kernel has this bug.
-.It
-Username lookups may cause noticeable delays for non-UNIX users.
-The default timeout for username lookups is 10 seconds: too short to cope
-with slow networks, but long enough to irritate PC users.
-.El
-.Pp
-Selective username lookups can alleviate the last problem.
-For example, a rule like:
-.Pp
-.Dl daemon_list\ \&: @pcnetgroup ALL@ALL
-.Pp
-would match members of the pc netgroup without doing username lookups,
-but would perform username lookups with all other systems.
-.Sh DETECTING ADDRESS SPOOFING ATTACKS
-A flaw in the sequence number generator of many TCP/IP implementations
-allows intruders to easily impersonate trusted hosts and to break in
-via, for example, the remote shell service.
-The IDENT (RFC 931 etc.\&)
-service can be used to detect such and other host address spoofing attacks.
-.Pp
-Before accepting a client request, the wrappers can use the IDENT
-service to find out that the client did not send the request at all.
-When the client host provides IDENT service, a negative IDENT lookup
-result (the client matches
-.Sq UNKNOWN@host )
-is strong evidence of a host spoofing attack.
-.Pp
-A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches
-.Sq KNOWN@host )
-is less trustworthy.
-It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
-client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
-harder than spoofing just a client connection.
-It may also be that the client\'s IDENT server is lying.
-.Pp
-Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services.
-.Sh EXAMPLES
-The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
-policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss.
-Although the language
-uses two access control tables, the most common policies can be
-implemented with one of the tables being trivial or even empty.
-.Pp
-When reading the examples below it is important to realize that the
-allow table is scanned before the deny table, that the search
-terminates when a match is found, and that access is granted when no
-match is found at all.
-.Pp
-The examples use host and domain names.
-They can be improved by
-including address and/or network/netmask information, to reduce the
-impact of temporary name server lookup failures.
-.Sh MOSTLY CLOSED
-In this case, access is denied by default.
-Only explicitly authorized hosts are permitted access.
-.Pp
-The default policy (no access) is implemented with a trivial deny
-file:
-.Pp
-.Pa /etc/hosts.deny :
-.Pp
-.Dl ALL: ALL
-.Pp
-This denies all services to all hosts, unless they are permitted access
-by entries in the allow file.
-.Pp
-The explicitly authorized hosts are listed in the allow file.
-For example:
-.Pp
-.Pa /etc/hosts.allow :
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup
-ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
-.Ed
-.Pp
-The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no
-.Sq \&.
-in the host name) and from members of the
-.Ar some_netgroup
-netgroup.
-The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
-.Ar foobar.edu
-domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
-.Ar terminalserver.foobar.edu .
-.Sh MOSTLY OPEN
-Here, access is granted by default; only explicitly specified hosts are
-refused service.
-.Pp
-The default policy (access granted) makes the allow file redundant so
-that it can be omitted.
-The explicitly non-authorized hosts are listed in the deny file.
-For example:
-.Pp
-.Pa /etc/hosts.deny :
-.Bd -unfilled -offset indent
-ALL: some.host.name, .some.domain
-ALL EXCEPT in.fingerd: other.host.name, .other.domain
-.Ed
-.Pp
-The first rule denies some hosts and domains all services; the second
-rule still permits finger requests from other hosts and domains.
-.Sh BOOBY TRAPS
-The next example permits tftp requests from hosts in the local domain
-(notice the leading dot).
-Requests from any other hosts are denied.
-Instead of the requested file, a finger probe is sent to the offending host.
-The result is mailed to the superuser.
-.Pp
-.Pa /etc/hosts.allow :
-.Pp
-.Dl tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain
-.Pp
-.Pa /etc/hosts.deny :
-.Bd -unfilled -offset indent
-tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \e
- /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) &
-.Ed
-.Pp
-The
-.Nm safe_finger
-command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be
-installed in a suitable place.
-It limits possible damage from data sent by the remote finger server.
-It gives better protection than the standard finger command.
-.Pp
-The expansion of the %h (client host) and %d (service name) sequences
-is described in the section on shell commands.
-.Pp
-Warning: do not booby-trap your finger daemon, unless you are prepared
-for infinite finger loops.
-.Pp
-On network firewall systems this trick can be carried even further.
-The typical network firewall only provides a limited set of services to
-the outer world.
-All other services can be "bugged" just like the above tftp example.
-The result is an excellent early-warning system.
-.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width /etc/hosts.allow -compact
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
-Access control table (allow list)
-.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
-Access control table (deny list)
-.El
-.Sh DIAGNOSTICS
-An error is reported when a syntax error is found in a host access
-control rule; when the length of an access control rule exceeds the
-capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
-terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
-expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
-that shouldn\'t.
-All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr tcpd 8 ,
-.Xr tcpdchk 8 ,
-.Xr tcpdmatch 8
-.Sh AUTHORS
-.Bd -unfilled -offset indent
-Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
-Department of Mathematics and Computing Science
-Eindhoven University of Technology
-Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513,
-5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
-.Ed
-.Sh BUGS
-If a name server lookup times out, the host name will not be available
-to the access control software, even though the host is registered.
-.Pp
-Domain name server lookups are case insensitive; YP
-netgroup lookups are case sensitive.
-.Pp
-The total length of an entry can be no more than 2047 characters long,
-including the final newline.
-.\" @(#) hosts_access.5 1.20 95/01/30 19:51:46
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.c b/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.c
deleted file mode 100644
index fbde0025fb0..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,511 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hosts_access.c,v 1.12 2009/10/27 23:59:30 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * This module implements a simple access control language that is based on
- * host (or domain) names, NIS (host) netgroup names, IP addresses (or
- * network numbers) and daemon process names. When a match is found the
- * search is terminated, and depending on whether PROCESS_OPTIONS is defined,
- * a list of options is executed or an optional shell command is executed.
- *
- * Host and user names are looked up on demand, provided that suitable endpoint
- * information is available as sockaddr_in structures or TLI netbufs. As a
- * side effect, the pattern matching process may change the contents of
- * request structure fields.
- *
- * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3).
- *
- * Compile with -DNETGROUP if your library provides support for netgroups.
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-/* System libraries. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#ifdef INET6
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#endif
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <setjmp.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#ifdef NETGROUP
-#include <netgroup.h>
-#endif
-#include <netdb.h>
-
-
-/* Local stuff. */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* Error handling. */
-
-extern jmp_buf tcpd_buf;
-
-/* Delimiters for lists of daemons or clients. */
-
-static char sep[] = ", \t\r\n";
-
-/* Constants to be used in assignments only, not in comparisons... */
-
-#define YES 1
-#define NO 0
-
- /*
- * These variables are globally visible so that they can be redirected in
- * verification mode.
- */
-
-char *hosts_allow_table = HOSTS_ALLOW;
-char *hosts_deny_table = HOSTS_DENY;
-int hosts_access_verbose = 0;
-
- /*
- * In a long-running process, we are not at liberty to just go away.
- */
-
-int resident = (-1); /* -1, 0: unknown; +1: yes */
-
-/* Forward declarations. */
-
-static int table_match(char *, struct request_info *);
-static int list_match(char *, struct request_info *,
- int (*)(char *, struct request_info *));
-static int server_match(char *, struct request_info *);
-static int client_match(char *, struct request_info *);
-static int host_match(char *, struct host_info *);
-static int string_match(char *, char *);
-static int masked_match(char *, char *, char *);
-static int masked_match4(char *, char *, char *);
-#ifdef INET6
-static int masked_match6(char *, char *, char *);
-#endif
-
-/* Size of logical line buffer. */
-
-#define BUFLEN 2048
-
-/* hosts_access - host access control facility */
-
-int hosts_access(request)
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- int verdict;
-
- /*
- * If the (daemon, client) pair is matched by an entry in the file
- * /etc/hosts.allow, access is granted. Otherwise, if the (daemon,
- * client) pair is matched by an entry in the file /etc/hosts.deny,
- * access is denied. Otherwise, access is granted. A non-existent
- * access-control file is treated as an empty file.
- *
- * After a rule has been matched, the optional language extensions may
- * decide to grant or refuse service anyway. Or, while a rule is being
- * processed, a serious error is found, and it seems better to play safe
- * and deny service. All this is done by jumping back into the
- * hosts_access() routine, bypassing the regular return from the
- * table_match() function calls below.
- */
-
- if (resident <= 0)
- resident++;
- verdict = setjmp(tcpd_buf);
- if (verdict != 0)
- return (verdict == AC_PERMIT);
- if (table_match(hosts_allow_table, request))
- return (YES);
- if (table_match(hosts_deny_table, request))
- return (NO);
- return (YES);
-}
-
-/* table_match - match table entries with (daemon, client) pair */
-
-static int table_match(table, request)
-char *table;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- FILE *fp;
- char sv_list[BUFLEN]; /* becomes list of daemons */
- char *cl_list; /* becomes list of clients */
- char *sh_cmd; /* becomes optional shell command */
- int match = NO;
- struct tcpd_context saved_context;
-
- saved_context = tcpd_context; /* stupid compilers */
-
- /*
- * Between the fopen() and fclose() calls, avoid jumps that may cause
- * file descriptor leaks.
