Rename s3_{both,clnt,pkt_srvr}.c to have an ssl_ prefix since they are no

longer SSLv3 code.

ok beck@

1 files changed, 2923 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl_srvr.c b/lib/libssl/ssl_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..dfc6ee67b6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libssl/ssl_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2923 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_srvr.c,v 1.1 2017/01/26 05:51:54 jsing Exp $ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+#include <openssl/gost.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "bytestring.h"
+
+int
+ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+{
+	unsigned long alg_k;
+	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+	int ret = -1;
+	int new_state, state, skip = 0;
+
+	ERR_clear_error();
+	errno = 0;
+
+	if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb = s->internal->info_callback;
+	else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
+		cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
+
+	/* init things to blank */
+	s->internal->in_handshake++;
+	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+		SSL_clear(s);
+
+	if (s->cert == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+		ret = -1;
+		goto end;
+	}
+
+	for (;;) {
+		state = s->internal->state;
+
+		switch (s->internal->state) {
+		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+			s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
+			/* s->internal->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
+
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+		case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
+
+			s->server = 1;
+			if (cb != NULL)
+				cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+			if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			}
+			s->internal->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
+
+			if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			}
+			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			}
+
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+
+			if (s->internal->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
+				/*
+				 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO
+				 * so that the output is sent in a way that
+				 * TCP likes :-)
+				 */
+				if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
+					ret = -1;
+					goto end;
+				}
+
+				if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+					ret = -1;
+					goto end;
+				}
+
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+				s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept++;
+			} else if (!S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) {
+				/*
+				 * Server attempting to renegotiate with
+				 * client that doesn't support secure
+				 * renegotiation.
+				 */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
+				    SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+				ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+				    SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * s->internal->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
+				 * we will just send a HelloRequest
+				 */
+				s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
+
+			s->internal->shutdown = 0;
+			ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+
+			if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
+			s->internal->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
+
+			s->internal->shutdown = 0;
+			if (s->internal->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+				ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+				if (ret <= 0)
+					goto end;
+			}
+
+			s->internal->renegotiate = 2;
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+			ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			if (s->internal->hit) {
+				if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+					s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+				else
+					s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+			}
+			else
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
+			/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */
+			if (!(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+			    SSL_aNULL)) {
+				ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
+				if (ret <= 0)
+					goto end;
+				if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected)
+					s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+				else
+					s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			} else {
+				skip = 1;
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			}
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+			alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+			/*
+			 * Only send if using a DH key exchange.
+			 *
+			 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange
+			 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other
+			 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's
+			 * public key for key exchange.
+			 */
+			if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
+				ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
+				if (ret <= 0)
+					goto end;
+			} else
+				skip = 1;
+
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
+			/*
+			 * Determine whether or not we need to request a
+			 * certificate.
+			 *
+			 * Do not request a certificate if:
+			 *
+			 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset).
+			 *
+			 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are
+			 *   renegotiating.
+			 *
+			 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites
+			 *   (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
+			 *   and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application
+			 *   insists on verification (against the specs, but
+			 *   s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3).
+			 */
+			if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
+			    ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
+			     (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
+			    ((S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
+			     SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode &
+			     SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) {
+				/* No cert request */
+				skip = 1;
+				S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 0;
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+				if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
+					if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+						ret = -1;
+						goto end;
+					}
+				}
+			} else {
+				S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+				ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
+				if (ret <= 0)
+					goto end;
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+				s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+			ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
+
+			/*
+			 * This code originally checked to see if
+			 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
+			 * and then flushed. This caused problems
+			 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
+			 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
+			 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
+			 * still exist. So instead we just flush
+			 * unconditionally.
+			 */
+
+			s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			}
+			s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+			s->internal->state = S3I(s)->tmp.next_state;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
+			if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
+				ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+				if (ret <= 0)
+					goto end;
+			}
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+			ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+			if (ret == 2) {
+				/*
+				 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+				 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+				 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+				 * message is not sent.
