First pass at applying KNF to the OpenSSL code, which almost makes it

readable. This pass is whitespace only and can readily be verified using
tr and md5.

1 files changed, 582 insertions, 604 deletions

diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 0c4cddedf85..e59e883424e 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -149,15 +149,12 @@
 #endif
 
 /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
-			int sec_len,
-			const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-			const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-			const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-			const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-			const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-			unsigned char *out, int olen)
-	{
+static int
+tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, int sec_len,
+    const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
+    const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
+    const void *seed5, int seed5_len, unsigned char *out, int olen)
+{
 	int chunk;
 	size_t j;
 	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
@@ -165,8 +162,8 @@ static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
 	unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 	size_t A1_len;
 	int ret = 0;
-	
-	chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+	chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
 	OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
@@ -176,114 +173,109 @@ static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
 	mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
 	if (!mac_key)
 		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
 		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+	if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+	if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+	if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+	if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+	if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
 		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
 		goto err;
 
-	for (;;)
-		{
+	for (;;) {
 		/* Reinit mac contexts */
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
 			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
 			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
+		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+		if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+		if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+		if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+		if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
 			goto err;
-		if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+		if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
 			goto err;
 
-		if (olen > chunk)
-			{
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
+		if (olen > chunk) {
+			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
 				goto err;
-			out+=j;
-			olen-=j;
+			out += j;
+			olen -= j;
 			/* calc the next A1 value */
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
+			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
 				goto err;
-			}
+		}
 		else	/* last one */
-			{
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+		{
+			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
 				goto err;
-			memcpy(out,A1,olen);
+			memcpy(out, A1, olen);
 			break;
-			}
 		}
+	}
 	ret = 1;
 err:
 	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
 	return ret;
-	}
+}
 
 /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
-		     const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
-		     const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-		     const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
-		     const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-		     const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
-		     const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
-		     unsigned char *out1,
-		     unsigned char *out2, int olen)
-	{
-	int len,i,idx,count;
+static int
+tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2,
+    int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4,
+    int seed4_len, const void *seed5, int seed5_len, const unsigned char *sec,
+    int slen, unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen)
+{
+	int len, i, idx, count;
 	const unsigned char *S1;
 	long m;
 	const EVP_MD *md;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	/* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
-	count=0;
-	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
-		if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
-	}	
-	len=slen/count;
+	count = 0;
+	for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
+		if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT)
+			& digest_mask) count++;
+	}
+	len = slen/count;
 	if (count == 1)
 		slen = 0;
-	S1=sec;
-	memset(out1,0,olen);
-	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
-		if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
+	S1 = sec;
+	memset(out1, 0, olen);
+	for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
+		if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
 			if (!md) {
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
 				SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
-				goto err;				
-			}
-			if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
-					seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
-					out2,olen))
 				goto err;
-			S1+=len;
-			for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
-			{
-				out1[i]^=out2[i];
+
+			}
+			if (!tls1_P_hash(md , S1, len + (slen&1),
+				seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len,
+			out2, olen))
+			goto err;
+			S1 += len;
+			for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
+				out1[i] ^= out2[i];
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -291,41 +283,43 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
 err:
 	return ret;
 }
-static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
-	     unsigned char *tmp, int num)
-	{
+
+static int
+tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, unsigned char *tmp, int num)
+{
 	int ret;
 	ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
-		 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		 NULL,0,NULL,0,
-		 s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-		 km,tmp,num);
+	TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
+	s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+	s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+	NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+	s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+	km, tmp, num);
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
-                s->session->master_key_length);
+	s->session->master_key_length);
 	{
-        int i;
-        for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
-                {
-                printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
-                }
-        printf("\n");  }
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) {
+			printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
+		}
+		printf("\n");
+	}
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 	return ret;
-	}
+}
 
