summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorbeck <beck@openbsd.org>2016-09-03 11:33:34 +0000
committerbeck <beck@openbsd.org>2016-09-03 11:33:34 +0000
commit8204a9859e29f943f9d45fa3c5bacf005da87a21 (patch)
tree3d72799b17122728ed1ce817d171df956c52a633 /lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
parentRemove NULL pointer checks before calls to free(). (diff)
downloadwireguard-openbsd-8204a9859e29f943f9d45fa3c5bacf005da87a21.tar.xz
wireguard-openbsd-8204a9859e29f943f9d45fa3c5bacf005da87a21.zip
Remove the libssl/src directory
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c2635
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2635 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 264cb012d5a..00000000000
--- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2635 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: s3_clnt.c,v 1.138 2016/03/27 00:55:38 mmcc Exp $ */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
- * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
-#include <openssl/gost.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "bytestring.h"
-
-static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
-
-int
-ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
-{
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
- int new_state, state, skip = 0;
-
- ERR_clear_error();
- errno = 0;
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- SSL_clear(s);
-
- for (;;) {
- state = s->state;
-
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
- /* break */
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
- case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
-
- s->server = 0;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-
- if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
- s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
-
- if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
-
- s->shutdown = 0;
- ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
- if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
- s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (s->hit) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
- /* receive renewed session ticket */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- }
- } else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
- ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (ret == 2) {
- s->hit = 1;
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
- }
- /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH. */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
- SSL_aNULL)) {
- ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /*
- * At this point we check that we have the
- * required stuff from the server.
- */
- if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
- ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- /*
- * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
- * sent back
- */
- /*
- * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
- * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent
- */
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client
- * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
- * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
- * We need to skip the certificate verify
- * message when client's ECDH public key is sent
- * inside the client certificate.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
- } else {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- }
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- }
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
- s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
-
- /* clear flags */
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
- if (s->hit) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- if (s->s3->flags &
- SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
- s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
- }
- } else {
- /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state =
- SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
-
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
- * remove the buffering now
- */
- if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
- /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->renegotiate = 0;
- s->new_session = 0;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
- if (s->hit)
- s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
-
- ret = 1;
- /* s->server=0; */
- s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
-
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- default:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- /* did we do anything */
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
- if (s->debug) {
- if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
- new_state = s->state;
- s->state = state;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
- s->state = new_state;
- }
- }
- skip = 0;
- }
-
-end:
- s->in_handshake--;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *bufend, *p, *d;
- int i;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
- SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
-
- if ((sess == NULL) ||
- (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
- (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
- (sess->not_resumable)) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
- goto err;
- }
- /* else use the pre-loaded session */
-
- /*
- * If a DTLS ClientHello message is being resent after a
- * HelloVerifyRequest, we must retain the original client
- * random value.
- */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
- arc4random_buf(s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
- d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO);
-
- /*
- * Version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
- * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
- * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
- * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
- * choke if we initially report a higher version then
- * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
- * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
- * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
- * 1.0.
- *
- * Possible scenario with previous logic:
- * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
- * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
- * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
- * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
- * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
- * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
- * know that is maximum server supports.
- * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
- * containing version 1.0.
- *
- * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
- * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
- * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
- * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
- * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
- * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
- * the negotiated version.