- */
-
- if ((fp = fopen(table, "r")) != 0) {
- tcpd_context.file = table;
- tcpd_context.line = 0;
- while (match == NO && xgets(sv_list, sizeof(sv_list), fp) != 0) {
- if (sv_list[strlen(sv_list) - 1] != '\n') {
- tcpd_warn("missing newline or line too long");
- continue;
- }
- if (sv_list[0] == '#' || sv_list[strspn(sv_list, " \t\r\n")] == 0)
- continue;
- if ((cl_list = split_at(sv_list, ':')) == 0) {
- tcpd_warn("missing \":\" separator");
- continue;
- }
- sh_cmd = split_at(cl_list, ':');
- match = list_match(sv_list, request, server_match)
- && list_match(cl_list, request, client_match);
- }
- (void) fclose(fp);
- } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
- tcpd_warn("cannot open %s: %m", table);
- }
- if (match) {
- if (hosts_access_verbose > 1)
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "matched: %s line %d",
- tcpd_context.file, tcpd_context.line);
- if (sh_cmd) {
-#ifdef PROCESS_OPTIONS
- process_options(sh_cmd, request);
-#else
- char cmd[BUFSIZ];
- shell_cmd(percent_x(cmd, sizeof(cmd), sh_cmd, request));
-#endif
- }
- }
- tcpd_context = saved_context;
- return (match);
-}
-
-/* list_match - match a request against a list of patterns with exceptions */
-
-static int list_match(list, request, match_fn)
-char *list;
-struct request_info *request;
-int (*match_fn)(char *, struct request_info *);
-{
- char *tok;
- static char *last;
- int l;
-
- /*
- * Process tokens one at a time. We have exhausted all possible matches
- * when we reach an "EXCEPT" token or the end of the list. If we do find
- * a match, look for an "EXCEPT" list and recurse to determine whether
- * the match is affected by any exceptions.
- */
-
- for (tok = strtok_r(list, sep, &last); tok != 0;
- tok = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &last)) {
- if (STR_EQ(tok, "EXCEPT")) /* EXCEPT: give up */
- return (NO);
- l = strlen(tok);
- if (*tok == '[' && tok[l - 1] == ']') {
- tok[l - 1] = '\0';
- tok++;
- }
- if (match_fn(tok, request)) { /* YES: look for exceptions */
- while ((tok = strtok_r(NULL, sep, &last)) && STR_NE(tok, "EXCEPT"))
- /* VOID */ ;
- return (tok == 0 || list_match(NULL, request, match_fn) == 0);
- }
- }
- return (NO);
-}
-
-/* server_match - match server information */
-
-static int server_match(tok, request)
-char *tok;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- char *host;
-
- if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) { /* plain daemon */
- return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request)));
- } else { /* daemon@host */
- return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request))
- && host_match(host, request->server));
- }
-}
-
-/* client_match - match client information */
-
-static int client_match(tok, request)
-char *tok;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- char *host;
-
- if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) { /* plain host */
- return (host_match(tok, request->client));
- } else { /* user@host */
- return (host_match(host, request->client)
- && string_match(tok, eval_user(request)));
- }
-}
-
-/* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */
-
-static int host_match(tok, host)
-char *tok;
-struct host_info *host;
-{
- char *mask;
-
- /*
- * This code looks a little hairy because we want to avoid unnecessary
- * hostname lookups.
- *
- * The KNOWN pattern requires that both address AND name be known; some
- * patterns are specific to host names or to host addresses; all other
- * patterns are satisfied when either the address OR the name match.
- */
-
- if (tok[0] == '@') { /* netgroup: look it up */
-#ifdef NETGROUP
- static char mydomain[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- if (mydomain[0] == '\0')
- getdomainname(mydomain, sizeof(mydomain));
- return (innetgr(tok + 1, eval_hostname(host), NULL, mydomain));
-#else
- tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */
- return (NO);
-#endif
- } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */
- char *name = eval_hostname(host);
- return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
- } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "LOCAL")) { /* local: no dots in name */
- char *name = eval_hostname(host);
- return (strchr(name, '.') == 0 && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
- } else if ((mask = split_at(tok, '/')) != 0) { /* net/mask */
- return (masked_match(tok, mask, eval_hostaddr(host)));
- } else { /* anything else */
- return (string_match(tok, eval_hostaddr(host))
- || (NOT_INADDR(tok) && string_match(tok, eval_hostname(host))));
- }
-}
-
-/* string_match - match string against pattern */
-
-static int string_match(tok, string)
-char *tok;
-char *string;
-{
- int n;
-
- if (tok[0] == '.') { /* suffix */
- n = strlen(string) - strlen(tok);
- return (n > 0 && STR_EQ(tok, string + n));
- } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "ALL")) { /* all: match any */
- return (YES);
- } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* not unknown */
- return (STR_NE(string, unknown));
- } else if (tok[(n = strlen(tok)) - 1] == '.') { /* prefix */
- return (STRN_EQ(tok, string, n));
- } else { /* exact match */
- return (STR_EQ(tok, string));
- }
-}
-
-/* masked_match - match address against netnumber/netmask */
-
-static int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string)
-char *net_tok;
-char *mask_tok;
-char *string;
-{
-#ifndef INET6
- return masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string);
-#else
- /*
- * masked_match4() is kept just for supporting shortened IPv4 address form.
- * If we could get rid of shortened IPv4 form, we could just always use
- * masked_match6().
- */
- if (dot_quad_addr_new(net_tok, NULL) &&
- dot_quad_addr_new(mask_tok, NULL) &&
- dot_quad_addr_new(string, NULL)) {
- return masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string);
- } else
- return masked_match6(net_tok, mask_tok, string);
-#endif
-}
-
-static int masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string)
-char *net_tok;
-char *mask_tok;
-char *string;
-{
- in_addr_t net;
- in_addr_t mask;
- in_addr_t addr;
-
- /*
- * Disallow forms other than dotted quad: the treatment that inet_addr()
- * gives to forms with less than four components is inconsistent with the
- * access control language. John P. Rouillard <rouilj@cs.umb.edu>.
- */
-
- if (!dot_quad_addr_new(string, &addr))
- return (NO);
- if (!dot_quad_addr_new(net_tok, &net) ||
- !dot_quad_addr_new(mask_tok, &mask)) {
- tcpd_warn("bad net/mask expression: %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok);
- return (NO); /* not tcpd_jump() */
- }
-
- if ((net & ~mask) != 0)
- tcpd_warn("host bits not all zero in %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok);
-
- return ((addr & mask) == net);
-}
-
-#ifdef INET6
-static int masked_match6(net_tok, mask_tok, string)
-char *net_tok;
-char *mask_tok;
-char *string;
-{
- union {
- struct sockaddr sa;
- struct sockaddr_in sin;
- struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
- } net, mask, addr;
- struct addrinfo hints, *res;
- unsigned long masklen;
- char *ep;
- int i;
- char *np, *mp, *ap;
- int alen;
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- if (getaddrinfo(net_tok, "0", &hints, &res) == 0) {
- if (res->ai_addrlen > sizeof(net) || res->ai_next) {
- freeaddrinfo(res);
- return NO;
- }
- memcpy(&net, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
- freeaddrinfo(res);
- } else
- return NO;
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = net.sa.sa_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- ep = NULL;
- if (getaddrinfo(mask_tok, "0", &hints, &res) == 0) {
- if (res->ai_family == AF_INET6 &&
- ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_scope_id) {
- freeaddrinfo(res);
- return NO;
- }
- if (res->ai_addrlen > sizeof(mask) || res->ai_next) {
- freeaddrinfo(res);
- return NO;
- }
- memcpy(&mask, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
- freeaddrinfo(res);
- } else {
- ep = NULL;
- masklen = strtoul(mask_tok, &ep, 10);
- if (ep && !*ep) {
- memset(&mask, 0, sizeof(mask));
- mask.sa.sa_family = net.sa.sa_family;
- mask.sa.sa_len = net.sa.sa_len;
- switch (mask.sa.sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- mp = (char *)&mask.sin.sin_addr;
- alen = sizeof(mask.sin.sin_addr);
- break;
- case AF_INET6:
- mp = (char *)&mask.sin6.sin6_addr;
- alen = sizeof(mask.sin6.sin6_addr);
- break;
- default:
- return NO;
- }
- if (masklen / 8 > alen)
- return NO;
- memset(mp, 0xff, masklen / 8);
- if (masklen % 8)
- mp[masklen / 8] = 0xff00 >> (masklen % 8);
- } else
- return NO;
- }
-
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- if (getaddrinfo(string, "0", &hints, &res) == 0) {
- if (res->ai_addrlen > sizeof(addr) || res->ai_next) {
- freeaddrinfo(res);
- return NO;
- }
- /* special case - IPv4 mapped address */
- if (net.sa.sa_family == AF_INET && res->ai_family == AF_INET6 &&
- IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_addr)) {
- memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
- addr.sa.sa_family = net.sa.sa_family;
- addr.sa.sa_len = net.sa.sa_len;
- memcpy(&addr.sin.sin_addr,
- &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_addr.s6_addr[12],
- sizeof(addr.sin.sin_addr));
- } else
- memcpy(&addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
- freeaddrinfo(res);
- } else
- return NO;
-
- if (net.sa.sa_family != mask.sa.sa_family ||
- net.sa.sa_family != addr.sa.sa_family) {
- return NO;
- }
-
- switch (net.sa.sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- np = (char *)&net.sin.sin_addr;
- mp = (char *)&mask.sin.sin_addr;
- ap = (char *)&addr.sin.sin_addr;
- alen = sizeof(net.sin.sin_addr);
- break;
- case AF_INET6:
- np = (char *)&net.sin6.sin6_addr;
- mp = (char *)&mask.sin6.sin6_addr;
- ap = (char *)&addr.sin6.sin6_addr;
- alen = sizeof(net.sin6.sin6_addr);
- break;
- default:
- return NO;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < alen; i++)
- if (np[i] & ~mp[i]) {
- tcpd_warn("host bits not all zero in %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok);
- break;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < alen; i++)
- ap[i] &= mp[i];
-
- if (addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 && addr.sin6.sin6_scope_id &&
- addr.sin6.sin6_scope_id != net.sin6.sin6_scope_id)
- return NO;
- return (memcmp(ap, np, alen) == 0);
-}
-#endif
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/hosts_ctl.c b/lib/libwrap/hosts_ctl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 0161f9fda54..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/hosts_ctl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hosts_ctl.c,v 1.2 2009/10/27 23:59:30 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * hosts_ctl() combines common applications of the host access control
- * library routines. It bundles its arguments then calls the hosts_access()
- * access control checker. The host name and user name arguments should be
- * empty strings, STRING_UNKNOWN or real data. If a match is found, the
- * optional shell command is executed.
