Remove the libssl/src directory

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1419 deletions

diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 53570b2d4f7..00000000000
--- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1419 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.85 2016/04/28 16:39:45 jsing Exp $ */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-
-void
-tls1_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
-{
-	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block != NULL) {
-		explicit_bzero(s->s3->tmp.key_block,
-		    s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
-		free(s->s3->tmp.key_block);
-		s->s3->tmp.key_block = NULL;
-	}
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0;
-}
-
-int
-tls1_init_finished_mac(SSL *s)
-{
-	BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
-	tls1_free_digest_list(s);
-
-	s->s3->handshake_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer == NULL)
-		return (0);
-
-	(void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE);
-
-	return (1);
-}
-
-void
-tls1_free_digest_list(SSL *s)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	if (s == NULL)
-		return;
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL)
-		return;
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
-		if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])
-			EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
-	}
-	free(s->s3->handshake_dgst);
-	s->s3->handshake_dgst = NULL;
-}
-
-void
-tls1_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
-{
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
-	    !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) {
-		BIO_write(s->s3->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len);
-	} else {
-		int i;
-		for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
-			if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]!= NULL)
-				EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], buf, len);
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-int
-tls1_digest_cached_records(SSL *s)
-{
-	int i;
-	long mask;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-	long hdatalen;
-	void *hdata;
-
-	tls1_free_digest_list(s);
-
-	s->s3->handshake_dgst = calloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *));
-	if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return 0;
-	}
-	hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
-	if (hdatalen <= 0) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS,
-		    SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	/* Loop through bits of the algorithm2 field and create MD contexts. */
-	for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++) {
-		if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) && md) {
-			s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-			if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) {
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS,
-				    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-				return 0;
-			}
-			if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i],
-			    md, NULL)) {
-				EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
-				return 0;
-			}
-			if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], hdata,
-			    hdatalen))
-				return 0;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) {
-		BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
-		s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
-	}
-
-	return 1;
-}
-
-void
-tls1_record_sequence_increment(unsigned char *seq)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-		if (++seq[i] != 0)
-			break;
-	}
-}
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int
-tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, int sec_len,
-    const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
-    const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
-    const void *seed5, int seed5_len, unsigned char *out, int olen)
-{
-	int chunk;
-	size_t j;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
-	EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
-	unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	size_t A1_len;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
-	OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
-	mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
-	if (!mac_key)
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
-		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
-		goto err;
-
-	for (;;) {
-		/* Reinit mac contexts */
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
-			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
-			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len))
-			goto err;
-		if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len))
-			goto err;
-
-		if (olen > chunk) {
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j))
-				goto err;
-			out += j;
-			olen -= j;
-			/* calc the next A1 value */
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
-				goto err;
-		} else {
-			/* last one */
-			if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len))
-				goto err;
-			memcpy(out, A1, olen);
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	ret = 1;
-
-err:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
-	explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1));
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static int
-tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2,
-    int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4,
-    int seed4_len, const void *seed5, int seed5_len, const unsigned char *sec,
-    int slen, unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen)
-{
-	int len, i, idx, count;
-	const unsigned char *S1;
-	long m;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	/* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
-	count = 0;
-	for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
-		if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask)
-			count++;
-	}
-	if (count == 0) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
-		    SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	len = slen / count;
-	if (count == 1)
-		slen = 0;
-	S1 = sec;
-	memset(out1, 0, olen);
-	for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
-		if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
-			if (!md) {
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
-				    SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
-				goto err;
-			}
-			if (!tls1_P_hash(md , S1, len + (slen&1), seed1,
-			    seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len,
-			    seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len, out2, olen))
-				goto err;
-			S1 += len;
-			for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) {
-				out1[i] ^= out2[i];
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	ret = 1;
-
-err:
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, unsigned char *tmp, int num)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-	    TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
-	    s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-	    s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-	    NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-	    s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
-	    km, tmp, num);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success
- * and 0 on failure.