+				 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
+				 * the client uses its key from the certificate
+				 * for key exchange.
+				 */
+				if (S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen)
+					s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+				else
+					s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+				s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			} else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) {
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+				s->internal->init_num = 0;
+				if (!s->session->peer)
+					break;
+				/*
+				 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
+				 * at this point and digest cached records.
+				 */
+				if (!S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
+					    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+					ret = -1;
+					goto end;
+				}
+				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+				if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+					ret = -1;
+					goto end;
+				}
+			} else {
+				int offset = 0;
+				int dgst_num;
+
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+				s->internal->init_num = 0;
+
+				/*
+				 * We need to get hashes here so if there is
+				 * a client cert, it can be verified
+				 * FIXME - digest processing for
+				 * CertificateVerify should be generalized.
+				 * But it is next step
+				 */
+				if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
+					if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+						ret = -1;
+						goto end;
+					}
+				}
+				for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST;
+				    dgst_num++)
+					if (S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
+					int dgst_size;
+
+					s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+					    EVP_MD_CTX_type(
+					    S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),
+					    &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
+					dgst_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(
+					    S3I(s)->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+					if (dgst_size < 0) {
+						ret = -1;
+						goto end;
+					}
+					offset += dgst_size;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
+			ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+
+			if (S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen)
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+			else
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+			ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+			ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+			    SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			if (s->internal->hit)
+				s->internal->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+			else if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+			else
+				s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+			ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+			ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
+
+			s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher;
+			if (!s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			}
+
+			ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+			    SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
+
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+
+			if (!s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(
+			    s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+			}
+
+			break;
+
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
+		case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
+			ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
+			SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
+			s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
+			s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
+			if (ret <= 0)
+				goto end;
+			s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+			if (s->internal->hit) {
+				if (S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+					s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+					S3I(s)->tmp.next_state =
+					    SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+				} else
+					S3I(s)->tmp.next_state =
+					    SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+			} else
+				S3I(s)->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+			break;
+
+		case SSL_ST_OK:
+			/* clean a few things up */
+			tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+			BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf);
+			s->internal->init_buf = NULL;
+
+			/* remove buffering on output */
+			ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+			s->internal->init_num = 0;
+
+			/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+			if (s->internal->renegotiate == 2) {
+				s->internal->renegotiate = 0;
+				s->internal->new_session = 0;
+
+				ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+				s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+				/* s->server=1; */
+				s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
+
+				if (cb != NULL)
+					cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+			}
+
+			ret = 1;
+			goto end;
+			/* break; */
+
+		default:
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
+			    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+			ret = -1;
+			goto end;
+			/* break; */
+		}
+
+		if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
+			if (s->internal->debug) {
+				if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+					goto end;
+			}
+
+
+			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->internal->state != state)) {
+				new_state = s->internal->state;
+				s->internal->state = state;
+				cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
+				s->internal->state = new_state;
+			}
+		}
+		skip = 0;
+	}
+end:
+	/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+
+	s->internal->in_handshake--;
+	if (cb != NULL)
+		cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+{
+	if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
+		ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST);
+		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0);
+
+		s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+	}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
+	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+	int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
+	unsigned int cookie_len;
+	long n;
+	unsigned long id;
+	unsigned char *p, *d;
+	SSL_CIPHER *c;
+	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+	unsigned long alg_k;
+	const SSL_METHOD *method;
+	uint16_t shared_version;
+
+	/*
+	 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
+	 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
+	 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
+	 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
+	 * TLSv1.
+	 */
+	if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+		s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+	}
+
+	s->internal->first_packet = 1;
+	n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
+	    SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
+	    SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
+
+	if (!ok)
+		return ((int)n);
+	s->internal->first_packet = 0;
+
+	d = p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg;
+
+	if (2 > n)
+		goto truncated;
+	/*
+	 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header.
