security

3 files changed, 18 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/kerberosIV/krb/in_tkt.c b/kerberosIV/krb/in_tkt.c
index d34f1058b8d..6bea0ff6f56 100644
--- a/kerberosIV/krb/in_tkt.c
+++ b/kerberosIV/krb/in_tkt.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ in_tkt(pname, pinst)
 	    if (krb_debug)
 		printf("swapped UID's %d and %d\n",(int)metoo,(int)me);
     }
-    if ((tktfile = creat(file,0600)) < 0) {
+    if ((tktfile = open (file,O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY,0600)) < 0) {
 	if (krb_debug)
 	    fprintf(stderr,"Error initializing %s",TKT_FILE);
         return(KFAILURE);
diff --git a/usr.bin/login/klogin.c b/usr.bin/login/klogin.c
index 893e745e007..aef17616ef8 100644
--- a/usr.bin/login/klogin.c
+++ b/usr.bin/login/klogin.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: klogin.c,v 1.3 1996/06/26 05:36:00 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: klogin.c,v 1.4 1997/01/27 20:44:16 dm Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: klogin.c,v 1.7 1996/05/21 22:07:04 mrg Exp $	*/
 
 /*-
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 #if 0
 static char sccsid[] = "@(#)klogin.c	8.3 (Berkeley) 4/2/94";
 #endif
-static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: klogin.c,v 1.3 1996/06/26 05:36:00 deraadt Exp $";
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: klogin.c,v 1.4 1997/01/27 20:44:16 dm Exp $";
 #endif /* not lint */
 
 #ifdef KERBEROS
@@ -97,15 +97,18 @@ klogin(pw, instance, localhost, password)
 #endif
 
 	/*
-	 * Root logins don't use Kerberos.
+	 * Root logins don't use Kerberos (or at least shouldn't be
+	 * sending kerberos passwords around in cleartext), so don't
+	 * allow any root logins here (keeping in mind that we only
+	 * get here with a password).
+	 *
 	 * If we have a realm, try getting a ticket-granting ticket
 	 * and using it to authenticate.  Otherwise, return
 	 * failure so that we can try the normal passwd file
 	 * for a password.  If that's ok, log the user in
 	 * without issuing any tickets.
 	 */
-	if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, "root") == 0 ||
-	    krb_get_lrealm(realm, 0) != KSUCCESS)
+	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 || krb_get_lrealm(realm, 0) != KSUCCESS)
 		return (1);
 
 	/*
@@ -178,7 +181,9 @@ klogin(pw, instance, localhost, password)
 		  dest_tkt();
 		  return (1);
 		}
-		return (0);
+		/* Otherwise, leave ticket around, but make sure
+		 * password matches the Unix password. */
+		return (1);
 	}
 
 	if (kerror != KSUCCESS) {
diff --git a/usr.bin/login/login.c b/usr.bin/login/login.c
index e64d6003472..59f556a9b8a 100644
--- a/usr.bin/login/login.c
+++ b/usr.bin/login/login.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: login.c,v 1.16 1997/01/15 23:43:03 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: login.c,v 1.17 1997/01/27 20:44:14 dm Exp $	*/
 /*	$NetBSD: login.c,v 1.13 1996/05/15 23:50:16 jtc Exp $	*/
 
 /*-
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static char copyright[] =
 #if 0
 static char sccsid[] = "@(#)login.c	8.4 (Berkeley) 4/2/94";
 #endif
-static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: login.c,v 1.16 1997/01/15 23:43:03 millert Exp $";
+static char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: login.c,v 1.17 1997/01/27 20:44:14 dm Exp $";
 #endif /* not lint */
 
 /*
@@ -221,6 +221,9 @@ main(argc, argv)
 			getloginname();
 		}
 		rootlogin = 0;
+#if 1 /* Why should anyone with a root instance be able to be root here? */
+		instance = "";
+#else
 #ifdef	KERBEROS
 		if ((instance = strchr(username, '.')) != NULL) {
 			if (strncmp(instance, ".root", 5) == 0)
@@ -237,6 +240,7 @@ main(argc, argv)
 		} else
 			instance = "";
 #endif
+#endif
 		if (strlen(username) > UT_NAMESIZE)
 			username[UT_NAMESIZE] = '\0';