- */
-static int
-tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx)
-{
-	if (*aead_ctx != NULL) {
-		EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx);
-		return (1);
-	}
-
-	*aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX));
-	if (*aead_ctx == NULL) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_AEAD_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return (0);
-	}
-
-	return (1);
-}
-
-static int
-tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key,
-    unsigned key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len)
-{
-	const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
-	SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx;
-
-	if (is_read) {
-		if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx))
-			return 0;
-		aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx;
-	} else {
-		if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx))
-			return 0;
-		aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx;
-	}
-
-	if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len,
-	    EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL))
-		return (0);
-	if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD,
-		    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		return (0);
-	}
-	memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len);
-	aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len;
-	aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8;  /* always the case, currently. */
-	aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record =
-	    (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 &
-	    SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0;
-	aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce =
-	    s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305;
-	aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead);
-
-	if (aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce) {
-		if (aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) ||
-		    aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len > EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD,
-			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return (0);
-		}
-	} else {
-		if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len !=
-		    EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD,
-			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			return (0);
-		}
-	}
-
-	return (1);
-}
-
-/*
- * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher
- * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function
- * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec
- * message. In order to support export ciphersuites, use_client_keys indicates
- * whether the key material provided is in the "client write" direction.
- */
-static int
-tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, char use_client_keys,
-    const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size,
-    const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv,
-    unsigned int iv_len)
-{
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-	EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
-	const EVP_MD *mac;
-	int mac_type;
-
-	cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
-	mac = s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
-	mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
-
-	if (is_read) {
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
-			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-		else
-			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
-		s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
-		EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->read_hash);
-		s->read_hash = NULL;
-
-		if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx;
-		if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		s->read_hash = mac_ctx;
-	} else {
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
-			s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-		else
-			s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
-
-		/*
-		 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher
-		 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order
-		 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write
-		 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed
-		 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment.
-		 */
-		if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
-			s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
-			EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->write_hash);
-			s->write_hash = NULL;
-		}
-		if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		s->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx;
-		if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
-	}
-
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
-		EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL,
-		    !is_read);
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
-		    iv_len, (unsigned char *)iv);
-	} else
-		EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read);
-
-	if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
-		EVP_PKEY *mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
-		    mac_secret, mac_secret_size);
-		if (mac_key == NULL)
-			goto err;
-		EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
-	} else if (mac_secret_size > 0) {
-		/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
-		    mac_secret_size, (unsigned char *)mac_secret);
-	}
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) {
-		int nid;
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94)
-			nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet;
-		else
-			nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z;
-
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0);
-		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC)
-			EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0);
-	}
-
-	return (1);
-
-err:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	return (0);
-}
-
-int
-tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
-{
-	const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret;
-	const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key;
-	const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv;
-	const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv;
-	int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len;
-	unsigned char *key_block, *seq;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-	const EVP_AEAD *aead;
-	char is_read, use_client_keys;
-
-
-	cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
-	aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
-
-	/*
-	 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message,
-	 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have
-	 * just written one.
-	 */
-	is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client
-	 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a
-	 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec.
-	 */
-	use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
-	    (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ));
-
-
-	/*
-	 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in
-	 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers().