- *
- * Restriction: this interface does not pass enough information to support
- * selective remote username lookups or selective hostname double checks.
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* hosts_ctl - limited interface to the hosts_access() routine */
-
-int hosts_ctl(daemon, name, addr, user)
-char *daemon;
-char *name;
-char *addr;
-char *user;
-{
- struct request_info request;
-
- return (hosts_access(request_init(&request,
- RQ_DAEMON, daemon,
- RQ_CLIENT_NAME, name,
- RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, addr,
- RQ_USER, user,
- 0)));
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/hosts_options.5 b/lib/libwrap/hosts_options.5
deleted file mode 100644
index 0fa3e5675f2..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/hosts_options.5
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: hosts_options.5,v 1.11 2007/05/31 19:19:39 jmc Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 1997, Jason Downs. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
-.\" OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
-.\" WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
-.\" DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
-.\" INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
-.\" (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-.\" SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
-.\" CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: May 31 2007 $
-.Dt HOSTS_OPTIONS 5
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm hosts_options
-.Nd tcp wrapper host access control language extensions
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-This document describes optional extensions to the language described
-in the
-.Xr hosts_access 5
-document.
-.\" The extensions are enabled at program build time.
-.\" For example, by editing the Makefile and turning on the
-.\" PROCESS_OPTIONS compile-time option.
-.Pp
-The extensible language uses the following format:
-.Pp
-.Dl daemon_list\ \&: client_list\ \&: option\ \&: option ...
-.Pp
-The first two fields are described in the
-.Xr hosts_access 5
-manual page.
-The remainder of the rules is a list of zero or more options.
-Any ":"
-characters within options should be protected with a backslash.
-.Pp
-An option is of the form "keyword" or "keyword value".
-Options are processed in the specified order.
-Some options are subjected to %<letter> substitutions.
-For the sake of backwards compatibility with
-earlier versions, an "=" is permitted between keyword and value.
-.Sh LOGGING
-.Bl -tag -width "severity mail.info"
-.It "severity mail.info"
-.It "severity notice"
-Change the severity level at which the event will be logged.
-Facility names (such as mail) are optional, and are not supported
-on systems with older syslog implementations.
-The severity option can be used to emphasize or to ignore specific events.
-.El
-.Sh ACCESS CONTROL
-.Bl -tag -width allow
-.It "allow"
-.It "deny"
-Grant (deny) service.
-These options must appear at the end of a rule.
-.El
-.Pp
-The
-.Ar allow
-and
-.Ar deny
-keywords make it possible to keep all
-access control rules within a single file, for example in the
-.Pa /etc/hosts.allow
-file.
-.Pp
-To permit access from specific hosts only:
-.Bd -unfilled -offset indent
-ALL: .friendly.domain: ALLOW
-ALL: ALL: DENY
-.Ed
-.Pp
-To permit access from all hosts except a few trouble makers:
-.Bd -unfilled -offset indent
-ALL: .bad.domain: DENY
-ALL: ALL: ALLOW
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Notice the leading dot on the domain name patterns.
-.Sh RUNNING OTHER COMMANDS
-.Bl -tag -width "spawn shell_command"
-.It "spawn shell_command"
-Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after
-performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5)
-manual page.
-The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr
-connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the
-conversation with the client host.
-Example:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \e
- /usr/ucb/mail root) &
-.Ed
-.Pp
-executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger
--l @%h | mail root" after replacing %h by the name or address of the
-remote host.
-.Pp
-The example uses the "safe_finger" command instead of the regular
-"finger" command, to limit possible damage from data sent by the finger
-server.
-The "safe_finger" command is part of the daemon wrapper
-package; it is a wrapper around the regular finger command that filters
-the data sent by the remote host.
-.It "twist shell_command"
-Replace the current process by an instance of the specified shell
-command, after performing the %<letter> expansions described in the
-.Xr hosts_access 5
-manual page.
-Stdin, stdout and stderr are connected to the client process.
-This option must appear at the end of a rule.
-.Pp
-To send a customized bounce message to the client instead of
-running the real ftp daemon:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-ftpd : ... : twist /bin/echo 421 \e
- Some bounce message
-.Ed
-.Pp
-For an alternative way to talk to client processes, see the
-.Ar banners
-option below.
-.Pp
-To run /some/other/telnetd without polluting its command-line
-array or its process environment:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-telnetd : ... : twist PATH=/some/other; \e
- exec in.telnetd
-.Ed
-.Pp
-Warning: in case of UDP services, do not twist to commands that use
-the standard I/O or the
-.Xr read 2
-or
-.Xr write 2
-routines to communicate with
-the client process; UDP requires other I/O primitives.
-.El
-.Sh NETWORK OPTIONS
-.Bl -tag -width "linger number_of_seconds"
-.It "keepalive"
-Causes the server to periodically send a message to the client.
-The connection is considered broken when the client does not respond.
-The keepalive option can be useful when users turn off their machine while
-it is still connected to a server.
-The keepalive option is not useful for datagram (UDP) services.
-.It "linger number_of_seconds"
-Specifies how long the kernel will try to deliver not-yet delivered
-data after the server process closes a connection.
-.El
-.Sh USERNAME LOOKUP
-.Bl -tag -width "rfc931 [ timeout_in_seconds ]"
-.It "rfc931 [ timeout_in_seconds ]"
-Look up the client user name with the RFC 931 (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413)
-protocol.
-This option is silently ignored in case of services based on
-transports other than TCP.
-It requires that the client system runs an
-RFC 931 (IDENT, etc.) -compliant daemon, and may cause noticeable
-delays with connections from non-UNIX clients.
-The timeout period is optional.
-If no timeout is specified a compile-time defined default
-value is taken.
-.El
-.Sh MISCELLANEOUS
-.Bl -tag -width "banners /some/directory"
-.It "banners /some/directory"
-Look for a file in
-.Pa /some/directory
-with the same name as the daemon process (for example
-.Nm telnetd
-for the telnet service), and copy its contents to the client.
-Newline characters are replaced by carriage-return newline, and %<letter>
-sequences are expanded (see the
-.Xr hosts_access 5
-manual page).
-.Pp
-.\" The tcp wrappers source code distribution provides a sample makefile
-.\" (Banners.Makefile) for convenient banner maintenance.
-.\" .Pp
-Warning: banners are supported for connection-oriented (TCP) network
-services only.
-.It "nice [ number ]"
-Change the nice value of the process (default 10).
-Specify a positive value to spend more CPU resources on other processes.
-.It "setenv name value"
-Place a (name, value) pair into the process environment.
-The value is subjected to %<letter> expansions and may contain whitespace (but
-leading and trailing blanks are stripped off).
-.Pp
-Warning: many network daemons reset their environment before spawning a
-login or shell process.
-.It "umask 022"
-Like the umask command that is built into the shell.
-An umask of 022
-prevents the creation of files with group and world write permission.
-The umask argument should be an octal number.
-.It "user nobody"
-.It "user nobody.kmem"
-Assume the privileges of the "nobody" userid (or user "nobody", group
-"kmem").
-The first form is useful with inetd implementations that run all services with
-root privilege.
-The second form is useful for services that need special group privileges only.
-.El
-.Sh DIAGNOSTICS
-When a syntax error is found in an access control rule, the error
-is reported to the syslog daemon; further options will be ignored,
-and service is denied.
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr hosts_access 5
-.Sh AUTHORS
-.Bd -unfilled -offset indent
-Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
-Department of Mathematics and Computing Science
-Eindhoven University of Technology
-Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513,
-5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
-.Ed
-.\" @(#) hosts_options.5 1.10 94/12/28 17:42:28
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/misc.c b/lib/libwrap/misc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d1f3811a52f..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/misc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.7 2009/10/27 23:59:30 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * Misc routines that are used by tcpd and by tcpdchk.
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* xgets - fgets() with backslash-newline stripping */
-
-char *xgets(ptr, len, fp)
-char *ptr;
-int len;
-FILE *fp;
-{
- int got;
- char *start = ptr;
-
- while (len > 1 && fgets(ptr, len, fp)) {
- got = strlen(ptr);
- if (got >= 1 && ptr[got - 1] == '\n') {
- tcpd_context.line++;
- if (got >= 2 && ptr[got - 2] == '\\') {
- got -= 2;
- } else {
- return (start);
- }
- }
- ptr += got;
- len -= got;
- ptr[0] = 0;
- }
- return (ptr > start ? start : 0);
-}
-
-/* split_at - break string at delimiter or return NULL */
-
-char *split_at(string, delimiter)
-char *string;
-int delimiter;
-{
- char *cp;
- int bracket;
-
- bracket = 0;
- for (cp = string; cp && *cp; cp++) {
- switch (*cp) {
- case '[':
- bracket++;
- break;
- case ']':
- bracket--;
- break;
- default:
- if (bracket == 0 && *cp == delimiter) {
- *cp++ = 0;
- return cp;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/* dot_quad_addr_new - convert dotted quad to internal form */
-int
-dot_quad_addr_new(str, ap)
-char *str;
-in_addr_t *ap;
-{
- struct in_addr a;
- int in_run = 0;
- int runs = 0;
- char *cp = str;
-
- while (*cp) {
- if (*cp == '.') {
- in_run = 0;
- } else if (in_run == 0) {
- in_run = 1;
- runs++;
- }
- cp++;
- }
- if (runs != 4)
- return 0;
-
- if (!inet_aton(str, &a))
- return 0;
- if (ap)
- *ap = a.s_addr;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* dot_quad_addr - convert dotted quad to internal form */
-in_addr_t
-dot_quad_addr(str)
-char *str;
-{
- in_addr_t addr;
-
- (void) dot_quad_addr_new(str, &addr);
- return addr;
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/options.c b/lib/libwrap/options.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 67990952ff5..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/options.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,629 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: options.c,v 1.8 2013/11/22 07:49:44 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * General skeleton for adding options to the access control language. The
- * features offered by this module are documented in the hosts_options(5)
- * manual page (source file: hosts_options.5, "nroff -man" format).
