do not encourage random uppercasing;

4 files changed, 14 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/usr.sbin/hostapd/hostapd.8 b/usr.sbin/hostapd/hostapd.8
index f851b4e0f50..09e28ca9137 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/hostapd/hostapd.8
+++ b/usr.sbin/hostapd/hostapd.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: hostapd.8,v 1.20 2013/07/16 11:13:33 schwarze Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: hostapd.8,v 1.21 2015/03/26 20:34:54 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
 .\"
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 .\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
 .\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2013 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 26 2015 $
 .Dt HOSTAPD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ which is not supported by
 .Nm .
 .Pp
 The IEEE 802.11 WLAN protocol lacks authentication of management
-frames and is vulnerable to various Denial-of-Service and
-Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
+frames and is vulnerable to various denial of service and
+man-in-the-middle attacks.
 That should be considered when implementing wireless networks
 with
 .Nm .
diff --git a/usr.sbin/hostapd/hostapd.conf.5 b/usr.sbin/hostapd/hostapd.conf.5
index de7de65c4e7..d47abb44e52 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/hostapd/hostapd.conf.5
+++ b/usr.sbin/hostapd/hostapd.conf.5
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: hostapd.conf.5,v 1.44 2015/02/16 16:21:25 bentley Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: hostapd.conf.5,v 1.45 2015/03/26 20:34:54 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2004, 2005, 2006 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
 .\"
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 .\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
 .\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 16 2015 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 26 2015 $
 .Dt HOSTAPD.CONF 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ of matched frames.
 .Ed
 .Pp
 This will help to detect excessive flooding of IEEE 802.11 frames.
-For example, de-auth flooding is a DoS (Denial of Service) attack
+For example, de-auth flooding is a denial of service (DoS) attack
 against IEEE 802.11 wireless networks.
 .Ss Management Frame Subtypes
 The
@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ hostap handle type management subtype probe request \e
     with log
 
 # Detect flooding of management frames except beacons.
-# This will detect some possible Denial of Service attacks
+# This will detect some possible denial of service attacks
 # against the IEEE 802.11 protocol.
 hostap handle skip type management subtype ! beacon \e
     with log \e
diff --git a/usr.sbin/ntpd/ntpd.8 b/usr.sbin/ntpd/ntpd.8
index 1363f5e80be..343985e08b9 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/ntpd/ntpd.8
+++ b/usr.sbin/ntpd/ntpd.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ntpd.8,v 1.38 2015/03/14 04:11:02 deraadt Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ntpd.8,v 1.39 2015/03/26 20:34:54 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2003, 2004, 2006 Henning Brauer <henning@openbsd.org>
 .\"
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 .\" AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT
 .\" OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: March 14 2015 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 26 2015 $
 .Dt NTPD 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ and the Network Time Protocol version 3,
 as described in RFC 1305.
 Time can also be fetched from TLS HTTPS servers to reduce the
 impact of unauthenticated NTP
-.Sq Man-In-The-Middle
-attacks.
+man-in-the-middle attacks.
 .Pp
 The options are as follows:
 .Bl -tag -width "-f fileXXX"
diff --git a/usr.sbin/ntpd/ntpd.conf.5 b/usr.sbin/ntpd/ntpd.conf.5
index 309acebe751..54910c60b87 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/ntpd/ntpd.conf.5
+++ b/usr.sbin/ntpd/ntpd.conf.5
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ntpd.conf.5,v 1.29 2015/02/16 19:25:35 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ntpd.conf.5,v 1.30 2015/03/26 20:34:54 jmc Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Henning Brauer <henning@openbsd.org>
 .\"
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 .\" AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT
 .\" OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 16 2015 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 26 2015 $
 .Dt NTPD.CONF 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -184,8 +184,7 @@ from trusted HTTPS servers via TLS.
 This time information is not used for precision but acts as an
 authenticated constraint,
 thereby reducing the impact of unauthenticated NTP
-.Sq Man-In-The-Middle
-attacks.
+man-in-the-middle attacks.
 Received NTP packets with time information falling outside of a range
 near the constraint will be discarded and such NTP servers
 will be marked as invalid.