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author | 2014-06-01 15:10:53 +0000 | |
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committer | 2014-06-01 15:10:53 +0000 | |
commit | 07519e1f4c7cbe5b6fb9813fc4ec04ca8957575a (patch) | |
tree | 67417aff68e467b4bd8f93302069d2f250764d1d /lib/libcrypto/buffer/buffer.c | |
parent | Build with WARNINGS=Yes and Werror. (diff) | |
download | wireguard-openbsd-07519e1f4c7cbe5b6fb9813fc4ec04ca8957575a.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-07519e1f4c7cbe5b6fb9813fc4ec04ca8957575a.zip |
Commit this before the head-scratching leads to premature baldness:
memset(a->data, 0, (unsigned int)a->max);
but the decl is:
size_t max;
size_t could be larger than int, especially in some of the systems OpenSSL
purports to support.
How do _intentionally truncating_ casts like enter into a codebase?
Lack of understanding of C, at a minimum. Generally the objects are
small, but this code is _intentionally unready_ for large objects.
ok miod
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libcrypto/buffer/buffer.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libcrypto/buffer/buffer.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/buffer/buffer.c b/lib/libcrypto/buffer/buffer.c index 486d6fef141..71784693be3 100644 --- a/lib/libcrypto/buffer/buffer.c +++ b/lib/libcrypto/buffer/buffer.c @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a) return; if (a->data != NULL) { - memset(a->data, 0, (unsigned int)a->max); + memset(a->data, 0, a->max); free(a->data); } free(a); |