import OpenSSL-1.0.0a

6 files changed, 949 insertions, 242 deletions

diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c
index 15a201a25cf..4ce4064cc91 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -123,6 +123,37 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
+			if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
+				long ii; \
+				for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
+			} else { \
+				long ii; \
+				bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
+				for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
+				bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
+			} }
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
+			long ii; \
+			OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
+			is_complete = 1; \
+			if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
+			if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
+				if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
+
+#if 0
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
+			long ii; \
+			printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
+			printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
+			printf("\n"); }
+#endif
+
+static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
+static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
 
 /* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
 static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
@@ -136,15 +167,15 @@ static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
 static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
 	unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, 
 	unsigned long frag_len);
-static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
 static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, 
 	long max, int *ok);
 
 static hm_fragment *
-dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
+dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
 	{
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
 	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+	unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
 
 	frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
 	if ( frag == NULL)
@@ -163,6 +194,21 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
 	/* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
 	frag->fragment = buf;
 
+	/* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
+	if (reassembly)
+		{
+		bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+		if (bitmask == NULL)
+			{
+			if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
+			OPENSSL_free(frag);
+			return NULL;
+			}
+		memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+		}
+
+	frag->reassembly = bitmask;
+
 	return frag;
 	}
 
@@ -170,6 +216,7 @@ static void
 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
 	{
 	if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+	if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
 	OPENSSL_free(frag);
 	}
 
@@ -178,7 +225,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 	{
 	int ret;
 	int curr_mtu;
-	unsigned int len, frag_off;
+	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
 
 	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
 	if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
@@ -226,11 +273,22 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
 			(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
 
+	if (s->write_hash)
+		mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+	else
+		mac_size = 0;
+
+	if (s->enc_write_ctx && 
+		(EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
+		blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
+	else
+		blocksize = 0;
+
 	frag_off = 0;
 	while( s->init_num)
 		{
 		curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - 
-			DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+			DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
 
 		if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
 			{
@@ -238,7 +296,8 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 			ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
 			if ( ret <= 0)
 				return ret;
-			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+			curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
+				mac_size - blocksize;
 			}
 
 		if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
@@ -280,7 +339,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 			 * retransmit 
 			 */
 			if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
-				BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL))
+				BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
 				s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
 					BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
 			else
@@ -301,7 +360,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 				const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
 				int xlen;
 
-				if (frag_off == 0 && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+				if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 					{
 					/* reconstruct message header is if it
 					 * is being sent in single fragment */
@@ -352,6 +411,8 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
 	{
 	int i, al;
 	struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned long msg_len;
 
 	/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
 	 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
@@ -371,76 +432,55 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
 		}
 
 	msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
-	do
-		{
-		if ( msg_hdr->frag_off == 0)
-			{
-			/* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */
-			memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-			}
+	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
 
-		i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
-		if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
-			i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY)  /* bad fragment received */
-			continue;
-		else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
-			return i;
+again:
+	i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
+	if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
+		i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY)  /* bad fragment received */
+		goto again;
+	else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
+		return i;
 
