remove CMS manuals; beck@ agress with the general idea

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-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 11 2015 $
-.Dt CMS_DECRYPT 3
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm CMS_decrypt
-.Nd decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.In openssl/cms.h
-.Ft int
-.Fo CMS_decrypt
-.Fa "CMS_ContentInfo *cms"
-.Fa "EVP_PKEY *pkey"
-.Fa "X509 *cert"
-.Fa "BIO *dcont"
-.Fa "BIO *out"
-.Fa "unsigned int flags"
-.Fc
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-.Fn CMS_decrypt
-extracts and decrypts the content from a CMS EnvelopedData structure.
-.Fa pkey
-is the private key of the recipient,
-.Fa cert
-is the recipient's certificate,
-.Fa out
-is a
-.Vt BIO
-to write the content to and
-.Fa flags
-is an optional set of flags.
-.Pp
-The
-.Fa dcont
-parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content is
-detached.
-It will normally be set to
-.Dv NULL .
-.Sh NOTES
-.Xr OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms 3
-(or equivalent) should be called before using this function or errors
-about unknown algorithms will occur.
-.Pp
-Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it
-is needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in
-the CMS structure.
-.Pp
-If
-.Fa cert
-is set to
-.Dv NULL ,
-all possible recipients are tried.
-This case however is problematic.
-To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA
-padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or not.
-If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt
-the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not
-guaranteed to) ultimately return a padding error only.
-If
-.Fn CMS_decrypt
-just returned an error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to
-decrypt an attacker could use this in a timing attack.
-If the special flag
-.Dv CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT
-is set then the above behaviour is modified and an error
-.Em is
-returned if no recipient encrypted key can be decrypted
-.Em without
-generating a random content encryption key.
-Applications should use this flag with
-.Sy extreme caution
-especially in automated gateways as it can leave them open to attack.
-.Pp
-It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means
-(for example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS
-structure in advance using the CMS utility functions such as
-.Xr CMS_set1_pkey 3 .
-In this case both
-.Fa cert
-and
-.Fa pkey
-should be set to
-.Dv NULL .
-.Pp
-To process KEKRecipientInfo types
-.Xr CMS_set1_key 3
-or
-.Xr CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key 3
-and
-.Xr CMS_ReceipientInfo_decrypt 3
-should be called before
-.Fn CMS_decrypt
-and
-.Fa cert
-and
-.Fa pkey
-set to
-.Dv NULL .
-.Pp
-The following flags can be passed in the
-.Fa flags
-parameter:
-.Pp
-If the
-.Dv CMS_TEXT
-flag is set MIME headers for type
-.Sy text/plain
-are deleted from the content.
-If the content is not of type
-.Sy text/plain
-then an error is returned.
-.Sh RETURN VALUES
-.Fn CMS_decrypt
-returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
-The error can be obtained from
-.Xr ERR_get_error 3 .
-.Sh BUGS
-The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in
-memory as mentioned in
-.Xr CMS_verify 3
-also applies to
-.Fn CMS_decrypt .
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr CMS_encrypt 3 ,
-.Xr ERR_get_error 3
-.Sh HISTORY
-.Fn CMS_decrypt
-was added to OpenSSL 0.9.8.