diff options
author | 2016-09-03 11:33:34 +0000 | |
---|---|---|
committer | 2016-09-03 11:33:34 +0000 | |
commit | 8204a9859e29f943f9d45fa3c5bacf005da87a21 (patch) | |
tree | 3d72799b17122728ed1ce817d171df956c52a633 /lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c | |
parent | Remove NULL pointer checks before calls to free(). (diff) | |
download | wireguard-openbsd-8204a9859e29f943f9d45fa3c5bacf005da87a21.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-8204a9859e29f943f9d45fa3c5bacf005da87a21.zip |
Remove the libssl/src directory
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 2635 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2635 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c deleted file mode 100644 index 264cb012d5a..00000000000 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2635 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: s3_clnt.c,v 1.138 2016/03/27 00:55:38 mmcc Exp $ */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - -#include <limits.h> -#include <stdint.h> -#include <stdio.h> - -#include "ssl_locl.h" - -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/dh.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/md5.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -#include <openssl/engine.h> -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST -#include <openssl/gost.h> -#endif - -#include "bytestring.h" - -static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b); - -int -ssl3_connect(SSL *s) -{ - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - int ret = -1; - int new_state, state, skip = 0; - - ERR_clear_error(); - errno = 0; - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - s->in_handshake++; - if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) - SSL_clear(s); - - for (;;) { - state = s->state; - - switch (s->state) { - case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: - s->renegotiate = 1; - s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; - /* break */ - case SSL_ST_BEFORE: - case SSL_ST_CONNECT: - case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: - case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: - - s->server = 0; - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); - - if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ - s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT; - - if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ - - if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: - - s->shutdown = 0; - ret = ssl3_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; - s->init_num = 0; - - /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ - if (s->bbio != s->wbio) - s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: - ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - - if (s->hit) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - /* receive renewed session ticket */ - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - } - } else - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: - ret = ssl3_check_finished(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (ret == 2) { - s->hit = 1; - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - } - /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH. */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & - SSL_aNULL)) { - ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - } else { - skip = 1; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - } - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; - s->init_num = 0; - - /* - * At this point we check that we have the - * required stuff from the server. - */ - if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: - ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: - ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num = 0; - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: - ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - /* - * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert - * sent back - */ - /* - * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain - * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent - */ - /* - * XXX: For now, we do not support client - * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with - * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. - * We need to skip the certificate verify - * message when client's ECDH public key is sent - * inside the client certificate. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; - } else { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - } - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - } - - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: - ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num = 0; - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: - ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, - SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num = 0; - - s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: - ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: - ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, - s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, - s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; - - /* clear flags */ - s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; - if (s->hit) { - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; - if (s->s3->flags & - SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) { - s->state = SSL_ST_OK; - s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; - s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0; - } - } else { - /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->s3->tmp.next_state = - SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else - - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - } - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: - ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: - ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - - if (s->hit) - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; - else - s->state = SSL_ST_OK; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: - s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; - if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; - break; - - case SSL_ST_OK: - /* clean a few things up */ - tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); - - if (s->init_buf != NULL) { - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf = NULL; - } - - /* - * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, - * remove the buffering now - */ - if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER)) - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); - /* else do it later in ssl3_write */ - - s->init_num = 0; - s->renegotiate = 0; - s->new_session = 0; - - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); - if (s->hit) - s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; - - ret = 1; - /* s->server=0; */ - s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; - - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); - - goto end; - /* break; */ - - default: - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); - ret = -1; - goto end; - /* break; */ - } - - /* did we do anything */ - if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { - if (s->debug) { - if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) - goto end; - } - - if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { - new_state = s->state; - s->state = state; - cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); - s->state = new_state; - } - } - skip = 0; - } - -end: - s->in_handshake--; - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); - - return (ret); -} - -int -ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *bufend, *p, *d; - int i; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { - SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; - - if ((sess == NULL) || - (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || - (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || - (sess->not_resumable)) { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) - goto err; - } - /* else use the pre-loaded session */ - - /* - * If a DTLS ClientHello message is being resent