-int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
-	{
+int
+tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+{
 	static const unsigned char empty[]="";
-	unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
+	unsigned char *p, *mac_secret;
 	unsigned char *exp_label;
 	unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
 	unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
 	unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
 	unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
-	unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
+	unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv;
 	int client_write;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
@@ -337,36 +331,35 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 	int *mac_secret_size;
 	EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
 	EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-	int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
+	int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl;
 	int reuse_dd = 0;
 
-	is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-	c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
-	m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
+	is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+	c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
+	m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
 	mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-	comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
+	comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
 #endif
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
 	printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
-	       s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
-	       s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
-	       comp);
+	s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
+	s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
+	comp);
 	printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
 	printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
-                c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
+	c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len);
 	printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
 	{
-        int i;
-        for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-		printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
-        }
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
+			printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
+	}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
-		{
+	if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
 		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
 			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
 		else
@@ -374,303 +367,285 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 
 		if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
 			reuse_dd = 1;
-		else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+		else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
 			goto err;
 		else
 			/* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
-		mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
+		dd = s->enc_read_ctx;
+		mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		if (s->expand != NULL)
-			{
+		if (s->expand != NULL) {
 			COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
-			s->expand=NULL;
-			}
-		if (comp != NULL)
-			{
-			s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-			if (s->expand == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+			s->expand = NULL;
+		}
+		if (comp != NULL) {
+			s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+			if (s->expand == NULL) {
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
 				goto err2;
-				}
+			}
 			if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
-				s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
-					OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+				s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *)
+			OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
 			if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
 				goto err;
-			}
+		}
 #endif
 		/* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- 		if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-			memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
-		mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
-		mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
-		}
-	else
-		{
+		if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+			memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+		mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
+		mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
+	} else {
 		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
 			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-			else
+		else
 			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
 		if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 			reuse_dd = 1;
-		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
 			goto err;
-		dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
-		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
-			{
+		dd = s->enc_write_ctx;
+		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
 			mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
 			if (!mac_ctx)
 				goto err;
 			s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
-			}
-		else
-			mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+		} else
+			mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-		if (s->compress != NULL)
-			{
+		if (s->compress != NULL) {
 			COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
-			s->compress=NULL;
-			}
-		if (comp != NULL)
-			{
-			s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
-			if (s->compress == NULL)
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
+			s->compress = NULL;
+		}
+		if (comp != NULL) {
+			s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
+			if (s->compress == NULL) {
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
 				goto err2;
-				}
 			}
+		}
 #endif
 		/* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
- 		if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
-			memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
-		mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
+		if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+			memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8);
+		mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
 		mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
-		}
+	}
 
 	if (reuse_dd)
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
 
-	p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
-	i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
+	p = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
+	i=*mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
 
-	cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
-	j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
-	               cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
+	cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
+	j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
+	cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
 	/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
 	/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
 	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
 		k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
 	else
-		k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
-	if (	(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
-		(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
-		{
-		ms=  &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
-		key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
-		iv=  &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
-		exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-		exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-		client_write=1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		n=i;
-		ms=  &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
-		key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
-		iv=  &(p[ n]); n+=k;
-		exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
-		exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
-		client_write=0;
-		}
+		k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+	if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
+		(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+		ms = &(p[0]);
+		n = i + i;
+		key = &(p[n]);
+		n += j + j;
+		iv = &(p[n]);
+		n += k + k;
+		exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+		exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+		client_write = 1;
+	} else {
+		n = i;
+		ms = &(p[n]);
+		n += i + j;
+		key = &(p[n]);
+		n += j + k;
+		iv = &(p[n]);
+		n += k;
+		exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
+		exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
+		client_write = 0;
+	}
 
-	if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+	if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 		goto err2;
-		}
+	}
 
-	memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
+	memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i);
 