+	 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
+	 */
+	s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8)|(int)p[1];
+	p += 2;
+
+	if (ssl_max_shared_version(s, s->client_version, &shared_version) != 1) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+		if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
+		    !s->internal->enc_write_ctx && !s->internal->write_hash) {
+			/*
+			 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote
+			 * version number.
+			 */
+			s->version = s->client_version;
+		}
+		al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+	s->version = shared_version;
+
+	if ((method = tls1_get_server_method(shared_version)) == NULL)
+		method = dtls1_get_server_method(shared_version);
+	if (method == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	s->method = method;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we require cookies (DTLS) and this ClientHello doesn't
+	 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
+	 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
+	 */
+	if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+		unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
+
+		if (p - d + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 >= n)
+			goto truncated;
+		session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+		if (p - d + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= n)
+			goto truncated;
+		cookie_length = p[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1];
+
+		if (cookie_length == 0)
+			return (1);
+	}
+
+	if (p - d + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 > n)
+		goto truncated;
+
+	/* load the client random */
+	memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+	/* get the session-id */
+	j= *(p++);
+	if (p - d + j > n)
+		goto truncated;
+
+	s->internal->hit = 0;
+	/*
+	 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+	 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+	 * ignore resumption requests with flag
+	 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
+	 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications
+	 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older
+	 * library versions).
+	 *
+	 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated()
+	 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->internal->new_session
+	 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+	 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
+	 * ignored.
+	 */
+	if ((s->internal->new_session && (s->internal->options &
+	    SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
+		if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+			goto err;
+	} else {
+		i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
+		if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
+			s->internal->hit = 1;
+		} else if (i == -1)
+			goto err;
+		else {
+			/* i == 0 */
+			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+				goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	p += j;
+
+	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+		/* cookie stuff */
+		if (p - d + 1 > n)
+			goto truncated;
+		cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+		/*
+		 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+		 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+		 * does not cause an overflow.
+		 */
+		if (cookie_len > sizeof(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie)) {
+			/* too much data */
+			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+			    SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+
+		if (p - d + cookie_len > n)
+			goto truncated;
+
+		/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+		if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+		    cookie_len > 0) {
+			memcpy(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+
+			if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+				if (s->ctx->internal->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
+				    D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) {
+					al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+					    SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+					goto f_err;
+				}
+				/* else cookie verification succeeded */
+			} else if (timingsafe_memcmp(D1I(s)->rcvd_cookie, D1I(s)->cookie,
+			    D1I(s)->cookie_len) != 0) {
+				/* default verification */
+				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+				    SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+				goto f_err;
+			}
+
+			ret = 2;
+		}
+
+		p += cookie_len;
+	}
+
+	if (p - d + 2 > n)
+		goto truncated;
+	n2s(p, i);
+	if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
+		/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
+		al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+		    SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+	if (p - d + i > n)
+		goto truncated;
+	if (i > 0) {
+		if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i)) == NULL)
+			goto err;
+	}
+	p += i;
+
+	/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+	if ((s->internal->hit) && (i > 0)) {
+		j = 0;
+		id = s->session->cipher->id;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+			c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+			if (c->id == id) {
+				j = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (j == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher
+			 * list if we are asked to reuse it
+			 */
+			al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+			    SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* compression */
+	if (p - d + 1 > n)
+		goto truncated;
+	i= *(p++);
+	if (p - d + i > n)
+		goto truncated;
+	for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+		if (p[j] == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	p += i;
+	if (j >= i) {
+		/* no compress */
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+		    SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+	/* TLS extensions*/
+	if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
+		/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+	if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+		    SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
+	 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
+	 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
+	 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation.