- *
- * Notes and warnings for those who want to add features:
- *
- * In case of errors, abort options processing and deny access. There are too
- * many irreversible side effects to make error recovery feasible. For
- * example, it makes no sense to continue after we have already changed the
- * userid.
- *
- * In case of errors, do not terminate the process: the routines might be
- * called from a long-running daemon that should run forever. Instead, call
- * tcpd_jump() which does a non-local goto back into the hosts_access()
- * routine.
- *
- * In case of severe errors, use clean_exit() instead of directly calling
- * exit(), or the inetd may loop on an UDP request.
- *
- * In verification mode (for example, with the "tcpdmatch" command) the
- * "dry_run" flag is set. In this mode, an option function should just "say"
- * what it is going to do instead of really doing it.
- *
- * Some option functions do not return (for example, the twist option passes
- * control to another program). In verification mode (dry_run flag is set)
- * such options should clear the "dry_run" flag to inform the caller of this
- * course of action.
- */
-
-/* System libraries. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <grp.h>
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <setjmp.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#ifndef MAXPATHNAMELEN
-#define MAXPATHNAMELEN BUFSIZ
-#endif
-
-/* Local stuff. */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* Options runtime support. */
-
-int dry_run = 0; /* flag set in verification mode */
-extern jmp_buf tcpd_buf; /* tcpd_jump() support */
-
-/* Options parser support. */
-
-static char whitespace_eq[] = "= \t\r\n";
-#define whitespace (whitespace_eq + 1)
-
-static char *get_field(char *); /* chew :-delimited field off string */
-static char *chop_string(char *); /* strip leading and trailing blanks */
-
-/* List of functions that implement the options. Add yours here. */
-
-static void user_option /* execute "user name.group" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void group_option /* execute "group name" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void umask_option /* execute "umask mask" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void linger_option /* execute "linger time" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void keepalive_option /* execute "keepalive" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void spawn_option /* execute "spawn command" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void twist_option /* execute "twist command" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void rfc931_option /* execute "rfc931" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void setenv_option /* execute "setenv name value" */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void nice_option /* execute "nice" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void severity_option /* execute "severity value" */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void allow_option /* execute "allow" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void deny_option /* execute "deny" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-static void banners_option /* execute "banners path" option */
- (char *, struct request_info *);
-
-/* Structure of the options table. */
-
-struct option {
- char *name; /* keyword name, case is ignored */
- void (*func)(char *, struct request_info *);
- /* function that does the real work */
- int flags; /* see below... */
-};
-
-#define NEED_ARG (1<<1) /* option requires argument */
-#define USE_LAST (1<<2) /* option must be last */
-#define OPT_ARG (1<<3) /* option has optional argument */
-#define EXPAND_ARG (1<<4) /* do %x expansion on argument */
-
-#define need_arg(o) ((o)->flags & NEED_ARG)
-#define opt_arg(o) ((o)->flags & OPT_ARG)
-#define permit_arg(o) ((o)->flags & (NEED_ARG | OPT_ARG))
-#define use_last(o) ((o)->flags & USE_LAST)
-#define expand_arg(o) ((o)->flags & EXPAND_ARG)
-
-/* List of known keywords. Add yours here. */
-
-static struct option option_table[] = {
- { "user", user_option, NEED_ARG },
- { "group", group_option, NEED_ARG },
- { "umask", umask_option, NEED_ARG },
- { "linger", linger_option, NEED_ARG },
- { "keepalive", keepalive_option, 0 },
- { "spawn", spawn_option, NEED_ARG | EXPAND_ARG },
- { "twist", twist_option, NEED_ARG | EXPAND_ARG | USE_LAST },
- { "rfc931", rfc931_option, OPT_ARG },
- { "setenv", setenv_option, NEED_ARG | EXPAND_ARG },
- { "nice", nice_option, OPT_ARG },
- { "severity", severity_option, NEED_ARG },
- { "allow", allow_option, USE_LAST },
- { "deny", deny_option, USE_LAST },
- { "banners", banners_option, NEED_ARG },
- { 0 },
-};
-
-/* process_options - process access control options */
-
-void process_options(options, request)
-char *options;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- char *key;
- char *value;
- char *curr_opt;
- char *next_opt;
- struct option *op;
- char bf[BUFSIZ];
-
- for (curr_opt = get_field(options); curr_opt; curr_opt = next_opt) {
- next_opt = get_field((char *) 0);
-
- /*
- * Separate the option into name and value parts. For backwards
- * compatibility we ignore exactly one '=' between name and value.
- */
- curr_opt = chop_string(curr_opt);
- if (*(value = curr_opt + strcspn(curr_opt, whitespace_eq))) {
- if (*value != '=') {
- *value++ = 0;
- value += strspn(value, whitespace);
- }
- if (*value == '=') {
- *value++ = 0;
- value += strspn(value, whitespace);
- }
- }
- if (*value == 0)
- value = 0;
- key = curr_opt;
-
- /*
- * Disallow missing option names (and empty option fields).
- */
- if (*key == 0)
- tcpd_jump("missing option name");
-
- /*
- * Lookup the option-specific info and do some common error checks.
- * Delegate option-specific processing to the specific functions.
- */
-
- for (op = option_table; op->name && STR_NE(op->name, key); op++)
- /* VOID */ ;
- if (op->name == 0)
- tcpd_jump("bad option name: \"%s\"", key);
- if (!value && need_arg(op))
- tcpd_jump("option \"%s\" requires value", key);
- if (value && !permit_arg(op))
- tcpd_jump("option \"%s\" requires no value", key);
- if (next_opt && use_last(op))
- tcpd_jump("option \"%s\" must be at end", key);
- if (value && expand_arg(op))
- value = chop_string(percent_x(bf, sizeof(bf), value, request));
- if (hosts_access_verbose)
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "option: %s %s", key, value ? value : "");
- (*(op->func)) (value, request);
- }
-}
-
-/* allow_option - grant access */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void
-allow_option(char *value, struct request_info *request)
-{
- longjmp(tcpd_buf, AC_PERMIT);
-}
-
-/* deny_option - deny access */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void
-deny_option(char *value, struct request_info *request)
-{
- longjmp(tcpd_buf, AC_DENY);
-}
-
-/* banners_option - expand %<char>, terminate each line with CRLF */
-
-static void
-banners_option(char *value, struct request_info *request)
-{
- char path[MAXPATHNAMELEN];
- char ibuf[BUFSIZ];
- char obuf[2 * BUFSIZ];
- struct stat st;
- int ch;
- FILE *fp;
-
- snprintf(path, sizeof (path), "%s/%s", value, eval_daemon(request));
- if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) {
- while ((ch = fgetc(fp)) == 0)
- write(request->fd, "", 1);
- ungetc(ch, fp);
- while (fgets(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf) - 1, fp)) {
- if (split_at(ibuf, '\n'))
- strlcat(ibuf, "\r\n", sizeof(ibuf));
- percent_x(obuf, sizeof(obuf), ibuf, request);
- write(request->fd, obuf, strlen(obuf));
- }
- fclose(fp);
- } else if (stat(value, &st) < 0) {
- tcpd_warn("%s: %m", value);
- }
-}
-
-/* group_option - switch group id */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void group_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- struct group *grp;
-
- if ((grp = getgrnam(value)) == 0)
- tcpd_jump("unknown group: \"%s\"", value);
- endgrent();
-
- if (dry_run == 0 && setgid(grp->gr_gid))
- tcpd_jump("setgid(%s): %m", value);
-}
-
-/* user_option - switch user id */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void user_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- struct passwd *pwd;
- char *group;
-
- if ((group = split_at(value, '.')) != 0)
- group_option(group, request);
- if ((pwd = getpwnam(value)) == 0)
- tcpd_jump("unknown user: \"%s\"", value);
- endpwent();
-
- if (dry_run == 0 && setuid(pwd->pw_uid))
- tcpd_jump("setuid(%s): %m", value);
-}
-
-/* umask_option - set file creation mask */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void umask_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- unsigned int mask;
- char junk;
-
- if (sscanf(value, "%o%c", &mask, &junk) != 1 || (mask & 0777) != mask)
- tcpd_jump("bad umask value: \"%s\"", value);
- (void) umask(mask);
-}
-
-/* spawn_option - spawn a shell command and wait */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void spawn_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- if (dry_run == 0)
- shell_cmd(value);
-}
-
-/* linger_option - set the socket linger time (Marc Boucher <marc@cam.org>) */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void linger_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- struct linger linger;
- char junk;
-
- if (sscanf(value, "%d%c", &linger.l_linger, &junk) != 1
- || linger.l_linger < 0)
- tcpd_jump("bad linger value: \"%s\"", value);
- if (dry_run == 0) {
- linger.l_onoff = (linger.l_linger != 0);
- if (setsockopt(request->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (char *) &linger,
- sizeof(linger)) < 0)
- tcpd_warn("setsockopt SO_LINGER %d: %m", linger.l_linger);
- }
-}
-
-/* keepalive_option - set the socket keepalive option */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void keepalive_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- static int on = 1;
-
- if (dry_run == 0 && setsockopt(request->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE,
- (char *) &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
- tcpd_warn("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %m");
-}
-
-/* nice_option - set nice value */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void nice_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- int niceval = 10;
- char junk;
-
- if (value != 0 && sscanf(value, "%d%c", &niceval, &junk) != 1)
- tcpd_jump("bad nice value: \"%s\"", value);
- if (dry_run == 0 && nice(niceval) < 0)
- tcpd_warn("nice(%d): %m", niceval);
-}
-
-/* twist_option - replace process by shell command */
-
-static void twist_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- char *error;
-
- if (dry_run != 0) {
- dry_run = 0;
- } else {
- if (resident > 0)
- tcpd_jump("twist option in resident process");
-
- syslog(deny_severity, "twist %s to %s", eval_client(request), value);
-
- /* Before switching to the shell, set up stdin, stdout and stderr. */
-
-#define maybe_dup2(from, to) ((from == to) ? to : (close(to), dup(from)))
-
- if (maybe_dup2(request->fd, 0) != 0 ||
- maybe_dup2(request->fd, 1) != 1 ||
- maybe_dup2(request->fd, 2) != 2) {
- error = "twist_option: dup: %m";
- } else {
- if (request->fd > 2)
- close(request->fd);
- (void) execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", value, (char *) 0);
- error = "twist_option: /bin/sh: %m";
- }
-
- /* Something went wrong: we MUST terminate the process. */
-
- tcpd_warn(error);
- clean_exit(request);
- }
-}
-
-/* rfc931_option - look up remote user name */
-
-static void rfc931_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- int timeout;
- char junk;
-
- if (value != 0) {
- if (sscanf(value, "%d%c", &timeout, &junk) != 1 || timeout <= 0)
- tcpd_jump("bad rfc931 timeout: \"%s\"", value);
- rfc931_timeout = timeout;
- }
- (void) eval_user(request);
-}
-
-/* setenv_option - set environment variable */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void setenv_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- char *var_value;
-
- if (*(var_value = value + strcspn(value, whitespace)))
- *var_value++ = 0;
- if (setenv(chop_string(value), chop_string(var_value), 1))
- tcpd_jump("memory allocation failure");
-}
-
- /*
- * The severity option goes last because it comes with a huge amount of ugly
- * #ifdefs and tables.