-	if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
-		{
+	if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
 		mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
-				mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
-		EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
+		mac_secret, *mac_secret_size);
+		EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key);
 		EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-		}
+	}
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+	printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which);
+	{ int z; for (z = 0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c", ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 #endif
-	if (is_export)
-		{
+	if (is_export) {
 		/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
 		 * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
 		 */
 		if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-				exp_label,exp_label_len,
-				s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-				s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-				NULL,0,NULL,0,
-				key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
-			goto err2;
-		key=tmp1;
+			exp_label, exp_label_len,
+		s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+		s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+		NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+		key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+		goto err2;
+		key = tmp1;
 
-		if (k > 0)
-			{
+		if (k > 0) {
 			if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-					TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
-					s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-					s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-					NULL,0,NULL,0,
-					empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
-				goto err2;
+				TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
+			s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+			s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+			NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+			empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k*2))
+			goto err2;
 			if (client_write)
-				iv=iv1;
+				iv = iv1;
 			else
-				iv= &(iv1[k]);
-			}
+				iv = &(iv1[k]);
 		}
+	}
 
-	s->session->key_arg_length=0;
+	s->session->key_arg_length = 0;
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	{
-        int i;
-	printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
-	printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
-	printf("\n");
-	printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
-	printf("\n");
+		int i;
+		printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, key=, iv=, which)\n");
+		printf("\tkey= "); for (i = 0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
+		printf("\n");
+		printf("\t iv= "); for (i = 0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
+		printf("\n");
 	}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-		{
-		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
-		}
-	else	
-		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+	} else
+		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
 
 	/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
 	if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
-				*mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+	*mac_secret_size, mac_secret);
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\niv=");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
+	printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which);
+	{ int z; for (z = 0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c", key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+	printf("\niv=");
+	{ int z; for (z = 0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c", iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+	printf("\n");
 #endif
 
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
-	return(1);
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1));
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1));
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1));
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2));
+	return (1);
 err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 err2:
-	return(0);
-	}
+	return (0);
+}
 
-int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
-	{
-	unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
+int
+tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
+{
+	unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
 	const EVP_MD *hash;
 	int num;
 	SSL_COMP *comp;
-	int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
-	int ret=0;
+	int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
-		return(1);
+		return (1);
 
-	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
-		return(0);
-		}
+	if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp)) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
+		return (0);
+	}
 
-	s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
+	s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
+	s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash;
 	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
 	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
-	num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+	num = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
 	num*=2;
 
 	ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
 
-	if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 		goto err;
-		}
+	}
 
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
+	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num;
+	s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1;
 
-	if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 		goto err;
-		}
+	}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("client random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("server random\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("pre-master\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+	printf("client random\n");
+	{ int z; for (z = 0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+	printf("server random\n");
+	{ int z; for (z = 0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+	printf("pre-master\n");
+	{ int z; for (z = 0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 #endif
-	if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
+	if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num))
 		goto err;
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("\nkey block\n");
-{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+	printf("\nkey block\n");
+	{ int z; for (z = 0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c", p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 #endif
 
 	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
-		&& s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION)
-		{
+		&& s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
 		/* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
 		 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
 		 */
 		s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
 
-		if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
-			{
+		if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
 			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
 				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-			
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
 			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
 				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
 #endif
-			}
 		}
-		
+	}
+
 	ret = 1;
 err:
-	if (p2)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
+	if (p2) {
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num);
 		OPENSSL_free(p2);
-		}
-	return(ret);
 	}
+	return (ret);
+}
 