+	 */
+	arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+	if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+		SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+
+		s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+		if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+		    &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher,
+		    s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
+			s->internal->hit = 1;
+			s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+			s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+			ciphers = NULL;
+
+			/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+			pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
+			    ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
+			    SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+			if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
+				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+				    SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+				goto f_err;
+			}
+
+			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
+
+			sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+			sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->internal->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+			s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+			s->internal->cipher_list_by_id =
+			    sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
+	 * pick a cipher
+	 */
+
+	if (!s->internal->hit) {
+		sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+		s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
+		if (ciphers == NULL) {
+			al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+			    SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		ciphers = NULL;
+		c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
+		SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+
+		if (c == NULL) {
+			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+			    SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+	} else {
+		S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
+	}
+
+	alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+	if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) ||
+	    !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+		if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We now have the following setup.
+	 * client_random
+	 * cipher_list 		- our prefered list of ciphers
+	 * ciphers 		- the clients prefered list of ciphers
+	 * compression		- basically ignored right now
+	 * ssl version is set	- sslv3
+	 * s->session		- The ssl session has been setup.
+	 * s->internal->hit		- session reuse flag
+	 * s->tmp.new_cipher	- the new cipher to use.
+	 */
+
+	/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+	if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		ret = 1;
+	if (0) {
+truncated:
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+f_err:
+		ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+	}
+err:
+	sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+	unsigned char *bufend;
+	unsigned char *p, *d;
+	CBB cbb, session_id;
+	size_t outlen;
+	int sl;
+
+	memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
+
+	bufend = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+	if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
+		d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO);
+
+		if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, p, bufend - p))
+			goto err;
+
+		if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb, s->version))
+			goto err;
+		if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s->s3->server_random,
+		    sizeof(s->s3->server_random)))
+			goto err;
+
+		/*
+		 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
+		 * back in the server hello:
+		 *
+		 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+		 *   we send back the old session ID.
+		 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+		 *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+		 *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+		 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+		 *   session ID.
+		 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+		 *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
+		 *
+		 * s->internal->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+		 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+		 * to send back.
+		 */
+		if (!(s->ctx->internal->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+		    && !s->internal->hit)
+			s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+
+		sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+		if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,
+			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&cbb, &session_id))
+			goto err;
+		if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl))
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Cipher suite. */
+		if (!CBB_add_u16(&cbb,
+		    ssl3_cipher_get_value(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher)))
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Compression method. */
+		if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0))
+			goto err;
+
+		if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &outlen))
+			goto err;
+
+		if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p + outlen,
+		    bufend)) == NULL) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,
+			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d);
+	}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
+
+ err:
+	CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+{
+	if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
+		ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE);
+		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0);
+
+		s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
+	}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
+{
+	CBB dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys;
+	DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
+	unsigned char *data;
+	int al;
+
+	if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
+		if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) {
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	} else
+		dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp;
+
+	if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)
+		dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
+		    SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher));
+
+	if (dhp == NULL) {
+		al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+	if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
+		dh = dhp;
+	} else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	S3I(s)->tmp.dh = dh;
+	if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Serialize the DH parameters and public key.
+	 */
+	if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_p))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_p, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->p)))
+		goto err;
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->p, data);
+
+	if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_g))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_g, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->g)))
+		goto err;
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->g, data);
+
+	if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Ys))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Ys, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key)))
+		goto err;
+	BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, data);
+
+	if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
+		goto err;
+
+	return (1);
+
+ f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
+{
+	CBB ecpoint;
+	unsigned char *data;
+	EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+	int encodedlen = 0;
+	int curve_id = 0;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+	int al;
+
+	ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+	if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) {
+		if (nid != NID_undef)
+			ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+	} else if (ecdhp == NULL && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
+		ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
+		    SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher));
+	}
+	if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+		al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+	if (S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+	if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) {
+		ecdh = ecdhp;
+	} else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
+
+	if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+	    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+	    (s->internal->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
+		if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+	    (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh)  == NULL) ||
+	    (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+	 * For supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+	 */
+	if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(
+	    EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
+	 * allocate memory accordingly.