-		/* Note that s->init_sum is used as a counter summing
-		 * up fragments' lengths: as soon as they sum up to
-		 * handshake packet length, we assume we have got all
-		 * the fragments. Overlapping fragments would cause
-		 * premature termination, so we don't expect overlaps.
-		 * Well, handling overlaps would require something more
-		 * drastic. Indeed, as it is now there is no way to
-		 * tell if out-of-order fragment from the middle was
-		 * the last. '>=' is the best/least we can do to control
-		 * the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */
-		if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len)
-			{
-			unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-			unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
-
-			/* reconstruct message header as if it was
-			 * sent in single fragment */
-			*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
-			l2n3(msg_len,p);
-			s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
-			l2n3(0,p);
-			l2n3(msg_len,p);
-			if (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-				p       -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
-				msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
-			ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
-			if (s->msg_callback)
-				s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-					p, msg_len,
-					s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-			memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
-
-			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-			/* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
-			 * this means that we don't need to retransmit of the
-			 * buffered messages.  
-			 * XDTLS: may be able clear out this
-			 * buffer a little sooner (i.e if an out-of-order
-			 * handshake message/record is received at the record
-			 * layer.  
-			 * XDTLS: exception is that the server needs to
-			 * know that change cipher spec and finished messages
-			 * have been received by the client before clearing this
-			 * buffer.  this can simply be done by waiting for the
-			 * first data  segment, but is there a better way?  */
-			dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
-
-			s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-			return s->init_num;
-			}
-		else
-			msg_hdr->frag_off = i;
-		} while(1) ;
+	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+	/* reconstruct message header */
+	*(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
+	l2n3(msg_len,p);
+	s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+	l2n3(0,p);
+	l2n3(msg_len,p);
+	if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+		p       -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+	}
+
+	ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
+	if (s->msg_callback)
+		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+			p, msg_len,
+			s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+	memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+	s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+	/* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
+	 * this means that we don't need to retransmit of the
+	 * buffered messages.  
+	 * XDTLS: may be able clear out this
+	 * buffer a little sooner (i.e if an out-of-order
+	 * handshake message/record is received at the record
+	 * layer.  
+	 * XDTLS: exception is that the server needs to
+	 * know that change cipher spec and finished messages
+	 * have been received by the client before clearing this
+	 * buffer.  this can simply be done by waiting for the
+	 * first data  segment, but is there a better way?  */
+	dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
+
+	s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+	return s->init_num;
 
 f_err:
 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
@@ -474,7 +514,7 @@ static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max
 		{
 		/* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
 		 * against max above */
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
 			return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -516,9 +556,14 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 		return 0;
 
 	frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+	
+	/* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
+	if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
+		return 0;
 
 	if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
 		{
+		unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
 		pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
 
 		al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
@@ -536,7 +581,7 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 		if (al==0)
 			{
 			*ok = 1;
-			return frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+			return frag_len;
 			}
 
 		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
@@ -550,18 +595,50 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 
 
 static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
-{
-	int i=-1;
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+	{
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
 	pitem *item = NULL;
-	PQ_64BIT seq64;
-	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+	int i = -1, is_complete;
+	unsigned char seq64be[8];
+	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
 
 	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
 		goto err;
 
-	if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
+	/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
+	 * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
+	 */
+	if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
+		max_len = s->max_cert_list;
+	else
+		max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+
+	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
+		goto err;
+
+	/* Try to find item in queue */
+	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
+	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+	if (item == NULL)
+		{
+		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
+		if ( frag == NULL)
+			goto err;
+		memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+		frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
+		frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+		}
+	else
+		frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
+
+	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
+	 */
+	if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
 		{
 		unsigned char devnull [256];
 
@@ -573,32 +650,128 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 			if (i<=0) goto err;
 			frag_len -= i;
 			}
+		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 		}
 
-	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
-	if ( frag == NULL)
+	/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+	i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+		frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
+	if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
 		goto err;
 
-	memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+	RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
+	                    (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
 
-	if (frag_len)
+	RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
+	                           is_complete);
+
+	if (is_complete)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+		frag->reassembly = NULL;
+		}
+
+	if (item == NULL)
 		{
-		/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
-		i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
-			frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
-		if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+		memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+		seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+		seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
+
+		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+		if (item == NULL)
+			{
 			goto err;
+			i = -1;
+			}
+
+		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
 		}
 
-	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
-	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
+	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+err:
+	if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+	if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	*ok = 0;
+	return i;
+	}
+
 
-	item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
-	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
-	if ( item == NULL)
+static int
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+{
+	int i=-1;
+	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+	pitem *item = NULL;
+	unsigned char seq64be[8];
+	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
 		goto err;
 
-	pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+	/* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
+	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
+	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+	/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
+	 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
+	 */
+	if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+		item = NULL;
+
+	/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
+	 * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
+	 * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
+	 * retransmit.
+	 */
+	if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+		msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
+		(s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
+		{
+		unsigned char devnull [256];
+
+		while (frag_len)
+			{
+			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+				devnull,
+				frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
+			if (i<=0) goto err;
+			frag_len -= i;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
+		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
+		if ( frag == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
+		if (frag_len)
+			{
+			/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+				frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+			if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+				goto err;
+			}
+
+		memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+		seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+		seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
+
+		item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+		if ( item == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		}
+
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
@@ -613,14 +786,14 @@ static long
 dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 	{
 	unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
-	unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len;
+	unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
 	int i,al;
 	struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
 
