diff options
| author |   djm <djm@openbsd.org> | 2011-05-23 03:33:38 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | djm <djm@openbsd.org> | 2011-05-23 03:33:38 +0000 |
| commit | b802ffac598e8664b392381edb9316dbf369a95b (patch) | |
| tree | 1499da14994c44f9020e49914ac8a09e04f650d1 | |
| parent | include testing of multiple/overridden AuthorizedKeysFiles (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-openbsd-b802ffac598e8664b392381edb9316dbf369a95b.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-b802ffac598e8664b392381edb9316dbf369a95b.zip | |
make secure_filename() spam debug logs less
| -rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/ssh/auth.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c index 9608b58c328..d3663a487ce 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.93 2011/05/23 03:30:07 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.94 2011/05/23 03:33:38 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -366,7 +366,6 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, } strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); - debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { @@ -376,11 +375,9 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, } /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ - if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) { - debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", - buf); + if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) break; - } + /* * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too |