after a - * HelloVerifyRequest, we must retain the original client - * random value. - */ - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->d1->send_cookie == 0) - arc4random_buf(s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - - d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO); - - /* - * Version indicates the negotiated version: for example from - * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version - * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also - * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can - * choke if we initially report a higher version then - * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This - * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it - * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports - * 1.0. - * - * Possible scenario with previous logic: - * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 - * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 - * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. - * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. - * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. - * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now - * know that is maximum server supports. - * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret - * containing version 1.0. - * - * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the - * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely - * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't - * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with - * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using - * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to - * the negotiated version. - */ - *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; - - /* Random stuff */ - memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* Session ID */ - if (s->new_session) - i = 0; - else - i = s->session->session_id_length; - *(p++) = i; - if (i != 0) { - if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); - p += i; - } - - /* DTLS Cookie. */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; - memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - p += s->d1->cookie_len; - } - - /* Ciphers supported */ - i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &p[2]); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); - goto err; - } - s2n(i, p); - p += i; - - /* add in (no) COMPRESSION */ - *(p++) = 1; - *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ - - /* TLS extensions*/ - bufend = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; - if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, bufend)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d); - - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - -err: - return (-1); -} - -int -ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) -{ - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - const SSL_CIPHER *c; - unsigned char *p, *q, *d; - int i, al, ok; - unsigned int j; - uint16_t cipher_value; - long n; - unsigned long alg_k; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, /* ?? */ &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { - if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - return (1); - } else { - /* Already sent a cookie. */ - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - } - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - if (2 > n) - goto truncated; - if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version = (s->version&0xff00) | p[1]; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - p += 2; - - /* load the server hello data */ - - if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 - d > n) - goto truncated; - - /* load the server random */ - memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* get the session-id */ - j = *(p++); - - if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || - (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - - if (p + j + 2 - d > n) - goto truncated; - - /* Get the cipher value. */ - q = p + j; - n2s(q, cipher_value); - - /* - * Check if we want to resume the session based on external - * pre-shared secret - */ - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { - SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; - s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &s->session->master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { - s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : - ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value); - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - } - } - - if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length && - timingsafe_memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) { - if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || - timingsafe_memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, - s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length) != 0) { - /* actually a client application bug */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - s->hit = 1; - } else { - /* a miss or crap from the other end */ - - /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new - * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ - s->hit = 0; - if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - s->session->session_id_length = j; - memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */ - } - p += j; - - if ((c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value)) == NULL) { - /* unknown cipher */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */ - if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && - (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - p += SSL3_CIPHER_VALUE_SIZE; - - sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); - i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); - if (i < 0) { - /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher - * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that - * cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. - */ - if (s->session->cipher) - s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; - if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; - /* - * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for - * client authentication. - */ - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) && - !tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - /* lets get the compression algorithm */ - /* COMPRESSION */ - if (p + 1 - d > n) - goto truncated; - if (*(p++) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } - - /* TLS extensions*/ - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) { - /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto f_err; - } - if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - - if (p != d + n) - goto truncated; - - return (1); - -truncated: - /* wrong packet length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -err: - return (-1); -} - -int -ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) -{ - int al, i, ok, ret = -1; - long n; - CBS cbs, cert_list; - X509 *x = NULL; - const unsigned char *q; - STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; - SESS_CERT *sc; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - return (1); - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - - if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (n < 0) - goto truncated; - - CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); - if (CBS_len(&cbs) < 3) - goto truncated; - - if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cert_list) || - CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - while (CBS_len(&cert_list) > 0) { - CBS cert; - - if (CBS_len(&cert_list) < 3) - goto truncated; - if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_list, &cert)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - q = CBS_data(&cert); - x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert)); - if (x == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto f_err; - } - if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - x = NULL; - } - - i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); - if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)) { - al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - goto