 	/* see if we have the required fragment already */
 	if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
 		{
-		if (*ok)	s->init_num += frag_len;
+		if (*ok)	s->init_num = frag_len;
 		return frag_len;
 		}
 
@@ -645,10 +818,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 	if ( msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
 		return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
 
-	l = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+	len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
 	frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
 	frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
 
+	if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
+		return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
+
 	if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
 		wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
 		{
@@ -708,7 +884,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 	 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
 	 * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
 	 * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
-	s->init_num += frag_len;
+	s->init_num = frag_len;
 	return frag_len;
 
 f_err:
@@ -731,14 +907,30 @@ int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
 		p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
 
 		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
-			&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
-			&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
 			sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
 		s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
 		memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
 		p+=i;
 		l=i;
 
+	/* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+	 * renegotiation checks
+	 */
+	if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+		memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, 
+		       s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+		memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, 
+		       s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+		s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
+		}
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
 		/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
 		 * I do this.
@@ -779,12 +971,11 @@ int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
 		s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
 		s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
-		if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-			{
+		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
 			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
 			s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
 			s->init_num+=2;
-			}
+		}
 
 		s->init_off=0;
 
@@ -801,14 +992,30 @@ int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
 	}
 
+static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+	{
+	int n;
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
+	if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+	l2n3(n,p);
+	i2d_X509(x,&p);
+	*l+=n+3;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
 unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
 	{
 	unsigned char *p;
-	int n,i;
+	int i;
 	unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 	BUF_MEM *buf;
-	X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
-	X509_OBJECT obj;
 
 	/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
 	buf=s->init_buf;
@@ -819,54 +1026,35 @@ unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
 		}
 	if (x != NULL)
 		{
-		if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,NULL,NULL))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
-			return(0);
-			}
-
-		for (;;)
-			{
-			n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
-				{
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-				return(0);
-				}
-			p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[l]);
-			l2n3(n,p);
-			i2d_X509(x,&p);
-			l+=n+3;
-			if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),
-				X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0) break;
-
-			i=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&xs_ctx,X509_LU_X509,
-				X509_get_issuer_name(x),&obj);
-			if (i <= 0) break;
-			x=obj.data.x509;
-			/* Count is one too high since the X509_STORE_get uped the
-			 * ref count */
-			X509_free(x);
-			}
-
-		X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
-		}
-
-	/* Thawte special :-) */
-	if (s->ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
+		X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+		if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
+  			{
+  			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+  			return(0);
+  			}
+  
+		X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+		/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+		ERR_clear_error();
+		for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
+  			{
+			x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+			if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+  				{
+				X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+				return 0;
+  				}
+  			}
+  		X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+  		}
+  	/* Thawte special :-) */
 	for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
 		{
 		x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
-		n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
-		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-			return(0);
-			}
-		p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[l]);
-		l2n3(n,p);
-		i2d_X509(x,&p);
-		l+=n+3;
+		if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+			return 0;
 		}
 
 	l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
@@ -883,18 +1071,13 @@ unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
 
 int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
 	{
-	DTLS1_STATE *state;
-	BIO *bio;
-	int send_alert = 0;
-
 	if ( code > 0)
 		{
 		fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
 		return 1;
 		}
 
-	bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
-	if ( ! BIO_dgram_recv_timedout(bio))
+	if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
 		{
 		/* not a timeout, none of our business, 
 		   let higher layers handle this.  in fact it's probably an error */
@@ -907,23 +1090,6 @@ int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
 		return code;
 		}
 
-	state = s->d1;
-	state->timeout.num_alerts++;
-	if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
-		{
-		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	state->timeout.read_timeouts++;
-	if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
-		{
-		send_alert = 1;
-		state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
-		}
-
-
 #if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
 	item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
 	if ( item )
@@ -934,16 +1100,29 @@ int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
 #endif
 
 #if 0  /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
-		if ( send_alert)
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
-				DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+	if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+			DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
 #endif
 
-	return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s) ;
+	return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
 	}
 
+int
+dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
+	{
+	/* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
+	 * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
+	 * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
+	 * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
+	 * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
+	 * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
+	 * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
+	 */	
+	return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
+	}
 