- */
-
-struct syslog_names {
- char *name;
- int value;
-};
-
-static struct syslog_names log_fac[] = {
-#ifdef LOG_KERN
- { "kern", LOG_KERN },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_USER
- { "user", LOG_USER },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_MAIL
- { "mail", LOG_MAIL },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_DAEMON
- { "daemon", LOG_DAEMON },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_AUTH
- { "auth", LOG_AUTH },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_LPR
- { "lpr", LOG_LPR },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_NEWS
- { "news", LOG_NEWS },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_UUCP
- { "uucp", LOG_UUCP },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_CRON
- { "cron", LOG_CRON },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_LOCAL0
- { "local0", LOG_LOCAL0 },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_LOCAL1
- { "local1", LOG_LOCAL1 },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_LOCAL2
- { "local2", LOG_LOCAL2 },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_LOCAL3
- { "local3", LOG_LOCAL3 },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_LOCAL4
- { "local4", LOG_LOCAL4 },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_LOCAL5
- { "local5", LOG_LOCAL5 },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_LOCAL6
- { "local6", LOG_LOCAL6 },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_LOCAL7
- { "local7", LOG_LOCAL7 },
-#endif
- { 0 },
-};
-
-static struct syslog_names log_sev[] = {
-#ifdef LOG_EMERG
- { "emerg", LOG_EMERG },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_ALERT
- { "alert", LOG_ALERT },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_CRIT
- { "crit", LOG_CRIT },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_ERR
- { "err", LOG_ERR },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_WARNING
- { "warning", LOG_WARNING },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_NOTICE
- { "notice", LOG_NOTICE },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_INFO
- { "info", LOG_INFO },
-#endif
-#ifdef LOG_DEBUG
- { "debug", LOG_DEBUG },
-#endif
- { 0 },
-};
-
-/* severity_map - lookup facility or severity value */
-
-static int severity_map(struct syslog_names *table, char *name)
-{
- struct syslog_names *t;
-
- for (t = table; t->name; t++)
- if (STR_EQ(t->name, name))
- return (t->value);
- tcpd_jump("bad syslog facility or severity: \"%s\"", name);
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
-/* severity_option - change logging severity for this event (Dave Mitchell) */
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-
-static void severity_option(value, request)
-char *value;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- char *level = split_at(value, '.');
-
- allow_severity = deny_severity = level ?
- severity_map(log_fac, value) | severity_map(log_sev, level) :
- severity_map(log_sev, value);
-}
-
-/* get_field - return pointer to next field in string */
-
-static char *get_field(string)
-char *string;
-{
- static char *last = "";
- char *src;
- char *dst;
- char *ret;
- int ch;
-
- /*
- * This function returns pointers to successive fields within a given
- * string. ":" is the field separator; warn if the rule ends in one. It
- * replaces a "\:" sequence by ":", without treating the result of
- * substitution as field terminator. A null argument means resume search
- * where the previous call terminated. This function destroys its
- * argument.
- *
- * Work from explicit source or from memory. While processing \: we
- * overwrite the input. This way we do not have to maintain buffers for
- * copies of input fields.
- */
-
- src = dst = ret = (string ? string : last);
- if (src[0] == 0)
- return (0);
-
- while ((ch = *src)) {
- if (ch == ':') {
- if (*++src == 0)
- tcpd_warn("rule ends in \":\"");
- break;
- }
- if (ch == '\\' && src[1] == ':')
- src++;
- *dst++ = *src++;
- }
- last = src;
- *dst = 0;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-/* chop_string - strip leading and trailing blanks from string */
-
-static char *chop_string(string)
-register char *string;
-{
- char *start = 0;
- char *end;
- char *cp;
-
- for (cp = string; *cp; cp++) {
- if (!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) {
- if (start == 0)
- start = cp;
- end = cp;
- }
- }
- return (start ? (end[1] = 0, start) : cp);
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/percent_m.c b/lib/libwrap/percent_m.c
deleted file mode 100644
index ce7a3b883e0..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/percent_m.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: percent_m.c,v 1.5 2013/11/13 22:37:15 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * Replace %m by system error message.
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED
-extern char *sys_errlist[];
-extern int sys_nerr;
-#endif
-
-char *
-percent_m(char*obuf, char*ibuf)
-{
- char *bp = obuf;
- char *cp = ibuf;
- int len = BUFSIZ;
-
- while ((*bp = *cp)) {
- if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') {
- len = BUFSIZ - (bp - obuf);
- if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) {
- strlcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno], len);
- } else {
- snprintf(bp, len, "Unknown error %d", errno);
- }
- bp += strlen(bp);
- cp += 2;
- } else {
- bp++, cp++;
- }
- }
- return (obuf);
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/percent_x.c b/lib/libwrap/percent_x.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 15afce17677..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/percent_x.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: percent_x.c,v 1.3 2009/10/27 23:59:30 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * percent_x() takes a string and performs %<char> expansions. It aborts the
- * program when the expansion would overflow the output buffer. The result
- * of %<char> expansion may be passed on to a shell process. For this
- * reason, characters with a special meaning to shells are replaced by
- * underscores.
- *
- * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3).
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-/* System libraries. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-/* Local stuff. */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* percent_x - do %<char> expansion, abort if result buffer is too small */
-
-char *percent_x(result, result_len, string, request)
-char *result;
-int result_len;
-char *string;
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- char *bp = result;
- char *end = result + result_len - 1; /* end of result buffer */
- char *expansion;
- int expansion_len;
- static char ok_chars[] = "1234567890!@%-_=+:,./\
-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz\
-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
- char *str = string;
- char *cp;
- int ch;
-
- /*
- * Warning: we may be called from a child process or after pattern
- * matching, so we cannot use clean_exit() or tcpd_jump().
- */
-
- while (*str) {
- if (*str == '%' && (ch = str[1]) != 0) {
- str += 2;
- expansion =
- ch == 'a' ? eval_hostaddr(request->client) :
- ch == 'A' ? eval_hostaddr(request->server) :
- ch == 'c' ? eval_client(request) :
- ch == 'd' ? eval_daemon(request) :
- ch == 'h' ? eval_hostinfo(request->client) :
- ch == 'H' ? eval_hostinfo(request->server) :
- ch == 'n' ? eval_hostname(request->client) :
- ch == 'N' ? eval_hostname(request->server) :
- ch == 'p' ? eval_pid(request) :
- ch == 's' ? eval_server(request) :
- ch == 'u' ? eval_user(request) :
- ch == '%' ? "%" : (tcpd_warn("unrecognized %%%c", ch), "");
- for (cp = expansion; *(cp += strspn(cp, ok_chars)); /* */ )
- *cp = '_';
- expansion_len = cp - expansion;
- } else {
- expansion = str++;
- expansion_len = 1;
- }
- if (bp + expansion_len >= end) {
- tcpd_warn("percent_x: expansion too long: %.30s...", result);
- sleep(5);
- exit(0);
- }
- memcpy(bp, expansion, expansion_len);
- bp += expansion_len;
- }
- *bp = 0;
- return (result);
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/refuse.c b/lib/libwrap/refuse.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 4b89ca88cce..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/refuse.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: refuse.c,v 1.2 2009/10/27 23:59:30 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * refuse() reports a refused connection, and takes the consequences: in
- * case of a datagram-oriented service, the unread datagram is taken from
- * the input queue (or inetd would see the same datagram again and again);
- * the program is terminated.