f_err; - - } - ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ - - sc = ssl_sess_cert_new(); - if (sc == NULL) - goto err; - if (s->session->sess_cert) - ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); - s->session->sess_cert = sc; - - sc->cert_chain = sk; - /* - * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's - * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c - */ - x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); - sk = NULL; - /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/ - - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); - - if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { - x = NULL; - al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - - i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); - if (i < 0) { - x = NULL; - al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - sc->peer_cert_type = i; - CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - /* - * Why would the following ever happen? - * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. - */ - X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); - sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x; - sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); - - X509_free(s->session->peer); - CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); - s->session->peer = x; - s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - - x = NULL; - ret = 1; - - if (0) { -truncated: - /* wrong packet length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - } -err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - X509_free(x); - sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); - return (ret); -} - -int -ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - unsigned char *param, *p; - int al, i, j, param_len, ok; - long n, alg_k, alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - RSA *rsa = NULL; - DH *dh = NULL; - EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - int curve_nid = 0; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - - /* - * Use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() - * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped. - */ - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { - /* - * Do not skip server key exchange if this cipher suite uses - * ephemeral keys. - */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto f_err; - } - - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return (1); - } - - if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) { - DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL; - - EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL; - } else { - s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); - if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) - goto err; - } - - param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - param_len = 0; - - if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { - if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (2 > n) - goto truncated; - n2s(p, i); - param_len = i + 2; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p += i; - - if (param_len + 2 > n) - goto truncated; - n2s(p, i); - param_len += i + 2; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p += i; - - if (param_len + 2 > n) - goto truncated; - n2s(p, i); - param_len += i + 2; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - p += i; - n -= param_len; - - /* - * Check the strength of the DH key just constructed. - * Discard keys weaker than 1024 bits. - */ - - if (DH_size(dh) < 1024 / 8) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); - goto err; - } - - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey( - s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[ - SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); - else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey( - s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[ - SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); - /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - - s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh; - dh = NULL; - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { - const EC_GROUP *group; - EC_GROUP *ngroup; - - if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the - * server's ephemeral ECDH public key. - * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in - * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n. - */ - - /* - * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves - * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. - */ - param_len = 3; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has - * sent an invalid curve. - */ - if (tls1_check_curve(s, p, param_len) != 1) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); - goto f_err; - } - - if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - - ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); - if (ngroup == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); - - group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); - - p += 3; - - /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ - if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || - ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (param_len + 1 > n) - goto truncated; - encoded_pt_len = *p; - /* length of encoded point */ - p += 1; - param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len); - if ((param_len > n) || (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, - p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); - goto f_err; - } - - n -= param_len; - p += encoded_pt_len; - - /* - * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use - * of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server key - * exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA. - */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey( - s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[ - SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); - else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey( - s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[ - SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); - /* Else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); - s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; - ecdh = NULL; - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - bn_ctx = NULL; - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - } else if (alg_k) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - - /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */ - - /* if it was signed, check the signature */ - if (pkey != NULL) { - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); - /* Should never happen */ - if (sigalg == -1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - /* - * Check key type is consistent - * with signature - */ - if (2 > n) - goto truncated; - if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]); - if (md == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - p += 2; - n -= 2; - } else - md = EVP_sha1(); - - if (2 > n) - goto truncated; - n2s(p, i); - n -= 2; - j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - - if (i != n || n > j) { - /* wrong packet length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - int num; - - j = 0; - q = md_buf; - for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, - (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, - NULL)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, - s->s3->client_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, - s->s3->server_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, - (unsigned int *)&i); - q += i; - j += i; - } - i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, - p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa); - if (i < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); - goto f_err; - } - if (i == 0) { - /* bad signature */ - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } else { - EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len); - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p,(int)n, pkey) <= 0) { - /* bad signature */ - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - } else { - /* aNULL does not need public keys. */ - if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - /* still data left over */ - if (n != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; - } - } - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return (1); -truncated: - /* wrong packet length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - RSA_free(rsa); - DH_free(dh); - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); - EC_KEY_free(ecdh); - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return (-1); -} - -int -ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) -{ - int ok, ret = 0; - long n; - uint8_t ctype_num; - CBS cert_request, ctypes, rdn_list; - X509_NAME *xn = NULL; - const unsigned char *q; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - - s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - /* - * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records - * as we wont be doing client auth. - */ - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { - if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) - goto err; - } - return (1); - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto err; - } - - /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); - goto err; - } - - if (n < 0) - goto truncated; - CBS_init(&cert_request, s->init_msg, n); - - if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* get the certificate types */ - if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_request, &ctype_num)) - goto truncated; - - if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) - ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; - if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cert_request, &ctypes, ctype_num) || - !CBS_write_bytes(&ctypes, s->s3->tmp.ctype, - sizeof(s->s3->tmp.ctype), NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - CBS sigalgs; - - if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - /* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and - * following length value. - */ - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - if ((CBS_len(&sigalgs) & 1) || - !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, CBS_data(&sigalgs), - CBS_len(&sigalgs))) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - /* get the CA RDNs */ - if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &rdn_list) || - CBS_len(&cert_request) != 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - - while (CBS_len(&rdn_list) > 0) { - CBS rdn; - - if (CBS_len(&rdn_list) < 2) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&rdn_list, &rdn)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - q = CBS_data(&rdn); - if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&rdn))) == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if (q != CBS_data(&rdn) + CBS_len(&rdn)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - xn = NULL; /* avoid free in err block */ - } - - /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ - s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; - s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num; - if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); - s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; - ca_sk = NULL; - - ret = 1; - if (0) { -truncated: - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); - } -err: - X509_NAME_free(xn); - if (ca_sk != NULL) - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); - return (ret); -} - -static int -ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) -{ - return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); -} - -int -ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) -{ - int ok, al, ret = 0; - uint32_t lifetime_hint; - long n; - CBS cbs, session_ticket; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, -1, 16384, &ok); - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - return (1); - } - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, - SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - if (n < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); - if (!CBS_get_u32(&cbs, &lifetime_hint) || -#if UINT32_MAX > LONG_MAX - lifetime_hint > LONG_MAX || -#endif - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_ticket) || - CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = (long)lifetime_hint; - - if (!CBS_stow(&session_ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick, - &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. - * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server - * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal - * client session ID matching to work and we know much - * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. - * - * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the - * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine - * session resumption. - * - * We choose the former approach because this fits in with - * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set - * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the - * ticket. - */ - EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&session_ticket), CBS_len(&session_ticket), - s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, - EVP_sha256(), NULL); - ret = 1; - return (ret); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -err: - return (-1); -} - -int -ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) -{ - CBS cert_status, response; - size_t stow_len; - int ok, al; - long n; - uint8_t status_type; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, - 16384, &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - - if (n < 0) { - /* need at least status type + length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - CBS_init(&cert_status, s->init_msg, n); - if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_status, &status_type) || - CBS_len(&cert_status) < 3) { - /* need at least status type + length */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - if (status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, - SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_status, &response) || - CBS_len(&cert_status) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - if (!CBS_stow(&response, &s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, - &stow_len) || stow_len > INT_MAX) { - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = (int)stow_len; - - if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int ret; - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (ret == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, - SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); - goto f_err; - } - if (ret < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - } - return (1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return (-1); -} - -int -ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) -{ - int ok, ret = 0; - long n; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, - 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - if (n > 0) { - /* should contain no data */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - return (-1); - } - ret = 1; - return (ret); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, unsigned char *p, - int *outlen) -{ - unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - unsigned char *q; - int ret = -1; - int n; - - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); - if (pkey == NULL || pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || - pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8; - tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; - arc4random_buf(&tmp_buf[2], sizeof(tmp_buf) - 2); - - s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(tmp_buf); - - q = p; - p += 2; - - n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(tmp_buf), tmp_buf, p, pkey->pkey.rsa, - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - if (n <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); - goto err; - } - - s2n(n, q); - n += 2; - - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf)); - - *outlen = n; - ret = 1; - -err: - explicit_bzero(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf)); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - - return (ret); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, unsigned char *p, - int *outlen) -{ - DH *dh_srvr = NULL, *dh_clnt = NULL; - unsigned char *key = NULL; - int key_size, n; - int ret = -1; - - /* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key for DHE. */ - if (sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS); - goto err; - } - dh_srvr = sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; - - /* Generate a new random key. */ - if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - key_size = DH_size(dh_clnt); - if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - n = DH_compute_key(key, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); - if (n <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* Generate master key from the result. */ - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, key, n); - - /* Send off the data. */ - n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); - s2n(n, p); - BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); - n += 2; - - *outlen = n; - ret = 1; - -err: - DH_free(dh_clnt); - if (key != NULL) - explicit_bzero(key, key_size); - free(key); - - return (ret); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdh(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, unsigned char *p, - int *outlen) -{ - EC_KEY *tkey, *clnt_ecdh = NULL; - const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; - const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; - unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - unsigned char *key = NULL; - unsigned long alg_k; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; - int key_size, n; - int ret = -1; - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - - /* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key for ECDHE. */ - if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) && sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - tkey = sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; - - if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) { - /* Get the Server Public Key from certificate. */ - srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey( - sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); - if (srvr_pub_pkey != NULL && srvr_pub_pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) - tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; - } - - if (tkey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); - srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); - - if (srvr_group == NULL || srvr_ecpoint == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* Generate a new ECDH key pair. */ - if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - key_size = ECDH_size(clnt_ecdh); - if (key_size <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - } - n = ECDH_compute_key(key, key_size, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); - if (n <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* Generate master key from the result. */ - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, key, n); - - /* - * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory accordingly. - */ - encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); - - bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - encodedPoint = malloc(encoded_pt_len); - if (encodedPoint == NULL || bn_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Encode the public key */ - n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, - bn_ctx); - - *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ - /* Encoded point will be copied here */ - p += 1; - - /* copy the point */ - memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n); - /* increment n to account for length field */ - n += 1; - - *outlen = n; - ret = 1; - -err: - if (key != NULL) - explicit_bzero(key, key_size); - free(key); - - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - free(encodedPoint); - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); - - return (ret); -} - -static int -ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, unsigned char *p, - int *outlen) -{ - unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; - EVP_PKEY *pub_key = NULL; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; - X509 *peer_cert; - size_t msglen; - unsigned int md_len; - EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; - int ret = -1; - int nid; - int n; - - /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ - peer_cert = sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].x509; - if (peer_cert == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); - goto err; - } - - pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert); - pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key, NULL); - - /* - * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key parameters match - * those of server certificate, use certificate key for key exchange. - * Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair. - */ - EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); - - /* Generate session key. */ - arc4random_buf(premaster_secret, 32); - - /* - * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, - s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) { - /* - * If there was an error - just ignore it. - * Ephemeral key would be used. - */ - ERR_clear_error(); - } - } - - /* - * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context data. - */ - ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - if (ukm_hash == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) - nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; - else - nid = NID_id_tc26_gost3411_2012_256; - if (!EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) - goto err; - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); - EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Make GOST keytransport blob message, encapsulate it into sequence. - */ - *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - msglen = 255; - if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, - 32) < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); - goto err; - } - if (msglen >= 0x80) { - *(p++) = 0x81; - *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; - n = msglen + 3; - } else { - *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; - n = msglen + 2; - } - memcpy(p, tmp, msglen); - - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used. */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, - NULL) > 0) { - /* Set flag "skip certificate verify". */ - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - } - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); - - *outlen = n; - ret = 1; - -err: - explicit_bzero(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); - EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); - - return (ret); -} - -int -ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) -{ - SESS_CERT *sess_cert; - unsigned long alg_k; - unsigned char *p; - int n = 0; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { - p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE); - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - - if ((sess_cert = s->session->sess_cert) == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { - if (ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(s, sess_cert, p, &n) != 1) - goto err; - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { - if (ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(s, sess_cert, p, &n) != 1) - goto err; - } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) { - if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdh(s, sess_cert, p, &n) != 1) - goto err; - } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { - if (ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(s, sess_cert, p, &n) != 1) - goto err; - } else { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n); - - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - -err: - return (-1); -} - -int -ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *p; - unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX mctx; - unsigned u = 0; - unsigned long n; - int j; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { - p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); - - /* - * Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as - * digest. - */ - pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; - pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); - EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx); - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) { - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, - NID_sha1, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); - } else { - ERR_clear_error(); - } - /* - * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature - * using agreed digest and cached handshake records. - */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest; - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, - &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0 || - !