-static int
+int
 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
 	{
 	pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
@@ -957,8 +1136,9 @@ dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
 	for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
 		{
 		frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-		if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, &found) <= 0 &&
-			found)
+			if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+				(unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
+				0, &found) <= 0 && found)
 			{
 			fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
 			return -1;
@@ -973,22 +1153,20 @@ dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
 	{
 	pitem *item;
 	hm_fragment *frag;
-	PQ_64BIT seq64;
-	unsigned int epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+	unsigned char seq64be[8];
 
 	/* this function is called immediately after a message has 
 	 * been serialized */
 	OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
 
-	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num);
+	frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
 
 	memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
 
 	if ( is_ccs)
 		{
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + 
-			DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH <= (unsigned int)s->init_num);
-		epoch++;
+			       ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
 		}
 	else
 		{
@@ -1003,11 +1181,20 @@ dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
 	frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
 	frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
 
-	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
-	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, epoch<<16 | frag->msg_header.seq);
-
-	item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
-	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
+	/* save current state*/
+	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
+	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
+	frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+	
+	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+														  frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
+	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+														  frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
+
+	item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
 	if ( item == NULL)
 		{
 		dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
@@ -1033,7 +1220,9 @@ dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
 	pitem *item;
 	hm_fragment *frag ;
 	unsigned long header_length;
-	PQ_64BIT seq64;
+	unsigned char seq64be[8];
+	struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
+	unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
 
 	/*
 	  OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
@@ -1041,11 +1230,11 @@ dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
 	 */
 
 	/* XDTLS:  the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
-	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
-	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, seq);
+	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8);
+	seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
 
-	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64);
-	pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
+	item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
 	if ( item == NULL)
 		{
 		fprintf(stderr, "retransmit:  message %d non-existant\n", seq);
@@ -1069,9 +1258,45 @@ dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
 		frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, 
 		frag->msg_header.frag_len);
 
+	/* save current state */
+	saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+	saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+	saved_state.compress = s->compress;
+	saved_state.session = s->session;
+	saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+	saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+	
 	s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
+	
+	/* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
+	s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
+	s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
+	s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
+	s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
+	s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
+	
+	if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
+	{
+		memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+		memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+	}
+	
 	ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? 
-		SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+						 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+	
+	/* restore current state */
+	s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
+	s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
+	s->compress = saved_state.compress;
+	s->session = saved_state.session;
+	s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
+	
+	if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
+	{
+		memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+		memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+	}
+
 	s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
 
 	(void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
@@ -1160,7 +1385,7 @@ dtls1_min_mtu(void)
 static unsigned int 
 dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
 	{
-	size_t i;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
 		return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_enc.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_enc.c
index cf3332e4e43..8fa57347a99 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -136,8 +136,12 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 	if (send)
 		{
-		if (s->write_hash != NULL)
-			n=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
+			{
+			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+			if (n < 0)
+				return -1;
+			}
 		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
 		rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
 		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
@@ -151,15 +155,19 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 					__FILE__, __LINE__);
 			else if ( EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher) > 1)
 				{
-				if (!RAND_bytes(rec->input, EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher)))
+				if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher)) <= 0)
 					return -1;
 				}
 			}
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		if (s->read_hash != NULL)
-			n=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
+			{
+			n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+			if (n < 0)
+				return -1;
+			}
 		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
 		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
 		if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
@@ -206,11 +214,10 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		{
                 unsigned long ui;
 		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                        (void *)ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
-		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%ld %ld], %d iv_len\n",
+                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
                         ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                        (unsigned long)DES_KEY_SZ,
-			(unsigned long)DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
                         ds->cipher->iv_len);
 		printf("\t\tIV: ");
 		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
@@ -235,10 +242,10 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-                unsigned long ki;
+                unsigned long i;
                 printf("\trec->data=");
-		for (ki=0; ki<l; ki++)
-                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[ki]);  printf("\n");
+		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
+                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
                 }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_lib.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_lib.c
index 3568e97a877..96b220e87ce 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_lib.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_lib.c
@@ -58,10 +58,17 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+#include <sys/timeb.h>
+#endif
+
+static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
 const char dtls1_version_str[]="DTLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client);
 
 SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data={
     dtls1_enc,
@@ -84,11 +91,6 @@ long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
 	return(60*60*2);
 	}
 
-IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(dtlsv1_base_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl_bad_method)
-
 int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
 	{
 	DTLS1_STATE *d1;
@@ -98,22 +100,12 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
 	memset(d1,0, sizeof *d1);
 
 	/* d1->handshake_epoch=0; */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(VMS_TEST)
-	d1->bitmap.length=64;
-#else
-	d1->bitmap.length=sizeof(d1->bitmap.map) * 8;
-#endif
-	pq_64bit_init(&(d1->bitmap.map));
-	pq_64bit_init(&(d1->bitmap.max_seq_num));
-	
-	d1->next_bitmap.length = d1->bitmap.length;
-	pq_64bit_init(&(d1->next_bitmap.map));
-	pq_64bit_init(&(d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
 
 	d1->unprocessed_rcds.q=pqueue_new();
 	d1->processed_rcds.q=pqueue_new();
 	d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
 	d1->sent_messages=pqueue_new();
+	d1->buffered_app_data.q=pqueue_new();
 
 	if ( s->server)
 		{
@@ -121,12 +113,13 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
 		}
 
 	if( ! d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || ! d1->processed_rcds.q 
-        || ! d1->buffered_messages || ! d1->sent_messages)
+        || ! d1->buffered_messages || ! d1->sent_messages || ! d1->buffered_app_data.q)
 		{
         if ( d1->unprocessed_rcds.q) pqueue_free(d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
         if ( d1->processed_rcds.q) pqueue_free(d1->processed_rcds.q);
         if ( d1->buffered_messages) pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
 		if ( d1->sent_messages) pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
+		if ( d1->buffered_app_data.q) pqueue_free(d1->buffered_app_data.q);
 		OPENSSL_free(d1);
 		return (0);
 		}
@@ -175,11 +168,14 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
         }
 	pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
 
-	pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->bitmap.map));
-	pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num));
-
-	pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map));
-	pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
+	while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL)
+		{
+		frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+		OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+		OPENSSL_free(frag);
+		pitem_free(item);
+		}
+	pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
 
 	OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
 	}
@@ -187,7 +183,36 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 	{
 	ssl3_clear(s);
-	s->version=DTLS1_VERSION;
+	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
+		s->version=DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+	else
+		s->version=DTLS1_VERSION;
+	}
+
+long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+	{
+	int ret=0;
+
+	switch (cmd)
+		{
+	case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
+		if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval*) parg) != NULL)
+			{
+			ret = 1;
+			}
+		break;
+	case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
+		ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
+		break;
+	case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
+		ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
+		break;
+		}
+	return(ret);
 	}
 
 /*
@@ -197,15 +222,173 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
  * to explicitly list their SSL_* codes. Currently RC4 is the only one
  * available, but if new ones emerge, they will have to be added...
  */
-SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
+const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
 	{
-	SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
+	const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
 
 	if (ciph != NULL)
 		{
-		if ((ciph->algorithms&SSL_ENC_MASK) == SSL_RC4)
+		if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
 			return NULL;
 		}
 
