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| author |   deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> | 2014-04-17 12:14:26 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> | 2014-04-17 12:14:26 +0000 |
| commit | 4e938c91cc9b26aa0d9946d8ecd67cbfe685ee73 (patch) | |
| tree | 64523ca1cfd55eff5cc12f96ee1d143ce1d4eba6 /lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c | |
| parent | Remove some unnecessary includes and fix a typo. (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-openbsd-4e938c91cc9b26aa0d9946d8ecd67cbfe685ee73.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-4e938c91cc9b26aa0d9946d8ecd67cbfe685ee73.zip | |
Do not feed RSA private key information to the random subsystem as
entropy. It might be fed to a pluggable random subsystem....
What were they thinking?!
ok guenther
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c index 7750366613b..2e100ca457f 100644 --- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c +++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_crpt.c @@ -189,14 +189,6 @@ BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx) else e = rsa->e; - - if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL) - { - /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret - * exponent as unpredictable seed */ - RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0); - } - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { /* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */ |