diff options
author | 2014-07-09 08:20:08 +0000 | |
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committer | 2014-07-09 08:20:08 +0000 | |
commit | 87203b09ae4087c72bdef490d474f017ac8c73cf (patch) | |
tree | d2a4f7968b7a0d1d12e65af3baac6e66fd262516 /lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c | |
parent | Set default of net.inet6.icmp6.nodeinfo to 0, (diff) | |
download | wireguard-openbsd-87203b09ae4087c72bdef490d474f017ac8c73cf.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-87203b09ae4087c72bdef490d474f017ac8c73cf.zip |
KNF
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c | 291 |
1 files changed, 135 insertions, 156 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c index 4642775964e..239435fe919 100644 --- a/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c +++ b/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa_sign.c,v 1.17 2014/06/12 15:49:30 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rsa_sign.c,v 1.18 2014/07/09 08:20:08 miod Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -67,233 +67,212 @@ /* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ #define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 -int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, - unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa) - { +int +RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa) +{ X509_SIG sig; ASN1_TYPE parameter; - int i,j,ret=1; + int i, j, ret = 1; unsigned char *p, *tmps = NULL; const unsigned char *s = NULL; X509_ALGOR algor; ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; - if((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) - { - return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, - sigret, siglen, rsa); - } + + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) + return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa); + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ - if(type == NID_md5_sha1) { - if(m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); - return(0); + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + return 0; } i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; s = m; } else { - sig.algor= &algor; - sig.algor->algorithm=OBJ_nid2obj(type); - if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); - return(0); - } - if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD); - return(0); - } - parameter.type=V_ASN1_NULL; - parameter.value.ptr=NULL; - sig.algor->parameter= ¶meter; + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + return 0; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, + RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD); + return 0; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; - sig.digest= &digest; - sig.digest->data=(unsigned char *)m; /* TMP UGLY CAST */ - sig.digest->length=m_len; + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; /* TMP UGLY CAST */ + sig.digest->length = m_len; - i=i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,NULL); + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if (i > j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY); + return 0; } - j=RSA_size(rsa); - if (i > (j-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY); - return(0); + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) { + tmps = malloc((unsigned int)j + 1); + if (tmps == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } - if(type != NID_md5_sha1) { - tmps = malloc((unsigned int)j+1); - if (tmps == NULL) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return(0); - } - p=tmps; - i2d_X509_SIG(&sig,&p); - s=tmps; + p = tmps; + i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + s = tmps; } - i=RSA_private_encrypt(i,s,sigret,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + i = RSA_private_encrypt(i, s, sigret, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (i <= 0) - ret=0; + ret = 0; else - *siglen=i; + *siglen = i; - if(type != NID_md5_sha1) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmps,(unsigned int)j+1); + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmps, (unsigned int)j + 1); free(tmps); } return(ret); - } +} -int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, - unsigned int m_len, - unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len, - const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, - RSA *rsa) - { - int i,ret=0,sigtype; +int +int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, + size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) +{ + int i, ret = 0, sigtype; unsigned char *s; - X509_SIG *sig=NULL; + X509_SIG *sig = NULL; - if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); - return(0); - } + if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + return 0; + } - if((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && rm) - { - i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, - sigbuf,rm,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + if ((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && rm) { + i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, rm, rsa, + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (i <= 0) return 0; *prm_len = i; return 1; - } + } s = malloc((unsigned int)siglen); - if (s == NULL) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + if (s == NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1 && m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); goto err; - } - if((dtype == NID_md5_sha1) && (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) ) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); - goto err; } - i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,sigbuf,s,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + i = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, s, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - if (i <= 0) goto err; - /* Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. + if (i <= 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. * check for correct tag and length octets. */ - if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10) - { - if (rm) - { + if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10) { + if (rm) { memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16); *prm_len = 16; ret = 1; - } - else if(memcmp(m, s + 2, 16)) - RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + } else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16)) + RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); else ret = 1; - } + } /* Special case: SSL signature */ - if(dtype == NID_md5_sha1) { - if((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH)) - RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - else ret = 1; + if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) { + if (i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH)) + RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + else + ret = 1; } else { const unsigned char *p=s; - sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i); - if (sig == NULL) goto err; + sig = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &p, (long)i); + + if (sig == NULL) + goto err; /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */ - if(p != s+i) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + if (p != s + i) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; - } + } /* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to create forgeries */ - if(sig->algor->parameter - && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + if (sig->algor->parameter && + ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; - } - - sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm); + } + sigtype = OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm); - #ifdef RSA_DEBUG - /* put a backward compatibility flag in EAY */ - fprintf(stderr,"in(%s) expect(%s)\n",OBJ_nid2ln(sigtype), - OBJ_nid2ln(dtype)); - #endif - if (sigtype != dtype) - { - if (((dtype == NID_md5) && - (sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption)) || - ((dtype == NID_md2) && - (sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))) - { + if (sigtype != dtype) { + if ((dtype == NID_md5 && + sigtype == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) || + (dtype == NID_md2 && + sigtype == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) { /* ok, we will let it through */ - fprintf(stderr,"signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045\n"); - } - else - { + fprintf(stderr, + "signature has problems, " + "re-make with post SSLeay045\n"); + } else { RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, - RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); + RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); goto err; - } } - if (rm) - { + } + if (rm) { const EVP_MD *md; + md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dtype); if (md && (EVP_MD_size(md) != sig->digest->length)) RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, - RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); - else - { + RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); + else { memcpy(rm, sig->digest->data, - sig->digest->length); + sig->digest->length); *prm_len = sig->digest->length; ret = 1; - } } - else if (((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len) || - (memcmp(m,sig->digest->data,m_len) != 0)) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - } - else - ret=1; + } else if ((unsigned int)sig->digest->length != m_len || + memcmp(m,sig->digest->data,m_len) != 0) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + } else + ret = 1; } err: - if (sig != NULL) X509_SIG_free(sig); - if (s != NULL) - { - OPENSSL_cleanse(s,(unsigned int)siglen); + if (sig != NULL) + X509_SIG_free(sig); + if (s != NULL) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(s, (unsigned int)siglen); free(s); - } - return(ret); } + return ret; +} -int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, - const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, - RSA *rsa) - { - - if((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) - { - return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, - sigbuf, siglen, rsa); - } +int +RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa) +{ + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) + return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, + rsa); return int_rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, NULL, NULL, sigbuf, siglen, rsa); - } +} |