+	 */
+	encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+	    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+	encodedPoint = malloc(encodedlen);
+
+	bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+	if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+	    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+	if (encodedlen == 0) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	bn_ctx = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Only named curves are supported in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+	 * In this case the ServerKeyExchange message has:
+	 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+	 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+	 * the actual encoded point itself.
+	 */
+	if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_add_space(&ecpoint, &data, encodedlen))
+		goto err;
+
+	memcpy(data, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
+
+	free(encodedPoint);
+	encodedPoint = NULL;
+
+	if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
+		goto err;
+
+	return (1);
+	
+ f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+	free(encodedPoint);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, int nid, CBB *cbb)
+{
+	uint8_t *public_key = NULL;
+	int curve_id;
+	CBB ecpoint;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	/* Generate an X25519 key pair. */
+	if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	if ((S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	X25519_keypair(public_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519);
+
+	/* Serialize public key. */
+	if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid)) == 0) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (!CBB_add_u8(cbb, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_add_u16(cbb, curve_id))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH))
+		goto err;
+	if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
+		goto err;
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+	free(public_key);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
+{
+	int nid;
+
+	nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
+
+	if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0 && nid == NID_X25519)
+		return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, nid, cbb);
+
+	return ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, nid, cbb);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+	CBB cbb;
+	unsigned char *params = NULL;
+	size_t params_len;
+	unsigned char *q;
+	int j, num;
+	unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	unsigned int u;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+	unsigned char *p, *d;
+	int al, i;
+	unsigned long type;
+	int n;
+	int kn;
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+
+	memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+	if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+		type = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+		buf = s->internal->init_buf;
+
+		if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0))
+			goto err;
+
+		if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
+			if (ssl3_send_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbb) != 1)
+				goto err;
+		} else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
+			if (ssl3_send_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbb) != 1)
+				goto err;
+		} else {
+			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+
+		if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &params, &params_len))
+			goto err;
+
+		if (!(S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) {
+			if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(
+			    s, S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) {
+				al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+			}
+			kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+		} else {
+			pkey = NULL;
+			kn = 0;
+		}
+
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) +
+		    params_len + kn)) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_LIB_BUF);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
+		    SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE);
+
+		memcpy(p, params, params_len);
+
+		free(params);
+		params = NULL;
+
+		n = params_len;
+		p += params_len;
+
+		/* not anonymous */
+		if (pkey != NULL) {
+			/*
+			 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
+			 * and p points to the space at the end.
+			 */
+			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+				q = md_buf;
+				j = 0;
+				for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
+					if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
+					    (num == 2) ? s->ctx->internal->md5 :
+					    s->ctx->internal->sha1, NULL))
+						goto err;
+					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
+					    s->s3->client_random,
+					    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
+					    s->s3->server_random,
+					    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+					EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
+					EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
+					    (unsigned int *)&i);
+					q += i;
+					j += i;
+				}
+				if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+				    &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
+					SSLerr(
+					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					    ERR_LIB_RSA);
+					goto err;
+				}
+				s2n(u, p);
+				n += u + 2;
+			} else if (md) {
+				/* Send signature algorithm. */
+				if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+					if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+						/* Should never happen */
+						al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+						SSLerr(
+						    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+						    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+						goto f_err;
+					}
+					p += 2;
+				}
+				EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
+				    s->s3->client_random,
+				    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
+				    s->s3->server_random,
+				    SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+				EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
+				if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2],
+					(unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
+					SSLerr(
+					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+					    ERR_LIB_EVP);
+					goto err;
+				}
+				s2n(i, p);
+				n += i + 2;
+				if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+					n += 2;
+			} else {
+				/* Is this error check actually needed? */
+				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
+				goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+
+		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n);