- */
- *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
-
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* Session ID */
- if (s->new_session)
- i = 0;
- else
- i = s->session->session_id_length;
- *(p++) = i;
- if (i != 0) {
- if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
- p += i;
- }
-
- /* DTLS Cookie. */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
- memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
- p += s->d1->cookie_len;
- }
-
- /* Ciphers supported */
- i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &p[2]);
- if (i == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(i, p);
- p += i;
-
- /* add in (no) COMPRESSION */
- *(p++) = 1;
- *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
-
- /* TLS extensions*/
- bufend = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data +
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
- if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, bufend)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
- return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
-
-err:
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
-{
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- unsigned char *p, *q, *d;
- int i, al, ok;
- unsigned int j;
- uint16_t cipher_value;
- long n;
- unsigned long alg_k;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, /* ?? */ &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
- if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return (1);
- } else {
- /* Already sent a cookie. */
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
-
- if (2 > n)
- goto truncated;
- if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- s->version = (s->version&0xff00) | p[1];
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- p += 2;
-
- /* load the server hello data */
-
- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 - d > n)
- goto truncated;
-
- /* load the server random */
- memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* get the session-id */
- j = *(p++);
-
- if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) ||
- (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (p + j + 2 - d > n)
- goto truncated;
-
- /* Get the cipher value. */
- q = p + j;
- n2s(q, cipher_value);
-
- /*
- * Check if we want to resume the session based on external
- * pre-shared secret
- */
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
- SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
- s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
- &s->session->master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher,
- s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
- s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
- ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value);
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- }
- }
-
- if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length &&
- timingsafe_memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
- if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length ||
- timingsafe_memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,
- s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length) != 0) {
- /* actually a client application bug */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- s->hit = 1;
- } else {
- /* a miss or crap from the other end */
-
- /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
- * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
- s->hit = 0;
- if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- s->session->session_id_length = j;
- memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
- }
- p += j;
-
- if ((c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_value)) == NULL) {
- /* unknown cipher */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
- if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
- (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p += SSL3_CIPHER_VALUE_SIZE;
-
- sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
- i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
- if (i < 0) {
- /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
- * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
- * cipher_id is set and use it for comparison.
- */
- if (s->session->cipher)
- s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
- if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
- /*
- * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for
- * client authentication.
- */
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) &&
- !tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* lets get the compression algorithm */
- /* COMPRESSION */
- if (p + 1 - d > n)
- goto truncated;
- if (*(p++) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* TLS extensions*/
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
- /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (p != d + n)
- goto truncated;
-
- return (1);
-
-truncated:
- /* wrong packet length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-err:
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
-{
- int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
- long n;
- CBS cbs, cert_list;
- X509 *x = NULL;
- const unsigned char *q;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
- SESS_CERT *sc;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return (1);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
-
- if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n < 0)
- goto truncated;
-
- CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n);
- if (CBS_len(&cbs) < 3)
- goto truncated;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cert_list) ||
- CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&cert_list) > 0) {
- CBS cert;
-
- if (CBS_len(&cert_list) < 3)
- goto truncated;
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_list, &cert)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- q = CBS_data(&cert);
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert));
- if (x == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- x = NULL;
- }
-
- i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)) {
- al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
-
- }
- ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
-
- sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (sc == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (s->session->sess_cert)
- ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
- s->session->sess_cert = sc;
-
- sc->cert_chain = sk;
- /*
- * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
- * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
- */
- x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
- sk = NULL;
- /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
-
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-
- if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
- if (i < 0) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- sc->peer_cert_type = i;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- /*
- * Why would the following ever happen?
- * We just created sc a couple of lines ago.
- */
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
- sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
- sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- s->session->peer = x;
- s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
-
- x = NULL;
- ret = 1;
-
- if (0) {
-truncated:
- /* wrong packet length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
-err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- X509_free(x);
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
- unsigned char *param, *p;
- int al, i, j, param_len, ok;
- long n, alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- RSA *rsa = NULL;
- DH *dh = NULL;
- EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- int curve_nid = 0;
- int encoded_pt_len = 0;
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /*
- * Use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
- * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped.
- */
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- /*
- * Do not skip server key exchange if this cipher suite uses
- * ephemeral keys.
- */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return (1);
- }
-
- if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
- DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
-
- EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
- } else {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
- goto err;
- }
-
- param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- param_len = 0;
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
- if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (2 > n)
- goto truncated;
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len = i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- if (param_len + 2 > n)
- goto truncated;
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len += i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
-
- if (param_len + 2 > n)
- goto truncated;
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len += i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_BN_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
- n -= param_len;
-
- /*
- * Check the strength of the DH key just constructed.
- * Discard keys weaker than 1024 bits.
- */
-
- if (DH_size(dh) < 1024 / 8) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[
- SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[
- SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
- /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
-
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
- dh = NULL;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- EC_GROUP *ngroup;
-
- if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
- * server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
- * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
- * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
- */
-
- /*
- * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
- * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
- */
- param_len = 3;
- if (param_len > n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has
- * sent an invalid curve.