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += 2; - if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || - !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || - !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(u, p); - n = u + 4; - if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) - goto err; - } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac( - s, NID_md5, &(data[0])); - if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), - &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_RSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(u, p); - n = u + 2; - } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { - if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, - &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_DSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(j, p); - n = j + 2; - } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { - if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, - &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); - goto err; - } - s2n(j, p); - n = j + 2; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - } else if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || - pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { - unsigned char signbuf[128]; - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - const EVP_MD *md; - int nid; - size_t sigsize; - - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) || - !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) || - !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || - !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signbuf, &u) || - (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) || - (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, - GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, - NULL) <= 0) || - (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, &(p[2]), &sigsize, - signbuf, u) <= 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) - goto err; - j = sigsize; - s2n(j, p); - n = j + 2; -#endif - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; - - ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n); - } - - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); - -err: - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - return (-1); -} - -int -ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) -{ - X509 *x509 = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - int i; - unsigned long l; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { - if ((s->cert == NULL) || (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) || - (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)) - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; - } - - /* We need to get a client cert */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { - /* - * If we get an error, we need to - * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); - * We then get retied later - */ - i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); - if (i < 0) { - s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return (-1); - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; - if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || - !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) - i = 0; - } else if (i == 1) { - i = 0; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); - } - - X509_free(x509); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (i == 0) - s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; - - /* Ok, we have a cert */ - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; - } - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; - l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, - (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509); - s->init_num = (int)l; - s->init_off = 0; - } - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ - return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); -} - -#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) - -int -ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) -{ - int i, idx; - long alg_k, alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - SESS_CERT *sc; - DH *dh; - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - - /* We don't have a certificate. */ - if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) - return (1); - - sc = s->session->sess_cert; - if (sc == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; - - /* This is the passed certificate. */ - - idx = sc->peer_cert_type; - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { - if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg( - sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) { - /* check failed */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); - goto f_err; - } else { - return (1); - } - } - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); - i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - - /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one. */ - if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && - !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } - if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && - !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); - goto f_err; - } - if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && - !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - - return (1); -f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); -err: - return (0); -} - -int -ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned int len, padding_len; - unsigned char *d, *p; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) { - d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO); - - len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; - padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); - *(p++) = len; - memcpy(p, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); - p += len; - *(p++) = padding_len; - memset(p, 0, padding_len); - p += padding_len; - - ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d); - - s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; - } - - return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); -} - -/* - * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a - * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of - * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. - */ - -int -ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) -{ - int ok; - long n; - - /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */ - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) - return (1); - /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate - * message, so permit appropriate message length */ - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, - SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || - (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) - return (2); - - return (1); -} - -int -ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) -{ - int i = 0; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { - i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, - SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), - px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); - if (i != 0) - return (i); - } -#endif - if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) - i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); - return (i); -} |