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-/* System libraries. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-
-/* Local stuff. */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* refuse - refuse request */
-
-void refuse(request)
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- syslog(deny_severity, "refused connect from %s", eval_client(request));
- clean_exit(request);
- /* NOTREACHED */
-}
-
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/rfc1413.3 b/lib/libwrap/rfc1413.3
deleted file mode 100644
index 531c9cf7872..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/rfc1413.3
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: rfc1413.3,v 1.14 2007/05/31 19:19:39 jmc Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 2001, Bob Beck. All rights reserved.
-.\"
-.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-.\" are met:
-.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-.\"
-.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
-.\" OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
-.\" WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
-.\" DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
-.\" INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
-.\" (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-.\" SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
-.\" CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: May 31 2007 $
-.Dt RFC1413 3
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm rfc1413
-.Nd libwrap client side ident implementation
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Fd #include <tcpd.h>
-.Ft int
-.Fn rfc1413 "struct sockaddr *rmt_sin" "struct sockaddr *our_sin" "char *dest" "size_t dsize" "int ident_timeout_time"
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Fn rfc1413
-retrieves a user name from a remote system using the
-.Nm ident
-protocol described in RFC 1413.
-It is implemented in the
-.Nm libwrap.a
-library.
-.Pp
-.Fn rfc1413
-takes two sockaddr pointers as parameters:
-.Nm rmt_sin
-for the remote host end of a connected TCP socket, and
-.Nm our_sin
-for the local end.
-.Nm dest
-should be allocated by the caller to store the found username,
-and must be of length at least
-.Nm dsize .
-.Nm ident_timeout_time
-is a timeout in seconds on the entire ident query, used to ensure
-that you don't wait forever for a slow or unresponsive remote host
-to answer the ident query.
-.Sh RETURN VALUES
-When username lookup is successful,
-.Fn rfc1413
-strips the trailing CRLF from the returned value and stores up to
-.Nm "dsize - 1"
-bytes of the returned username into
-.Nm dest ,
-always terminating with a NUL byte.
-In this case 0 is returned.
-.Fn rfc1413
-returns -1 if any failure occurs such that it was unable to
-retrieve the remote username.
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr hosts_access 3
-.Sh BUGS
-The ident protocol only works on TCP sockets.
-.Pp
-Ident connections are made unencrypted, and nothing prevents the
-remote server from lying about who the user is.
-Consequently, ident should never be used to authenticate users.
-ident is however, quite useful for logging users of connections
-from multiuser machines that can be trusted not to lie about it.
-.\" @(#) hosts_access.3 1.8 96/02/11 17:01:26
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/rfc931.c b/lib/libwrap/rfc931.c
deleted file mode 100644
index cda2dde4187..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/rfc931.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rfc931.c,v 1.13 2013/11/13 22:37:15 deraadt Exp $ */
-
-/* rfc1413 does an attempt at an ident query to a client. Originally written
- * by Wietse Venema, rewritten by Bob Beck <beck@openbsd.org> to avoid
- * potential longjmp problems and get rid of stdio usage on sockets.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/uio.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-/* Local stuff for tcpd. */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-#define IDENT_PORT 113
-
-static volatile sig_atomic_t ident_timeout;
-
-int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT; /* global, legacy from tcpwrapper stuff */
-
-/*ARGSUSED*/
-static void
-timeout(int s)
-{
- ident_timeout = 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * The old rfc931 from original libwrap for compatibility. Now it calls
- * rfc1413 with the default global parameters, but puts in the string
- * "unknown" (from global unknown) on failure just like the original.
- */
-
-void
-rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest)
- struct sockaddr *rmt_sin;
- struct sockaddr *our_sin;
- char *dest;
-{
- if (rfc1413(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest, STRING_LENGTH, rfc931_timeout) ==
- -1)
- strlcpy(dest, unknown, STRING_LENGTH);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * rfc1413, an rfc1413 client request for user name given a socket
- * structure, with a timeout in seconds on the whole operation. On
- * success returns 0 and saves dsize-1 characters of the username
- * provided by remote ident daemon into "dest", stripping off any
- * terminating CRLF, and terminating with a nul byte. Returns -1 on
- * failure (timeout, remote daemon didn't answer, etc).
- */
-
-int
-rfc1413(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest, dsize, ident_timeout_time)
- struct sockaddr *rmt_sin;
- struct sockaddr *our_sin;
- char *dest;
- size_t dsize;
- int ident_timeout_time;
-{
- in_port_t rmt_port, our_port;
- int s, i, gotit, salen;
- char *cp;
- in_port_t *rmt_portp;
- in_port_t *our_portp;
- fd_set *readfds = NULL;
- fd_set *writefds = NULL;
- struct sockaddr_storage rmt_query_sin;
- struct sockaddr_storage our_query_sin;
- struct sigaction new_sa, old_sa;
- char user[256];
- char tbuf[1024];
- size_t rsize, wsize;
-
- gotit = 0;
- s = -1;
-
- /* address family must be the same */
- if (rmt_sin->sa_family != our_sin->sa_family)
- goto out1;
- switch (rmt_sin->sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
- rmt_portp = &(((struct sockaddr_in *)rmt_sin)->sin_port);
- break;
-#ifdef INET6
- case AF_INET6:
- salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
- rmt_portp = &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)rmt_sin)->sin6_port);
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- goto out1;
- }
- switch (our_sin->sa_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- our_portp = &(((struct sockaddr_in *)our_sin)->sin_port);
- break;
-#ifdef INET6
- case AF_INET6:
- our_portp = &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)our_sin)->sin6_port);
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- goto out1;
- }
-
- if ((s = socket(rmt_sin->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
- goto out1;
-
- /*
- * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server.
- * timer sets volatile sig_atomic_t ident_timeout when it fires.
- * this has to be checked after system calls in case we timed out.
- */
-
- ident_timeout = 0;
- memset(&new_sa, 0, sizeof(new_sa));
- new_sa.sa_handler = timeout;
- new_sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
- if (sigemptyset(&new_sa.sa_mask) == -1)
- goto out1;
- if (sigaction(SIGALRM, &new_sa, &old_sa) == -1)
- goto out1;
- alarm(ident_timeout_time);
-
- /*
- * Bind the local and remote ends of the query socket to the same
- * IP addresses as the connection under investigation. We go
- * through all this trouble because the local or remote system
- * might have more than one network address. The IDENT etc.
- * client sends only port numbers; the server takes the IP
- * addresses from the query socket.
- */
-
- memcpy(&our_query_sin, our_sin, salen);
- switch (our_query_sin.ss_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- ((struct sockaddr_in *)&our_query_sin)->sin_port = htons(0);
- break;
-#ifdef INET6
- case AF_INET6:
- ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&our_query_sin)->sin6_port = htons(0);
- break;
-#endif
- }
- memcpy(&rmt_query_sin, rmt_sin, salen);
- switch (rmt_query_sin.ss_family) {
- case AF_INET:
- ((struct sockaddr_in *)&rmt_query_sin)->sin_port =
- htons(IDENT_PORT);
- break;
-#ifdef INET6
- case AF_INET6:
- ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&rmt_query_sin)->sin6_port =
- htons(IDENT_PORT);
- break;
-#endif
- }
-
- if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *) & our_query_sin, salen) == -1)
- goto out;
- if ((connect(s, (struct sockaddr *) & rmt_query_sin, salen) == -1) ||
- ident_timeout)
- goto out;
-
- /* We are connected, build an ident query and send it. */
-
- rsize = howmany(s+1, NFDBITS);
- readfds = calloc(rsize, sizeof(fd_mask));
- if (readfds == NULL)
- goto out;
-
- wsize = howmany(s+1, NFDBITS);
- writefds = calloc(wsize, sizeof(fd_mask));
- if (writefds == NULL)
- goto out;
- snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%u,%u\r\n", ntohs(*rmt_portp),
- ntohs(*our_portp));
- i = 0;
- while (i < strlen(tbuf)) {
- int j;
-
- memset(writefds, 0, wsize * sizeof(fd_mask));
- FD_SET(s, writefds);
- do {
- j = select(s + 1, NULL, writefds, NULL, NULL);
- if (ident_timeout)
- goto out;
- } while ( j == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR ));
- if (j == -1)
- goto out;
- if (FD_ISSET(s, writefds)) {
- j = write(s, tbuf + i, strlen(tbuf + i));
- if ((j == -1 && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR) ||
- ident_timeout)
- goto out;
- if (j != -1)
- i += j;
- } else
- goto out;
- }
-
-
- /* Read the answer back. */
- i = 0;
- tbuf[0] = '\0';
- while ((cp = strchr(tbuf, '\n')) == NULL && i < sizeof(tbuf) - 1) {
- int j;
-
- memset(readfds, 0, rsize * sizeof(fd_mask));
- FD_SET(s, readfds);
- do {
- j = select(s + 1, readfds, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (ident_timeout)
- goto out;
- } while ( j == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR ));
- if (j == -1)
- goto out;
- if (FD_ISSET(s, readfds)) {
- j = read(s, tbuf + i, sizeof(tbuf) - 1 - i);
- if ((j == -1 && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR) ||
- j == 0 || ident_timeout)
- goto out;
- if (j != -1)
- i += j;
- tbuf[i] = '\0';
- } else
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ((sscanf(tbuf,"%hu , %hu : USERID :%*[^:]:%255s", &rmt_port,
- &our_port, user) == 3) &&
- (ntohs(*rmt_portp) == rmt_port) &&
- (ntohs(*our_portp) == our_port)) {
- if ((cp = strchr(user, '\r')) != NULL)
- *cp = '\0';
- gotit = 1;
- }
-
-out:
- alarm(0);
- sigaction(SIGALRM, &old_sa, NULL);
- if (readfds != NULL)
- free(readfds);
- if (writefds != NULL)
- free(writefds);
-out1:
- if (s != -1)
- close(s);
- if (gotit) {
- strlcpy(dest, user, dsize);
- return(0);
- }
- return(-1);
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/shell_cmd.c b/lib/libwrap/shell_cmd.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 55666455d5b..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/shell_cmd.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: shell_cmd.c,v 1.4 2013/11/13 22:37:15 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * shell_cmd() takes a shell command after %<character> substitutions. The
- * command is executed by a /bin/sh child process, with standard input,
- * standard output and standard error connected to /dev/null.