- */
- if (tls1_check_curve(s, p, param_len) != 1) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
- if (ngroup == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
-
- p += 3;
-
- /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
- if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
- ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (param_len + 1 > n)
- goto truncated;
- encoded_pt_len = *p;
- /* length of encoded point */
- p += 1;
- param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
- if ((param_len > n) || (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
- p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- n -= param_len;
- p += encoded_pt_len;
-
- /*
- * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use
- * of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server key
- * exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
- */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[
- SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[
- SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
- /* Else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
- EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
- ecdh = NULL;
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
- EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- } else if (alg_k) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
-
- /* if it was signed, check the signature */
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
- /* Should never happen */
- if (sigalg == -1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Check key type is consistent
- * with signature
- */
- if (2 > n)
- goto truncated;
- if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
- if (md == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- p += 2;
- n -= 2;
- } else
- md = EVP_sha1();
-
- if (2 > n)
- goto truncated;
- n2s(p, i);
- n -= 2;
- j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-
- if (i != n || n > j) {
- /* wrong packet length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int num;
-
- j = 0;
- q = md_buf;
- for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
- (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1,
- NULL)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
- s->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
- s->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
- (unsigned int *)&i);
- q += i;
- j += i;
- }
- i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
- p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
- if (i < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (i == 0) {
- /* bad signature */
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else {
- EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p,(int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
- /* bad signature */
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- } else {
- /* aNULL does not need public keys. */
- if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- /* still data left over */
- if (n != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return (1);
-truncated:
- /* wrong packet length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- RSA_free(rsa);
- DH_free(dh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok, ret = 0;
- long n;
- uint8_t ctype_num;
- CBS cert_request, ctypes, rdn_list;
- X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
- const unsigned char *q;
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- /*
- * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
- * as we wont be doing client auth.
- */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s))
- goto err;
- }
- return (1);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n < 0)
- goto truncated;
- CBS_init(&cert_request, s->init_msg, n);
-
- if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* get the certificate types */
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_request, &ctype_num))
- goto truncated;
-
- if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
- ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
- if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cert_request, &ctypes, ctype_num) ||
- !CBS_write_bytes(&ctypes, s->s3->tmp.ctype,
- sizeof(s->s3->tmp.ctype), NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- CBS sigalgs;
-
- if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
- * following length value.
- */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((CBS_len(&sigalgs) & 1) ||
- !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, CBS_data(&sigalgs),
- CBS_len(&sigalgs))) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* get the CA RDNs */
- if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &rdn_list) ||
- CBS_len(&cert_request) != 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&rdn_list) > 0) {
- CBS rdn;
-
- if (CBS_len(&rdn_list) < 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&rdn_list, &rdn)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- q = CBS_data(&rdn);
- if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&rdn))) == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (q != CBS_data(&rdn) + CBS_len(&rdn)) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- xn = NULL; /* avoid free in err block */
- }
-
- /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
- s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
- if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
- s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
- ca_sk = NULL;
-
- ret = 1;
- if (0) {
-truncated:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
- }
-err:
- X509_NAME_free(xn);
- if (ca_sk != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
-{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok, al, ret = 0;
- uint32_t lifetime_hint;
- long n;
- CBS cbs, session_ticket;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, -1, 16384, &ok);
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return (1);
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (n < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n);
- if (!CBS_get_u32(&cbs, &lifetime_hint) ||
-#if UINT32_MAX > LONG_MAX
- lifetime_hint > LONG_MAX ||
-#endif
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_ticket) ||
- CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = (long)lifetime_hint;
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&session_ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick,
- &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
- * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
- * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
- * client session ID matching to work and we know much
- * earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
- *
- * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
- * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
- * session resumption.
- *
- * We choose the former approach because this fits in with
- * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
- * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
- * ticket.