 	return ciph;
 	}
+
+void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
+	{
+	/* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
+	if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0)
+		{
+		s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
+		}
+	
+	/* Set timeout to current time */
+	get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
+
+	/* Add duration to current time */
+	s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
+	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
+	}
+
+struct timeval* dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval* timeleft)
+	{
+	struct timeval timenow;
+
+	/* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
+	if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0)
+		{
+		return NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* Get current time */
+	get_current_time(&timenow);
+
+	/* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
+	if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
+		(s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
+		 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec))
+		{
+		memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+		return timeleft;
+		}
+
+	/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
+	memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
+	timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
+	timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
+	if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0)
+		{
+		timeleft->tv_sec--;
+		timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
+		}
+
+	/* If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0
+	 * to prevent issues because of small devergences with
+	 * socket timeouts.
+	 */
+	if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000)
+		{
+		memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+		}
+	
+
+	return timeleft;
+	}
+
+int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
+	{
+	struct timeval timeleft;
+
+	/* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
+	if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL)
+		{
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	/* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
+	if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0)
+		{
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	/* Timer expired, so return true */	
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
+	{
+	s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
+	if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
+		s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
+	dtls1_start_timer(s);
+	}
+
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
+	{
+	/* Reset everything */
+	memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+	s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
+	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
+	}
+
+int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
+	{
+	DTLS1_STATE *state;
+
+	/* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
+	if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
+		{
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	dtls1_double_timeout(s);
+	state = s->d1;
+	state->timeout.num_alerts++;
+	if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
+		{
+		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	state->timeout.read_timeouts++;
+	if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+		{
+		state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
+		}
+
+	dtls1_start_timer(s);
+	return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+	}
+
+static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+	struct _timeb tb;
+	_ftime(&tb);
+	t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
+	t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+	struct timeb tb;
+	ftime(&tb);
+	t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
+	t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
+#else
+	gettimeofday(t, NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
+	{
+	int ret;
+
+	SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
+	s->d1->listen = 1;
+
+	ret = SSL_accept(s);
+	if (ret <= 0) return ret;
+	
+	(void) BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client);
+	return 1;
+	}
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_meth.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_meth.c
index 8a6cf31947a..5c4004bfe3c 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_meth.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/d1_meth.c
@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
-static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver);
-static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver)
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_method(int ver)
 	{
 	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
 		return(DTLSv1_method());
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl_lcl.h b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
index 4cd8dd2d7fe..c039c91b4ec 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/kssl_lcl.h
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk);
 char *kstring(char *string);
 char *knumber(int len, krb5_octet *contents);
 
-EVP_CIPHER *kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype);
+const EVP_CIPHER *kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype);
 
 int kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
 int kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_reneg.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_reneg.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9c2cc3c712a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_reneg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+/* ssl/t1_reneg.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2009 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+/* Add the client's renegotiation binding */
+int ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+					int maxlen)
+    {
+    if(p)
+        {
+	if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len+1) > maxlen)
+            {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
+            return 0;
+            }
+            
+        /* Length byte */
+	*p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+        p++;
+
+        memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+	       s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by client\n",
+		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
+#endif
+        }
+    
+    *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + 1;
+
+ 
+    return 1;
+    }
+
+/* Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not
+   right */
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+					  int *al)
+    {
+    int ilen;
+
+    /* Parse the length byte */
+    if(len < 1)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+        }
+    ilen = *d;
+    d++;
+
+    /* Consistency check */
+    if((ilen+1) != len)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+        }
+
+    /* Check that the extension matches */
+    if(ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        return 0;
+        }
+    
+    if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+	      s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        return 0;
+        }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by server\n",
+				ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
+#endif
+
+    s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
+
+    return 1;
+    }
+
+/* Add the server's renegotiation binding */
+int ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len,
+					int maxlen)
+    {
+    if(p)
+        {
+        if((s->s3->previous_client_finished_len +
+            s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1) > maxlen)
+            {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG);
+            return 0;
+            }
+        
+        /* Length byte */
+        *p = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+        p++;
+
+        memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+	       s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+        p += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+
+        memcpy(p, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+	       s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension sent by server\n",
+    		s->s3->previous_client_finished_len ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
+#endif
+        }
+    
+    *len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+	+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len + 1;
+    
+    return 1;
+    }
+
+/* Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not
+   right */
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,
+					  int *al)
+    {
+    int expected_len=s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
+	+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
+    int ilen;
+
+    /* Check for logic errors */
+    OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len);
+    OPENSSL_assert(!expected_len || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len);
+    
+    /* Parse the length byte */
+    if(len < 1)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+        }
+    ilen = *d;
+    d++;
+
+    /* Consistency check */
+    if(ilen+1 != len)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+        }
+    
+    /* Check that the extension matches */
+    if(ilen != expected_len)
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        return 0;
+        }
+
+    if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+	      s->s3->previous_client_finished_len))
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        return 0;
+        }
+    d += s->s3->previous_client_finished_len;
+
+    if(memcmp(d, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+	      s->s3->previous_server_finished_len))
+        {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT,SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+        *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        return 0;
+        }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr, "%s RI extension received by client\n",
+				ilen ? "Non-empty" : "Empty");
+#endif
+    s->s3->send_connection_binding=1;
+
+    return 1;
+    }