 /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
  *
@@ -681,176 +656,161 @@ err:
  *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
  *       an internal error occured.
  */
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-	{
+int
+tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
+	int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
-	if (send)
-		{
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
-			{
-			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+	if (send) {
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
+			int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
 			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-			}
-		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
+		}
+		ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+		rec = &(s->s3->wrec);
 		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
-		else
-			{
+			enc = NULL;
+		else {
 			int ivlen;
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+			enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
 			/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
 			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
 				&& EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 				ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
 			else
 				ivlen = 0;
-			if (ivlen > 1)
-				{
-				if ( rec->data != rec->input)
+			if (ivlen > 1) {
+				if (rec->data != rec->input)
 					/* we can't write into the input stream:
 					 * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
 					 */
 					fprintf(stderr,
-						"%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
-						__FILE__, __LINE__);
+					    "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+					    __FILE__, __LINE__);
 				else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
 					return -1;
-				}
 			}
 		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
-			{
-			int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+	} else {
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
+			int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-			}
-		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
-		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
+		}
+		ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
+		rec = &(s->s3->rrec);
 		if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
-			enc=NULL;
+			enc = NULL;
 		else
-			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		}
+			enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
+	}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
-		{
-		memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
-		rec->input=rec->data;
+	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
+		memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
+		rec->input = rec->data;
 		ret = 1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		l=rec->length;
-		bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
-			{
-			unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
-
-			seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
-
-			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-				{
-				unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
-
-				s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
-				memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
-				memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
-				}
-			else
+	} else {
+		l = rec->length;
+		bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+			unsigned char buf[13], *seq;
+
+			seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+				unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+				s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
+				memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+				memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
+			} else {
+				memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
+				for (i = 7;
+					i >= 0;
+				i--)	/* increment */
 				{
-				memcpy(buf,seq,8);
-				for (i=7; i>=0; i--)	/* increment */
-					{
 					++seq[i];
-					if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
-					}
-				}
+					if (seq[i] != 0)
+						break;
 
-			buf[8]=rec->type;
-			buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
-			buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
-			buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
-			buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
-			pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
-			if (send)
-				{
-				l+=pad;
-				rec->length+=pad;
 				}
 			}
-		else if ((bs != 1) && send)
-			{
-			i=bs-((int)l%bs);
+
+			buf[8] = rec->type;
+			buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
+			buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+			buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
+			buf[12] = rec->length&0xff;
+			pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf);
+			if (send) {
+				l += pad;
+				rec->length += pad;
+			}
+		} else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+			i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
 
 			/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
 
 			/* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
-			j=i-1;
-			if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				{
+			j = i - 1;
+			if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) {
 				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
 					j++;
-				}
-			for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
-				rec->input[k]=j;
-			l+=i;
-			rec->length+=i;
 			}
+			for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
+				rec->input[k] = j;
+			l += i;
+			rec->length += i;
+		}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-		unsigned long ui;
-		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-			ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
+			unsigned long ui;
+			printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p, rec->data=%p, rec->input=%p, l=%ld) ==>\n",
+			ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
+			printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
 			ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
 			DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
 			ds->cipher->iv_len);
-		printf("\t\tIV: ");
-		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
-		printf("\n");
-		printf("\trec->input=");
-		for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
-		printf("\n");
+			printf("\t\tIV: ");
+			for (i = 0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
+				printf("\n");
+			printf("\trec->input=");
+			for (ui = 0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
+				printf("\n");
 		}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-		if (!send)
-			{
-			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
+		if (!send) {
+			if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
 				return 0;
-			}
-		
-		i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		}
+
+		i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
 		if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
-						?(i<0)
-						:(i==0))
-			return -1;	/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
-			{
+			?(i < 0)
+		:(i == 0))
+		return -1;	/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
 			rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 			rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 			rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-			}
+		}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-		unsigned long i;
-		printf("\trec->data=");
-		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-			printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
+			unsigned long i;
+			printf("\trec->data=");
+			for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+				printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
 		}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -861,97 +821,93 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 			ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		if (pad && !send)
 			rec->length -= pad;
-		}
-	return ret;
 	}
+	return ret;
+}
 
-int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
-	{
+int
+tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
+{
 	unsigned int ret;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
 	int i;
 
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
+	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
 		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
 			return 0;
 
-	for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 
-		{
-		  if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) 
-		  	{
-		  	d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
+	for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+		if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
+			d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
 			break;
-			}
 		}
+	}
 	if (!d) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
 		return 0;
-	}	
+	}
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
+	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	return((int)ret);
-	}
+	return ((int)ret);
+}
 