+	}
+
+	s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
+	
+ f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+	free(params);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+	CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+{
+	unsigned char *p, *d;
+	int i, j, nl, off, n;
+	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
+	X509_NAME *name;
+	BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+	if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
+		buf = s->internal->init_buf;
+
+		d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
+		    SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST);
+
+		/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+		p++;
+		n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
+		d[0] = n;
+		p += n;
+		n++;
+
+		if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+			nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
+			s2n(nl, p);
+			p += nl + 2;
+			n += nl + 2;
+		}
+
+		off = n;
+		p += 2;
+		n += 2;
+
+		sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+		nl = 0;
+		if (sk != NULL) {
+			for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+				name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+				j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,
+				    ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + n + j
+				    + 2)) {
+					SSLerr(
+					    SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+					    ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+					goto err;
+				}
+				p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
+				    SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) + n;
+				s2n(j, p);
+				i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+				n += 2 + j;
+				nl += 2 + j;
+			}
+		}
+		/* else no CA names */
+		p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
+		    SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) + off;
+		s2n(nl, p);
+
+		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n);
+
+		s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+	}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
+	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
+err:
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
+{
+	unsigned char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+	unsigned char *d;
+	RSA *rsa = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	int i, al;
+
+	d = p;
+
+	arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey));
+	fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+	fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+
+	pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
+	if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
+	    (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
+		al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+	rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
+
+	if (2 > n)
+		goto truncated;
+	n2s(p, i);
+	if (n != i + 2) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+		goto err;
+	} else
+		n = i;
+
+	i = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
+	ERR_clear_error();
+
+	al = -1;
+
+	if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+	}
+
+	if (p - d + 2 > n)	/* needed in the SSL3 case */
+		goto truncated;
+	if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) &&
+	    (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
+		/*
+		 * The premaster secret must contain the same version
+		 * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback
+		 * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such
+		 * protection for DH ciphersuites).
+		 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated
+		 * protocol version instead if the server does not
+		 * support the requested protocol version.
+		 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
+		 * clients.
+		 */
+		if (!((s->internal->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
+		    (p[0] == (s->version >> 8)) &&
+		    (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) {
+			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+
+			/*
+			 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
+			 * Bleichenbacher's attack
+			 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits
+			 * the version number check as a "bad version
+			 * oracle" -- an alert would reveal that the
+			 * plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
+			 * made up by the adversary is properly
+			 * formatted except that the version number is
+			 * wrong.
+			 * To avoid such attacks, we should treat this
+			 * just like any other decryption error.
+			 */
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (al != -1) {
+		/*
+		 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead
+		 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack
+		 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
+		 * section 7.4.7.1).
+		 */
+		i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+		p = fakekey;
+	}
+
+	s->session->master_key_length =
+	    s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+	        s->session->master_key, p, i);
+
+	explicit_bzero(p, i);
+
+	return (1);
+truncated:
+	al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
+{
+	BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+	int key_size, al;
+	CBS cbs, dh_Yc;
+	DH *dh;
+
+	if (n < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	CBS_init(&cbs, p, n);
+
+	if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &dh_Yc))
+		goto truncated;
+
+	if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
+		goto truncated;
+
+	if (S3I(s)->tmp.dh == NULL) {
+		al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+	dh = S3I(s)->tmp.dh;
+
+	if ((bn = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Yc), CBS_len(&dh_Yc), NULL)) == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	key_size = DH_compute_key(p, bn, dh);
+	if (key_size <= 0) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+		BN_clear_free(bn);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	s->session->master_key_length =
+	    s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
+	        s, s->session->master_key, p, key_size);
+
+	explicit_bzero(p, key_size);
+
+	DH_free(S3I(s)->tmp.dh);
+	S3I(s)->tmp.dh = NULL;
+
+	BN_clear_free(bn);
+
+	return (1);
+
+ truncated:
+	al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
+{
+	EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+	EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+	int i, al;
+
+	int ret = 1;
+	int key_size;
+	const EC_KEY   *tkey;
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+	/* Initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair. */
+	if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Use the ephemeral values we saved when
+	 * generating the ServerKeyExchange message.