-	 */
-	if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-		seq = is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence;
-		memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
-	}
-
-	if (aead != NULL) {
-		key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
-		iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-	} else {
-		key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
-		iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
-
-		/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-			iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
-	}
-
-	mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
-
-	key_block = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
-	client_write_mac_secret = key_block;
-	key_block += mac_secret_size;
-	server_write_mac_secret = key_block;
-	key_block += mac_secret_size;
-	client_write_key = key_block;
-	key_block += key_len;
-	server_write_key = key_block;
-	key_block += key_len;
-	client_write_iv = key_block;
-	key_block += iv_len;
-	server_write_iv = key_block;
-	key_block += iv_len;
-
-	if (use_client_keys) {
-		mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret;
-		key = client_write_key;
-		iv = client_write_iv;
-	} else {
-		mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret;
-		key = server_write_key;
-		iv = server_write_iv;
-	}
-
-	if (key_block - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		goto err2;
-	}
-
-	if (is_read) {
-		memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size);
-		s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
-	} else {
-		memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size);
-		s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
-	}
-
-	if (aead != NULL) {
-		return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len,
-		    iv, iv_len);
-	}
-
-	return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys,
-	    mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len);
-
-err2:
-	return (0);
-}
-
-int
-tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
-{
-	unsigned char *key_block, *tmp_block = NULL;
-	int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0;
-	int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
-	const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
-	const EVP_MD *mac = NULL;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
-		return (1);
-
-	if (s->session->cipher &&
-	    (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD)) {
-		if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
-			    SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
-			return (0);
-		}
-		key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
-		iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher);
-	} else {
-		if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type,
-		    &mac_secret_size)) {
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,
-			    SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
-			return (0);
-		}
-		key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
-		iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
-
-		/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
-			iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
-	}
-
-	s->s3->tmp.new_aead = aead;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_hash = mac;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
-	s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
-
-	tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
-	if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len,
-	    2)) == NULL) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-	}
-	key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2;
-
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = key_block_len;
-	s->s3->tmp.key_block = key_block;
-
-	if ((tmp_block = malloc(key_block_len)) == NULL) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-	}
-
-	if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, tmp_block, key_block_len))
-		goto err;
-
-	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) &&
-	    s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) {
-		/*
-		 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
-		 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
-		 */
-		s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
-
-		if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
-			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
-			if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
-				s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
-#endif
-		}
-	}
-
-	ret = 1;
-
-err:
-	if (tmp_block) {
-		explicit_bzero(tmp_block, key_block_len);
-		free(tmp_block);
-	}
-	return (ret);
-}
-
-/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
- *
- * Returns:
- *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
- *       short etc).
- *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
- *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
- *       an internal error occured.
- */
-int
-tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
-{
-	const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead;
-	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-	unsigned char *seq;
-	unsigned long l;
-	int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
-
-	if (send) {
-		aead = s->aead_write_ctx;
-		rec = &s->s3->wrec;
-		seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
-	} else {
-		aead = s->aead_read_ctx;
-		rec = &s->s3->rrec;
-		seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
-	}
-
-	if (aead) {
-		unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16];
-		size_t out_len, pad_len = 0;
-		unsigned int nonce_used;
-
-		if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-			dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq,
-			    send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch);
-		} else {
-			memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
-			tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq);
-		}
-
-		ad[8] = rec->type;
-		ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
-		ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
-
-		if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8 ||
-		    aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce))
-			return -1;
-
-		if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) {
-			if (aead->fixed_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) ||
-			    aead->variable_nonce_len > aead->fixed_nonce_len)
-				return -1;  /* Should never happen. */
-			pad_len = aead->fixed_nonce_len - aead->variable_nonce_len;
-		} else {
-			if (aead->fixed_nonce_len +
-			    aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce))
-				return -1;  /* Should never happen. */
-		}
-
-		if (send) {
-			size_t len = rec->length;
-			size_t eivlen = 0;
-			in = rec->input;
-			out = rec->data;
-
-			if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) {
-				/*
-				 * The sequence number is left zero
-				 * padded, then xored with the fixed
-				 * nonce.
-				 */
-				memset(nonce, 0, pad_len);
-				memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad,
-				    aead->variable_nonce_len);
-				for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++)
-					nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i];
-				nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len;
-			} else {
-				/*
-				 * When sending we use the sequence number as
-				 * the variable part of the nonce.
-				 */
-				memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce,
-				    aead->fixed_nonce_len);
-				nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len;
-				memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad,
-				    aead->variable_nonce_len);
-				nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-			}
-
-			/*
-			 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by
-			 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the
-			 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number
-			 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the
-			 * plaintext.