-int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
-	     const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
-	{
+int
+tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
+{
 	unsigned int i;
 	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 	unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
+	unsigned char *q, buf2[12];
 	int idx;
 	long mask;
-	int err=0;
-	const EVP_MD *md; 
+	int err = 0;
+	const EVP_MD *md;
+
 
-	q=buf;
+	q = buf;
 
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 
+	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
 		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
 			return 0;
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
-	for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
-		{
-		if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
-			{
+	for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) {
+		if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
 			int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
 			EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
-			if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
-				{
+			if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
 				/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
 				err = 1;
-				}
-			else
-				{
+			} else {
 				if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
-					!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i) ||
-					(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
-					err = 1;
-				q+=hashsize;
-				}
+					!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) ||
+				(i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
+				err = 1;
+				q += hashsize;
 			}
 		}
-		
+	}
+
 	if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-			str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
-			s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-			out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
-		err = 1;
+		str, slen, buf,(int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
+	s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+	out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
+	err = 1;
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 
 	if (err)
 		return 0;
 	else
 		return sizeof buf2;
-	}
+}
 
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-	{
+int
+tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	unsigned char *seq;
 	EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
@@ -959,152 +915,141 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	int i;
 	EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
 	unsigned char header[13];
-	int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
+	int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : (ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
 	int t;
 
-	if (send)
-		{
-		rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
-		seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
-		hash=ssl->write_hash;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
-		seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
-		hash=ssl->read_hash;
-		}
+	if (send) {
+		rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+		seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
+		hash = ssl->write_hash;
+	} else {
+		rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+		seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
+		hash = ssl->read_hash;
+	}
 
-	t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+	t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
 	OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-	md_size=t;
+	md_size = t;
 
 	/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
-	if (stream_mac) 
-		{
-			mac_ctx = hash;
-		}
-		else
-		{
-			if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash))
-				return -1;
-			mac_ctx = &hmac;
-		}
+	if (stream_mac) {
+		mac_ctx = hash;
+	} else {
+		if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
+			return -1;
+		mac_ctx = &hmac;
+	}
 
-	if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
+	if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+		unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
 
-		s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
-		memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
+		s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
+		memcpy (p, &seq[2], 6);
 
 		memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
-		}
-	else
+	} else
 		memcpy(header, seq, 8);
 
 	/* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
-	orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+	orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
 	rec->type &= 0xff;
 
-	header[8]=rec->type;
-	header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-	header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-	header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
-	header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+	header[8] = rec->type;
+	header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
+	header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+	header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
+	header[12] = (rec->length)&0xff;
 
 	if (!send &&
-	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
-		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+	ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
 		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
 		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
 		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
 		 * timing-oracle. */
 		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
-			mac_ctx,
-			md, &md_size,
-			header, rec->input,
-			rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
-			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
-			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
-			0 /* not SSLv3 */);
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-		t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+		mac_ctx,
+		md, &md_size,
+		header, rec->input,
+		rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
+		ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+		ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+		0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+	} else {
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
+		t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
 		OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 		if (!send && FIPS_mode())
 			tls_fips_digest_extra(
-	    				ssl->enc_read_ctx,
-					mac_ctx, rec->input,
-					rec->length, orig_len);
+		ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+		mac_ctx, rec->input,
+		rec->length, orig_len);
 #endif
-		}
-		
+	}
+
 	if (!stream_mac)
 		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("sec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("seq=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("buf=");
-{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
-printf("rec=");
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
+	printf("sec=");
+	{unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ", mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
+	printf("seq=");
+	{int z; for (z = 0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ", seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
+	printf("buf=");
+	{int z; for (z = 0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ", buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
+	printf("rec=");
+	{unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ", buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
 #endif
 
