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authormiod <miod@openbsd.org>2014-07-09 08:20:08 +0000
committermiod <miod@openbsd.org>2014-07-09 08:20:08 +0000
commit87203b09ae4087c72bdef490d474f017ac8c73cf (patch)
treed2a4f7968b7a0d1d12e65af3baac6e66fd262516 /lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
parentSet default of net.inet6.icmp6.nodeinfo to 0, (diff)
downloadwireguard-openbsd-87203b09ae4087c72bdef490d474f017ac8c73cf.tar.xz
wireguard-openbsd-87203b09ae4087c72bdef490d474f017ac8c73cf.zip
KNF
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c291
1 files changed, 135 insertions, 156 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index 4642775964e..239435fe919 100644
--- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa_sign.c,v 1.17 2014/06/12 15:49:30 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa_sign.c,v 1.18 2014/07/09 08:20:08 miod Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -67,233 +67,212 @@
/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36
-int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
- {
+int
+RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
X509_SIG sig;
ASN1_TYPE parameter;
- int i,j,ret=1;
+ int i, j, ret = 1;
unsigned char *p, *tmps = NULL;
const unsigned char *s = NULL;
X509_ALGOR algor;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
- if((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign)
- {
- return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len,
- sigret, siglen, rsa);
- }
+
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign)
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
+
/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
- if(type == NID_md5_sha1) {
- if(m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- return(0);
+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
}
i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
s = m;
} else {
- sig.algor= &algor;
- sig.algor->algorithm=OBJ_nid2obj(type);
- if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
- return(0);
- }
- if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
- return(0);
- }
- parameter.type=V_ASN1_NULL;
- parameter.value.ptr=NULL;
- sig.algor->parameter= &parameter;
+ sig.algor = &algor;
+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,
+ RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
+ sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
- sig.digest= &digest;
- sig.digest->data=(unsigned char *)m; /* TMP UGLY CAST */
- sig.digest->length=m_len;
+ sig.digest = &digest;
+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; /* TMP UGLY CAST */
+ sig.digest->length = m_len;
- i=i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,NULL);
+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
+ }
+ j = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (i > j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
+ return 0;
}
- j=RSA_size(rsa);
- if (i > (j-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
- return(0);
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) {
+ tmps = malloc((unsigned int)j + 1);
+ if (tmps == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
}
- if(type != NID_md5_sha1) {
- tmps = malloc((unsigned int)j+1);
- if (tmps == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- p=tmps;
- i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,&p);
- s=tmps;
+ p = tmps;
+ i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
+ s = tmps;
}
- i=RSA_private_encrypt(i,s,sigret,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (i <= 0)
- ret=0;
+ ret = 0;
else
- *siglen=i;
+ *siglen = i;
- if(type != NID_md5_sha1) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmps,(unsigned int)j+1);
+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmps, (unsigned int)j + 1);
free(tmps);
}
return(ret);
- }
+}
-int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
- unsigned int m_len,
- unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen,
- RSA *rsa)
- {
- int i,ret=0,sigtype;
+int
+int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
+ size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0, sigtype;
unsigned char *s;
- X509_SIG *sig=NULL;
+ X509_SIG *sig = NULL;
- if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- return(0);
- }
+ if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && rm)
- {
- i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,
- sigbuf,rm,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && rm) {
+ i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, rm, rsa,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (i <= 0)
return 0;
*prm_len = i;
return 1;
- }
+ }
s = malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1 && m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
goto err;
- }
- if((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) ) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
- goto err;
}
- i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,sigbuf,s,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
- /* Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING.
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING.
* check for correct tag and length octets.
*/
- if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10)
- {
- if (rm)
- {
+ if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10) {
+ if (rm) {
memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
*prm_len = 16;
ret = 1;
- }
- else if(memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
else
ret = 1;
- }
+ }
/* Special case: SSL signature */
- if(dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
- if((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- else ret = 1;
+ if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ if (i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ else
+ ret = 1;
} else {
const unsigned char *p=s;
- sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
- if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+ sig = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &p, (long)i);
+
+ if (sig == NULL)
+ goto err;
/* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
- if(p != s+i)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ if (p != s + i) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
- }
+ }
/* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
create forgeries */
- if(sig->algor->parameter
- && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ if (sig->algor->parameter &&
+ ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
- }
-
- sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
+ }
+ sigtype = OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);
- #ifdef RSA_DEBUG
- /* put a backward compatibility flag in EAY */
- fprintf(stderr,"in(%s) expect(%s)\n",OBJ_nid2ln(sigtype),
- OBJ_nid2ln(dtype));
- #endif
- if (sigtype != dtype)
- {
- if (((dtype == NID_md5) &&
- (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) ||
- ((dtype == NID_md2) &&
- (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)))
- {
+ if (sigtype != dtype) {
+ if ((dtype == NID_md5 &&
+ sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) ||
+ (dtype == NID_md2 &&
+ sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) {
/* ok, we will let it through */
- fprintf(stderr,"signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n");
- }
- else
- {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "signature has problems, "
+ "re-make with post SSLeay045\n");
+ } else {
RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,
- RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+ RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
goto err;
- }
}
- if (rm)
- {
+ }
+ if (rm) {
const EVP_MD *md;
+
md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dtype);
if (md && (EVP_MD_size(md) != sig->digest->length))
RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,
- RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- else
- {
+ RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ else {
memcpy(rm, sig->digest->data,
- sig->digest->length);
+ sig->digest->length);
*prm_len = sig->digest->length;
ret = 1;
- }
}
- else if (((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) ||
- (memcmp(m,sig->digest->data,m_len) != 0))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- }
- else
- ret=1;
+ } else if ((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len ||
+ memcmp(m,sig->digest->data,m_len) != 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ } else
+ ret = 1;
}
err:
- if (sig != NULL) X509_SIG_free(sig);
- if (s != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(s,(unsigned int)siglen);
+ if (sig != NULL)
+ X509_SIG_free(sig);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(s, (unsigned int)siglen);
free(s);
- }
- return(ret);
}
+ return ret;
+}
-int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
- const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
- RSA *rsa)
- {
-
- if((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify)
- {
- return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len,
- sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
- }
+int
+RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify)
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen,
+ rsa);
return int_rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
- }
+}