-			 */
-			if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) {
-				memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
-				len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
-				eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len;
-			}
-
-			ad[11] = len >> 8;
-			ad[12] = len & 0xff;
-
-			if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx,
-			    out + eivlen, &out_len, len + aead->tag_len, nonce,
-			    nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad)))
-				return -1;
-			if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record)
-				out_len += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-		} else {
-			/* receive */
-			size_t len = rec->length;
-
-			if (rec->data != rec->input)
-				return -1;  /* internal error - should never happen. */
-			out = in = rec->input;
-
-			if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len)
-				return 0;
-
-			if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) {
-				/*
-				 * The sequence number is left zero
-				 * padded, then xored with the fixed
-				 * nonce.
-				 */
-				memset(nonce, 0, pad_len);
-				memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad,
-				    aead->variable_nonce_len);
-				for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++)
-					nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i];
-				nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len;
-			} else {
-				memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce,
-				    aead->fixed_nonce_len);
-				nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len;
-
-				memcpy(nonce + nonce_used,
-				    aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad,
-				    aead->variable_nonce_len);
-				nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-			}
-
-			if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) {
-				in += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-				len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
-				out += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-			}
-
-			if (len < aead->tag_len)
-				return 0;
-			len -= aead->tag_len;
-
-			ad[11] = len >> 8;
-			ad[12] = len & 0xff;
-
-			if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &out_len, len,
-			    nonce, nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad,
-			    sizeof(ad)))
-				return -1;
-
-			rec->data = rec->input = out;
-		}
-
-		rec->length = out_len;
-
-		return 1;
-	}
-
-	if (send) {
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
-			int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-		}
-		ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
-		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
-			enc = NULL;
-		else {
-			int ivlen = 0;
-			enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
-			if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
-			    EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-				ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
-			if (ivlen > 1) {
-				if (rec->data != rec->input) {
-#ifdef DEBUG
-					/* we can't write into the input stream:
-					 * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
-					 */
-					fprintf(stderr,
-					    "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
-					    __FILE__, __LINE__);
-#endif
-				} else
-					arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen);
-			}
-		}
-	} else {
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
-			int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-			OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
-		}
-		ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
-		if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
-			enc = NULL;
-		else
-			enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
-	}
-
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
-		memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
-		rec->input = rec->data;
-		ret = 1;
-	} else {
-		l = rec->length;
-		bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
-
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
-			unsigned char buf[13];
-
-			if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-				dtls1_build_sequence_number(buf, seq,
-				    send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch);
-			} else {
-				memcpy(buf, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
-				tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq);
-			}
-
-			buf[8] = rec->type;
-			buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
-			buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
-			buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
-			buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
-			pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf);
-			if (send) {
-				l += pad;
-				rec->length += pad;
-			}
-		} else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
-			i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
-
-			/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
-
-			/* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
-			j = i - 1;
-			for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
-				rec->input[k] = j;
-			l += i;
-			rec->length += i;
-		}
-
-		if (!send) {
-			if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
-				return 0;
-		}
-
-		i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
-		if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) &
-		    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0))
-			return -1;	/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
-			rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-			rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-			rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-		}
-
-		ret = 1;
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
-			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
-		if (pad && !send)
-			rec->length -= pad;
-	}
-	return ret;
-}
-
-int
-tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
-{
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
-	unsigned int ret;
-	int i;
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-		if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s))
-			return 0;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
-		if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] &&
-		    EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
-			d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	if (d == NULL) {
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d))
-		return 0;
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-	return ((int)ret);
-}
-
-int
-tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
-{
-	unsigned int i;
-	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-	unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	unsigned char *q, buf2[12];
-	int idx;
-	long mask;
-	int err = 0;
-	const EVP_MD *md;
-
-	q = buf;
-
-	if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-		if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s))
-			return 0;
-
-	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
-	for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) {
-		if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & mask) {
-			int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
-			EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx];
-			if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 ||
-			    hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) {
-				/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
-				err = 1;
-			} else {
-				if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
-				    !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) ||
-				    (i != (unsigned int)hashsize))
-					err = 1;
-				q += hashsize;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf),
-	    NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-	    s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
-	    out, buf2, sizeof buf2))
-		err = 1;
-	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
-	if (err)
-		return 0;
-	else
-		return sizeof buf2;
-}
-
-int
-tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
-{
-	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
-	unsigned char *seq;
-	EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
-	size_t md_size, orig_len;
-	EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-	unsigned char header[13];
-	int stream_mac = (send ?