- *
- * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3).
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-/* System libraries. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-
-/* Local stuff. */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* Forward declarations. */
-
-static void do_child(char *);
-
-/* shell_cmd - execute shell command */
-
-void shell_cmd(command)
-char *command;
-{
- pid_t child_pid;
- pid_t wait_pid;
-
- /*
- * Most of the work is done within the child process, to minimize the
- * risk of damage to the parent.
- */
-
- switch (child_pid = fork()) {
- case -1: /* error */
- tcpd_warn("cannot fork: %m");
- break;
- case 00: /* child */
- do_child(command);
- /* NOTREACHED */
- default: /* parent */
- while ((wait_pid = wait((int *) 0)) != -1 && wait_pid != child_pid)
- /* void */ ;
- }
-}
-
-/* do_child - exec command with { stdin, stdout, stderr } to /dev/null */
-
-static void do_child(command)
-char *command;
-{
- char *error;
- int tmp_fd;
-
- /*
- * Systems with POSIX sessions may send a SIGHUP to grandchildren if the
- * child exits first. This is sick, sessions were invented for terminals.
- */
-
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN);
-
- /* Set up new stdin, stdout, stderr, and exec the shell command. */
-
- for (tmp_fd = 0; tmp_fd < 3; tmp_fd++)
- (void) close(tmp_fd);
- if (open("/dev/null", O_RDWR) != 0) {
- error = "open /dev/null: %m";
- } else if (dup(0) != 1 || dup(0) != 2) {
- error = "dup: %m";
- } else {
- (void) execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", command, (char *) 0);
- error = "execl /bin/sh: %m";
- }
-
- /* Something went wrong. We MUST terminate the child process. */
-
- tcpd_warn(error);
- _exit(0);
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/shlib_version b/lib/libwrap/shlib_version
deleted file mode 100644
index 9c1551636c5..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/shlib_version
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-major=6
-minor=0
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/socket.c b/lib/libwrap/socket.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 93bb7f13400..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/socket.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,278 +0,0 @@
-/* $NetBSD: socket.c,v 1.17 2003/05/26 10:05:07 itojun Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * This module determines the type of socket (datagram, stream), the client
- * socket address and port, the server socket address and port. In addition,
- * it provides methods to map a transport address to a printable host name
- * or address. Socket address information results are in static memory.
- *
- * The result from the hostname lookup method is STRING_PARANOID when a host
- * pretends to have someone elses name, or when a host name is available but
- * could not be verified.
- *
- * When lookup or conversion fails the result is set to STRING_UNKNOWN.
- *
- * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3).
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-/* System libraries. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#include <netdb.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-/* Local stuff. */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* Forward declarations. */
-
-#ifdef APPEND_DOT
-static const char *append_dot(const char *);
-#endif
-static void sock_sink(int);
-
-#ifdef APPEND_DOT
- /*
- * Speed up DNS lookups by terminating the host name with a dot. Should be
- * done with care. The speedup can give problems with lookups from sources
- * that lack DNS-style trailing dot magic, such as local files or NIS maps.
- */
-
-static const char *
-append_dot(name)
-const char *name;
-{
- static char hbuf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
-
- /*
- * Don't append dots to unqualified names. Such names are likely to come
- * from local hosts files or from NIS.
- */
-
- if (strchr(name, '.') == 0 || strlen(name) + 2 > sizeof(hbuf))
- strlcpy(hbuf, name, sizeof(hbuf));
- else
- snprintf(hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), "%s.", name);
- return hbuf;
-}
-#endif
-
-/* sock_host - look up endpoint addresses and install conversion methods */
-
-void sock_host(request)
-struct request_info *request;
-{
- static struct sockaddr_storage client;
- static struct sockaddr_storage server;
- socklen_t len;
- char buf[BUFSIZ];
- int fd = request->fd;
-
- sock_methods(request);
-
- /*
- * Look up the client host address. Hal R. Brand <BRAND@addvax.llnl.gov>
- * suggested how to get the client host info in case of UDP connections:
- * peek at the first message without actually looking at its contents. We
- * really should verify that client.sin_family gets the value AF_INET,
- * but this program has already caused too much grief on systems with
- * broken library code.
- *
- * XXX the last sentence is untrue as we support AF_INET6 as well :-)
- */
-
- len = sizeof(client);
- if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr *) & client, &len) < 0) {
- request->sink = sock_sink;
- len = sizeof(client);
- if (recvfrom(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_PEEK,
- (struct sockaddr *) & client, &len) < 0) {
- tcpd_warn("can't get client address: %m");
- return; /* give up */
- }
-#ifdef really_paranoid
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
-#endif
- }
- request->client->sin = (struct sockaddr *)&client;
-
- /*
- * Determine the server binding. This is used for client username
- * lookups, and for access control rules that trigger on the server
- * address or name.
- */
-
- len = sizeof(server);
- if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *) & server, &len) < 0) {
- tcpd_warn("getsockname: %m");
- return;
- }
- request->server->sin = (struct sockaddr *)&server;
-}
-
-/* sock_hostaddr - map endpoint address to printable form */
-
-void sock_hostaddr(host)
-struct host_info *host;
-{
- struct sockaddr *sa = host->sin;
-
- if (!sa)
- return;
- host->addr[0] = '\0';
- getnameinfo(sa, sa->sa_len, host->addr, sizeof(host->addr),
- NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
-}
-
-/* sock_hostname - map endpoint address to host name */
-
-void sock_hostname(host)
-struct host_info *host;
-{
- struct sockaddr *sa = host->sin;
- char h1[NI_MAXHOST], h2[NI_MAXHOST];
- struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
-#ifdef INET6
- struct sockaddr_in tmp;
-#endif
-
- if (!sa)
- return;
-#ifdef INET6
- /* special case on reverse lookup: mapped addr. I hate it */
- if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6 &&
- IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr)) {
- memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
- tmp.sin_family = AF_INET;
- tmp.sin_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
- memcpy(&tmp.sin_addr,
- &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr.s6_addr[12], 4);
- sa = (struct sockaddr *)&tmp;
- }
-#endif
- if (getnameinfo(sa, sa->sa_len, h1, sizeof(h1), NULL, 0,
- NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) {
- return;
- }
- if (getnameinfo(sa, sa->sa_len, host->name, sizeof(host->name), NULL, 0,
- NI_NAMEREQD) == 0) {
- /*
- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
-#ifdef APPEND_DOT
- if (getaddrinfo(append_dot(host->name), "0", &hints, &res0) == 0)
-#else
- if (getaddrinfo(host->name, "0", &hints, &res0) == 0)
-#endif
- {
- tcpd_warn("Nasty PTR record is configured");
- freeaddrinfo(res0);
- /* name is bad, clobber it */
- (void)strlcpy(host->name, paranoid, sizeof(host->name));
- return;
- }
-
- /*
- * Verify that the address is a member of the address list returned
- * by getaddrinfo(hostname).
- *
- * Verify also that getnameinfo() and getaddrinfo() return the same
- * hostname, or rshd and rlogind may still end up being spoofed.
- *
- * On some sites, getaddrinfo("localhost") returns "localhost.domain".
- * This is a DNS artefact. We treat it as a special case. When we
- * can't believe the address list from getaddrinfo("localhost")
- * we're in big trouble anyway.
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
-#ifdef APPEND_DOT
- if (getaddrinfo(append_dot(host->name), "0", &hints, &res0) != 0)
-#else
- if (getaddrinfo(host->name, "0", &hints, &res0) != 0)
-#endif
- {
- /*
- * Unable to verify that the host name matches the address. This
- * may be a transient problem or a botched name server setup.
- */
-
- tcpd_warn("can't verify hostname: getaddrinfo(%s, %d) failed",
- host->name, hints.ai_family);
- } else if (res0->ai_canonname &&
- STR_NE(host->name, res0->ai_canonname) &&
- STR_NE(host->name, "localhost")) {
- /*
- * The getnameinfo() and getaddrinfo() calls did not return
- * the same hostname. This could be a nameserver configuration
- * problem. It could also be that someone is trying to spoof us.
- */
-
- tcpd_warn("host name/name mismatch: %s != %s",
- host->name, res0->ai_canonname);
- freeaddrinfo(res0);
- } else {
- /*
- * The address should be a member of the address list returned by
- * getaddrinfo().
- */
-
- for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
- if (getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, h2, sizeof(h2),
- NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) {
- continue;
- }
- if (STR_EQ(h1, h2)) {
- freeaddrinfo(res0);
- return;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * The host name does not map to the initial address. Perhaps
- * someone has messed up. Perhaps someone compromised a name
- * server.