- */
- EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&session_ticket), CBS_len(&session_ticket),
- s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
- EVP_sha256(), NULL);
- ret = 1;
- return (ret);
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
-err:
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
-{
- CBS cert_status, response;
- size_t stow_len;
- int ok, al;
- long n;
- uint8_t status_type;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
- 16384, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if (n < 0) {
- /* need at least status type + length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- CBS_init(&cert_status, s->init_msg, n);
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_status, &status_type) ||
- CBS_len(&cert_status) < 3) {
- /* need at least status type + length */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_status, &response) ||
- CBS_len(&cert_status) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,
- SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&response, &s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
- &stow_len) || stow_len > INT_MAX) {
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = (int)stow_len;
-
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int ret;
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- if (ret == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,
- SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (ret < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- return (1);
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok, ret = 0;
- long n;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
- 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
- if (n > 0) {
- /* should contain no data */
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- return (-1);
- }
- ret = 1;
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, unsigned char *p,
- int *outlen)
-{
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *q;
- int ret = -1;
- int n;
-
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
- if (pkey == NULL || pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
- pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- arc4random_buf(&tmp_buf[2], sizeof(tmp_buf) - 2);
-
- s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(tmp_buf);
-
- q = p;
- p += 2;
-
- n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(tmp_buf), tmp_buf, p, pkey->pkey.rsa,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s2n(n, q);
- n += 2;
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
-
- *outlen = n;
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
- explicit_bzero(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, unsigned char *p,
- int *outlen)
-{
- DH *dh_srvr = NULL, *dh_clnt = NULL;
- unsigned char *key = NULL;
- int key_size, n;
- int ret = -1;
-
- /* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key for DHE. */
- if (sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
- dh_srvr = sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
-
- /* Generate a new random key. */
- if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- key_size = DH_size(dh_clnt);
- if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- n = DH_compute_key(key, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Generate master key from the result. */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, key, n);
-
- /* Send off the data. */
- n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
- s2n(n, p);
- BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
- n += 2;
-
- *outlen = n;
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
- DH_free(dh_clnt);
- if (key != NULL)
- explicit_bzero(key, key_size);
- free(key);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdh(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, unsigned char *p,
- int *outlen)
-{
- EC_KEY *tkey, *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
- const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
- const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
- unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
- unsigned char *key = NULL;
- unsigned long alg_k;
- int encoded_pt_len = 0;
- int key_size, n;
- int ret = -1;
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key for ECDHE. */
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) && sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- tkey = sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
-
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) {
- /* Get the Server Public Key from certificate. */
- srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
- sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
- if (srvr_pub_pkey != NULL && srvr_pub_pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
- }
-
- if (tkey == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
-
- if (srvr_group == NULL || srvr_ecpoint == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Generate a new ECDH key pair. */
- if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- key_size = ECDH_size(clnt_ecdh);
- if (key_size <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- }
- n = ECDH_compute_key(key, key_size, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
- if (n <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Generate master key from the result. */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, key, n);
-
- /*
- * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory accordingly.
- */
- encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- encodedPoint = malloc(encoded_pt_len);
- if (encodedPoint == NULL || bn_ctx == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Encode the public key */
- n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len,
- bn_ctx);
-
- *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
- /* Encoded point will be copied here */
- p += 1;
-
- /* copy the point */
- memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
- /* increment n to account for length field */
- n += 1;
-
- *outlen = n;
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
- if (key != NULL)
- explicit_bzero(key, key_size);
- free(key);
-
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- free(encodedPoint);
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-static int
-ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, unsigned char *p,
- int *outlen)
-{
- unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
- EVP_PKEY *pub_key = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
- X509 *peer_cert;
- size_t msglen;
- unsigned int md_len;
- EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
- int ret = -1;
- int nid;
- int n;
-
- /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
- peer_cert = sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].x509;
- if (peer_cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert);
- pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key, NULL);
-
- /*
- * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key parameters match
- * those of server certificate, use certificate key for key exchange.
- * Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair.
- */
- EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
-
- /* Generate session key. */
- arc4random_buf(premaster_secret, 32);
-
- /*
- * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,
- s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
- /*
- * If there was an error - just ignore it.
- * Ephemeral key would be used.
- */
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context data.