-	    (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) :
-	    (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
-	int t;
-
-	if (send) {
-		rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
-		seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
-		hash = ssl->write_hash;
-	} else {
-		rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
-		seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
-		hash = ssl->read_hash;
-	}
-
-	t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
-	OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-	md_size = t;
-
-	/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
-	if (stream_mac) {
-		mac_ctx = hash;
-	} else {
-		if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
-			return -1;
-		mac_ctx = &hmac;
-	}
-
-	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
-		dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq,
-		    send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch);
-	else
-		memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
-
-	/* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
-	orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8);
-	rec->type &= 0xff;
-
-	header[8] = rec->type;
-	header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
-	header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-	header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
-	header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
-
-	if (!send &&
-	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
-		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
-		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
-		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
-		 * timing-oracle. */
-		if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
-		    md, &md_size, header, rec->input,
-		    rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
-		    ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
-		    ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
-		    0 /* not SSLv3 */))
-			return -1;
-	} else {
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
-		t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
-		OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
-	}
-
-	if (!stream_mac)
-		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
-
-	if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
-		tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq);
-
-	return (md_size);
-}
-
-int
-tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
-    int len)
-{
-	unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
-
-	tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-	    TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
-	    s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0,
-	    s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0,
-	    p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff);
-
-	return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
-}
-
-int
-tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
-    const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
-    size_t contextlen, int use_context)
-{
-	unsigned char *buff;
-	unsigned char *val = NULL;
-	size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
-	int rv;
-
-	buff = malloc(olen);
-	if (buff == NULL)
-		goto err2;
-
-	/* construct PRF arguments
-	 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
-	 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
-	 * does not create a prohibited label.
-	 */
-	vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
-	if (use_context) {
-		vallen += 2 + contextlen;
-	}
-
-	val = malloc(vallen);
-	if (val == NULL)
-		goto err2;
-	currentvalpos = 0;
-	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
-	currentvalpos += llen;
-	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
-	if (use_context) {
-		val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
-		currentvalpos++;
-		val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
-		currentvalpos++;
-		if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) {
-			memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
-		}
-	}
-
-	/* disallow prohibited labels
-	 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
-	 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
-	 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
-	 */
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
-	    TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
-		goto err1;
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
-	    TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
-		goto err1;
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
-	    TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
-		goto err1;
-	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
-	    TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0)
-		goto err1;
-
-	rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-	    val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
-	    s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
-	    out, buff, olen);
-
-	goto ret;
-err1:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL,
-	    SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
-	rv = 0;
-	goto ret;
-err2:
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-	rv = 0;
-ret:
-	free(buff);
-	free(val);
-
-	return (rv);
-}
-
-int
-tls1_alert_code(int code)
-{
-	switch (code) {
-	case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
-		return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
-	case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
-		return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
-		return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
-		return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-	case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
-		return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
-	case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
-		return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
-		return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
-		return (-1);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
-		return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
-		return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
-		return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
-		return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
-		return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
-	case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
-		return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
-		return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
-	case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
-		return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
-	case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
-		return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
-		return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
-		return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
-	case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
-		return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
-	case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
-		return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
-	case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
-		return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-	case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
-		return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
-	case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
-		return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
-	case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
-		return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
-	case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
-		return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
-	case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
-		return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
-		return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
-		return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
-	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
-		return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
-	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
-		return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
-	default:
-		return (-1);
-	}
-}