- */
-
- tcpd_warn("host name/address mismatch: %s != %s", h1,
- res0->ai_canonname ? res0->ai_canonname : "?");
-
- freeaddrinfo(res0);
- }
- /* name is bad, clobber it */
- strlcpy(host->name, paranoid, sizeof(host->name));
- }
-}
-
-/* sock_sink - absorb unreceived IP datagram */
-
-static void sock_sink(fd)
-int fd;
-{
- char buf[BUFSIZ];
- struct sockaddr_storage ss;
- socklen_t size = sizeof(ss);
-
- /*
- * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a
- * non-zero source address argument in the recvfrom() call below.
- */
-
- (void) recvfrom(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *) & ss, &size);
-}
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/tcpd.h b/lib/libwrap/tcpd.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 444818e917f..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/tcpd.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tcpd.h,v 1.17 2013/11/13 19:38:12 jca Exp $ */
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1997, Jason Downs. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
- * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
- * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
- * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
- * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
- * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
- * CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
- /*
- * @(#) tcpd.h 1.5 96/03/19 16:22:24
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-#ifndef _TCPD_H_
-#define _TCPD_H_
-
-/* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */
-
-#define STRING_LENGTH 256 /* hosts, users, processes */
-
-struct host_info {
- char name[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_hostname(host) */
- char addr[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_hostaddr(host) */
- struct sockaddr *sin; /* socket address or 0 */
- struct t_unitdata *unit; /* TLI transport address or 0 */
- struct request_info *request; /* for shared information */
-};
-
-/* Structure to describe what we know about a service request. */
-
-struct request_info {
- int fd; /* socket handle */
- char user[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_user(request) */
- char daemon[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_daemon(request) */
- char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */
- struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */
- struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */
- void (*sink)(int); /* datagram sink function or 0 */
- void (*hostname)(struct host_info *); /* address to printable hostname */
- void (*hostaddr)(struct host_info *); /* address to printable address */
- void (*cleanup)(void); /* cleanup function or 0 */
- struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */
-};
-
-/* Common string operations. Less clutter should be more readable. */
-
-#define STRN_CPY(d,s,l) { strncpy((d),(s),(l)); (d)[(l)-1] = 0; }
-
-#define STRN_EQ(x,y,l) (strncasecmp((x),(y),(l)) == 0)
-#define STRN_NE(x,y,l) (strncasecmp((x),(y),(l)) != 0)
-#define STR_EQ(x,y) (strcasecmp((x),(y)) == 0)
-#define STR_NE(x,y) (strcasecmp((x),(y)) != 0)
-
- /*
- * Initially, all above strings have the empty value. Information that
- * cannot be determined at runtime is set to "unknown", so that we can
- * distinguish between `unavailable' and `not yet looked up'. A hostname
- * that we do not believe in is set to "paranoid".
- */
-
-#define STRING_UNKNOWN "unknown" /* lookup failed */
-#define STRING_PARANOID "paranoid" /* hostname conflict */
-
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-extern char unknown[];
-extern char paranoid[];
-__END_DECLS
-
-#define HOSTNAME_KNOWN(s) (STR_NE((s),unknown) && STR_NE((s),paranoid))
-
-#define NOT_INADDR(s) (s[strspn(s,"01234567890./")] != 0)
-
-/* Global functions. */
-
-#define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */
-
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *);
-extern int hosts_ctl(char *, char *, char *, char *);
-extern void shell_cmd(char *);
-extern char *percent_m(char *, char *);
-extern char *percent_x(char *, int, char *, struct request_info *);
-extern void rfc931(struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *, char *);
-extern int rfc1413(struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *, char *, size_t, int);
-extern void clean_exit(struct request_info *);
-extern void refuse(struct request_info *);
-#ifdef _STDIO_H_
-extern char *xgets(char *, int, FILE *);
-#endif /* _STDIO_H_ */
-extern char *split_at(char *, int);
-extern int dot_quad_addr_new(char *, in_addr_t *);
-extern in_addr_t dot_quad_addr(char *);
-
-/* Global variables. */
-
-extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */
-extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */
-extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */
-extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */
-extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */
-extern int rfc931_timeout; /* user lookup timeout */
-extern int resident; /* > 0 if resident process */
-
- /*
- * Routines for controlled initialization and update of request structure
- * attributes. Each attribute has its own key.
- */
-
-extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *, ...);
-extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *, ...);
-
-#define RQ_FILE 1 /* file descriptor */
-#define RQ_DAEMON 2 /* server process (argv[0]) */
-#define RQ_USER 3 /* client user name */
-#define RQ_CLIENT_NAME 4 /* client host name */
-#define RQ_CLIENT_ADDR 5 /* client host address */
-#define RQ_CLIENT_SIN 6 /* client endpoint (internal) */
-#define RQ_SERVER_NAME 7 /* server host name */
-#define RQ_SERVER_ADDR 8 /* server host address */
-#define RQ_SERVER_SIN 9 /* server endpoint (internal) */
-
- /*
- * Routines for delayed evaluation of request attributes. Each attribute
- * type has its own access method. The trivial ones are implemented by
- * macros. The other ones are wrappers around the transport-specific host
- * name, address, and client user lookup methods. The request_info and
- * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results.
- */
-
-extern char *eval_user(struct request_info *);
-extern char *eval_hostname(struct host_info *);
-extern char *eval_hostaddr(struct host_info *);
-extern char *eval_hostinfo(struct host_info *);
-extern char *eval_client(struct request_info *);
-extern char *eval_server(struct request_info *);
-#define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */
-#define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */
-
-/* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */
-
-extern void sock_host(struct request_info *);
-extern void sock_hostname(struct host_info *);
-extern void sock_hostaddr(struct host_info *);
-#define sock_methods(r) \
- { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; }
-
- /*
- * Problem reporting interface. Additional file/line context is reported
- * when available. The jump buffer (tcpd_buf) is not declared here, or
- * everyone would have to include <setjmp.h>.
- */
-
-extern void tcpd_warn(char *, ...)
- __attribute__((__format__(__printf__, 1, 2)));
-extern void tcpd_jump(char *, ...)
- __attribute__((__format__(__printf__, 1, 2)));
-__END_DECLS
-
-struct tcpd_context {
- char *file; /* current file */
- int line; /* current line */
-};
-
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-extern struct tcpd_context tcpd_context;
-
- /*
- * While processing access control rules, error conditions are handled by
- * jumping back into the hosts_access() routine. This is cleaner than
- * checking the return value of each and every silly little function. The
- * (-1) returns are here because zero is already taken by longjmp().
- */
-
-#define AC_PERMIT 1 /* permit access */
-#define AC_DENY (-1) /* deny_access */
-#define AC_ERROR AC_DENY /* XXX */
-
- /*
- * In verification mode an option function should just say what it would do,
- * instead of really doing it. An option function that would not return
- * should clear the dry_run flag to inform the caller of this unusual
- * behavior.
- */
-
-extern void process_options(char *, struct request_info *);
-extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */
-__END_DECLS
-
-#endif /* _TCPD_H_ */
diff --git a/lib/libwrap/update.c b/lib/libwrap/update.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 36e5c021e8a..00000000000
--- a/lib/libwrap/update.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: update.c,v 1.7 2013/11/13 22:37:15 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * Routines for controlled update/initialization of request structures.
- *
- * request_init() initializes its argument. Pointers and string-valued members
- * are initialized to zero, to indicate that no lookup has been attempted.
- *
- * request_set() adds information to an already initialized request structure.
- *
- * Both functions take a variable-length name-value list.
- *
- * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3).
- *
- * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
- */
-
-/* System libraries */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-/* Local stuff. */
-
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-/* request_fill - request update engine */
-
-static struct request_info *request_fill(struct request_info *request,
- va_list ap)
-{
- int key;
- char *ptr;
-
- while ((key = va_arg(ap, int)) > 0) {
- switch (key) {
- default:
- tcpd_warn("request_fill: invalid key: %d", key);
- return (request);
- case RQ_FILE:
- request->fd = va_arg(ap, int);
- continue;
- case RQ_CLIENT_SIN:
- request->client->sin = va_arg(ap, struct sockaddr *);
- continue;
- case RQ_SERVER_SIN:
- request->server->sin = va_arg(ap, struct sockaddr *);
- continue;
-
- /*
- * All other fields are strings with the same maximal length.
- */
-
- case RQ_DAEMON:
- ptr = request->daemon;
- break;
- case RQ_USER:
- ptr = request->user;
- break;
- case RQ_CLIENT_NAME:
- ptr = request->client->name;
- break;
- case RQ_CLIENT_ADDR:
- ptr = request->client->addr;
- break;
- case RQ_SERVER_NAME:
- ptr = request->server->name;
- break;
- case RQ_SERVER_ADDR:
- ptr = request->server->addr;
- break;
- }
- strlcpy(ptr, va_arg(ap, char *), STRING_LENGTH);
- }
- return (request);
-}
-
-/* request_init - initialize request structure */
-
-struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *request, ...)
-{
- static struct request_info default_info;
- struct request_info *r;
- va_list ap;
-
- /*
- * Initialize data members. We do not assign default function pointer
- * members, to avoid pulling in the whole socket module when it is not
- * really needed.
- */
- va_start(ap, request);
- *request = default_info;
- request->fd = -1;
- strlcpy(request->daemon, unknown, sizeof(request->daemon));
- snprintf(request->pid, sizeof(request->pid), "%ld", (long)getpid());
- request->client->request = request;
- request->server->request = request;
- r = request_fill(request, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- return (r);
-}
-
-/* request_set - update request structure */
-
-struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *request, ...)
-{
- struct request_info *r;
- va_list ap;
-
- va_start(ap, request);
- r = request_fill(request, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- return (r);
-}