- */
- ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
- if (ukm_hash == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94)
- nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
- else
- nid = NID_id_tc26_gost3411_2012_256;
- if (!EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)))
- goto err;
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Make GOST keytransport blob message, encapsulate it into sequence.
- */
- *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
- msglen = 255;
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret,
- 32) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (msglen >= 0x80) {
- *(p++) = 0x81;
- *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
- n = msglen + 3;
- } else {
- *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
- n = msglen + 2;
- }
- memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
-
- /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used. */
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
- NULL) > 0) {
- /* Set flag "skip certificate verify". */
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32);
-
- *outlen = n;
- ret = 1;
-
-err:
- explicit_bzero(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
- EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
-
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
-{
- SESS_CERT *sess_cert;
- unsigned long alg_k;
- unsigned char *p;
- int n = 0;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE);
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- if ((sess_cert = s->session->sess_cert) == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
- if (ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(s, sess_cert, p, &n) != 1)
- goto err;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
- if (ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(s, sess_cert, p, &n) != 1)
- goto err;
- } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) {
- if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdh(s, sess_cert, p, &n) != 1)
- goto err;
- } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
- if (ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(s, sess_cert, p, &n) != 1)
- goto err;
- } else {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
- return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
-
-err:
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
- unsigned u = 0;
- unsigned long n;
- int j;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
- p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY);
-
- /*
- * Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as
- * digest.
- */
- pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- NID_sha1, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
- } else {
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- /*
- * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
- * using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
- */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- long hdatalen = 0;
- void *hdata;
- const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,
- &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0 ||
- !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- p += 2;
- if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
- !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
- !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n = u + 4;
- if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s))
- goto err;
- } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(
- s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
- if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
- &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
- ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n = u + 2;
- } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
- ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
- } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
- &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
- ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- } else if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
- pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
- unsigned char signbuf[128];
- long hdatalen = 0;
- void *hdata;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- int nid;
- size_t sigsize;
-
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
- !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
- !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
- !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signbuf, &u) ||
- (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) ||
- (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
- EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT,
- GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE,
- NULL) <= 0) ||
- (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, &(p[2]), &sigsize,
- signbuf, u) <= 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
- ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s))
- goto err;
- j = sigsize;
- s2n(j, p);
- n = j + 2;
-#endif
- } else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
-
- ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n);
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
-
- return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
-
-err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- return (-1);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
-{
- X509 *x509 = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int i;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
- if ((s->cert == NULL) || (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
- (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
- }
-
- /* We need to get a client cert */
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
- /*
- * If we get an error, we need to
- * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
- * We then get retied later
- */
- i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
- if (i < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return (-1);
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
- if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) ||
- !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
- i = 0;
- } else if (i == 1) {
- i = 0;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
- }
-
- X509_free(x509);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (i == 0)
- s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
-
- /* Ok, we have a cert */
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
- }
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
- l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
- (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
- s->init_num = (int)l;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
-}
-
-#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
-
-int
-ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
-{
- int i, idx;
- long alg_k, alg_a;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- SESS_CERT *sc;
- DH *dh;
-
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-
- /* We don't have a certificate. */
- if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL)
- return (1);
-
- sc = s->session->sess_cert;
- if (sc == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
-
- /* This is the passed certificate. */
-
- idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
- if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(
- sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
- /* check failed */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- } else {
- return (1);
- }
- }
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
- i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-
- /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one. */
- if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
- !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
- !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
- !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
- SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- return (1);
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-err:
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
-{
- unsigned int len, padding_len;
- unsigned char *d, *p;
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
- d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO);
-
- len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
- padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
- *(p++) = len;
- memcpy(p, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
- p += len;
- *(p++) = padding_len;
- memset(p, 0, padding_len);
- p += padding_len;
-
- ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d);
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
- }
-
- return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
-}
-
-/*
- * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
- * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
- * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
- */
-
-int
-ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
-{
- int ok;
- long n;
-
- /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
- return (1);
- /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
- * message, so permit appropriate message length */
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
- (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
- return (2);
-
- return (1);
-}
-
-int
-ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
-{
- int i = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
- i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
- SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
- px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (i != 0)
- return (i);
- }
-#endif
- if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
- i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
- return (i);
-}