-	if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-		{
-		for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
-			{
+	if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+		for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
 			++seq[i];
-			if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
-			}
+			if (seq[i] != 0)
+				break;
+
 		}
+	}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
+	{unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ", md[z]); printf("\n"); }
 #endif
-	return(md_size);
-	}
+	return (md_size);
+}
 
-int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
-	     int len)
-	{
+int
+tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
+    int len)
+{
 	unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 	const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
 	int col = 0, sol = 0;
 
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
-	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
+	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p, len);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
 	    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
-	    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
-		{
+	    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
 		co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
 		col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
 		so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
 		sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
-		}
+	}
 #endif
 
 	tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-		TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
-		s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		co, col,
-		s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-		so, sol,
-		p,len,
-		s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+	    TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
+	    s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+	    co, col,
+	    s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+	    so, sol,
+	    p, len,
+	    s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
 	fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
 	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
@@ -1119,13 +1064,14 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
-	return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-	}
+	return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+}
 
-int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-	 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
-	 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
-	{
+int
+tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+    const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
+    size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+{
 	unsigned char *buff;
 	unsigned char *val = NULL;
 	size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
@@ -1136,7 +1082,8 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 	buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
-	if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
+	if (buff == NULL)
+		goto err2;
 
 	/* construct PRF arguments
 	 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
@@ -1144,13 +1091,13 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
 	 * does not create a prohibited label.
 	 */
 	vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
-	if (use_context)
-		{
+	if (use_context) {
 		vallen += 2 + contextlen;
-		}
+	}
 
 	val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
-	if (val == NULL) goto err2;
+	if (val == NULL)
+		goto err2;
 	currentvalpos = 0;
 	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
 	currentvalpos += llen;
@@ -1159,17 +1106,15 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
 	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 
-	if (use_context)
-		{
+	if (use_context) {
 		val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
 		currentvalpos++;
 		val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
 		currentvalpos++;
-		if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
-			{
+		if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
 			memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
-			}
 		}
+	}
 
 	/* disallow prohibited labels
 	 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
@@ -1177,22 +1122,22 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
 	 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
 	 */
 	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+		TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
 	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+		TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
 	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+		TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
 	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
-		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+		TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
 
 	rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
-		      val, vallen,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      NULL, 0,
-		      s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
-		      out,buff,olen);
+	    val, vallen,
+	    NULL, 0,
+	    NULL, 0,
+	    NULL, 0,
+	    NULL, 0,
+	    s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
+	    out, buff, olen);
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
@@ -1206,49 +1151,82 @@ err2:
 	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	rv = 0;
 ret:
-	if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
-	if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
-	return(rv);
-	}
+	if (buff != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(buff);
+	if (val != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(val);
+	return (rv);
+}
 
-int tls1_alert_code(int code)
-	{
-	switch (code)
-		{
-	case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:	return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-	case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:	return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:	return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-	case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:	return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
-	case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:	return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:	return(-1);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:	return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
-	case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:	return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:		return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
-	case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:	return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
-	case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:	return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:	return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:	return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
-	case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:	return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-	case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
-	case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:	return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:	return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:	return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:	return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+int
+tls1_alert_code(int code)
+{
+	switch (code) {
+	case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
+		return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
+	case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
+		return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+	case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
+		return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+	case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
+		return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+	case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
+		return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
+	case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
+		return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+	case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
+		return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+	case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
+		return (-1);
+	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
+		return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
+		return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
+	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
+		return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
+	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
+		return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
+	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
+		return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
+	case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
+		return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
+		return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
+	case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
+		return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
+	case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
+		return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+	case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
+		return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+	case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
+		return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
+	case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+		return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+	case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
+		return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
+	case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+		return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+	case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
+		return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
+	case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
+		return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
+		return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
+		return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
+	case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
+		return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
+	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
+		return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
+		return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
+		return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
 #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
-	case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return 
-					  (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+	case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE : return
+		(DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
 #endif
-	default:			return(-1);
-		}
+	default:
+		return (-1);
 	}
+}