+	 */
+	tkey = S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh;
+
+	group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+	priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+	if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+	    !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Let's get client's public key */
+	if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (n == 0L) {
+		/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
+		if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
+		    s->session->peer)) == NULL) ||
+		    (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
+			/*
+			 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
+			 * authentication using ECDH certificates
+			 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
+			 * never executed. When that support is
+			 * added, we ought to ensure the key
+			 * received in the certificate is
+			 * authorized for key agreement.
+			 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
+			 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
+			 * group.
+			 */
+			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+
+		if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+		    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec))
+		    == 0) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Get client's public key from encoded point
+		 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
+		 */
+		if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+		/* Get encoded point length */
+		i = *p;
+
+		p += 1;
+		if (n != 1 + i) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
+			clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+			    ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
+		 * currently, so set it to the start.
+		 */
+		p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+	key_size = ECDH_size(srvr_ecdh);
+	if (key_size <= 0) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+	i = ECDH_compute_key(p, key_size, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
+	    NULL);
+	if (i <= 0) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+	EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+	EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	EC_KEY_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh);
+	S3I(s)->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+
+	/* Compute the master secret */
+	s->session->master_key_length =
+	    s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
+		s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
+
+	explicit_bzero(p, i);
+	return (ret);
+
+ f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+	EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+	EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+	EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
+{
+	uint8_t *shared_key = NULL;
+	CBS cbs, ecpoint;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (n < 0)
+		goto err;
+
+	CBS_init(&cbs, p, n);
+	if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &ecpoint))
+		goto err;
+	if (CBS_len(&ecpoint) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH)
+		goto err;
+
+	if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	if (!X25519(shared_key, S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, CBS_data(&ecpoint)))
+		goto err;
+
+	explicit_bzero(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
+	free(S3I(s)->tmp.x25519);
+	S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 = NULL;
+
+	s->session->master_key_length =
+	    s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
+		s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+	ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+	if (shared_key != NULL)
+		explicit_bzero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
+	free(shared_key);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
+{
+        if (S3I(s)->tmp.x25519 != NULL)
+		return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, p, n);
+
+	return ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, p, n);
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, long n)
+{
+
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+	EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+	unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
+	size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
+	unsigned long alg_a;
+	int Ttag, Tclass;
+	long Tlen;
+	int al;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* Get our certificate private key*/
+	alg_a = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+	if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+		pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+
+	pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+	EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+	/*
+	 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type,
+	 * maybe use it for key exchange.
+	 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because
+	 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for
+	 * authorization only.
+	 */
+	client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+	if (client_pub_pkey) {
+		if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,
+		    client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+			ERR_clear_error();
+	}
+	if (2 > n)
+		goto truncated;
+	/* Decrypt session key */
+	if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag,
+	    &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
+	    Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+		goto gerr;
+	}
+	start = p;
+	inlen = Tlen;
+	if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen,
+	    start, inlen) <=0) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+		goto gerr;
+	}
+	/* Generate master secret */
+	s->session->master_key_length =
+	    s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
+		s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32);
+	/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1,
+	    EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+		ret = 2;
+	else
+		ret = 1;
+ gerr:
+	EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+	if (ret)
+		return (ret);
+	else
+		goto err;
+
+ truncated:
+	al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+	unsigned long alg_k;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	int al, ok;
+	long n;
+
+	/* 2048 maxlen is a guess.  How long a key does that permit? */
+	n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+	    SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
+	if (!ok)
+		return ((int)n);
+
+	p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg;
+
+	alg_k = S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+		if (ssl3_get_client_kex_rsa(s, p, n) != 1)
+			goto err;
+	} else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+		if (ssl3_get_client_kex_dhe(s, p, n) != 1)
+			goto err;
+	} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+		if (ssl3_get_client_kex_ecdhe(s, p, n) != 1)
+			goto err;
+	} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+		if (ssl3_get_client_kex_gost(s, p, n) != 1)
+			goto err;
+	} else {
+		al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+		    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+	return (1);
+
+ f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+{
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	int al, ok, ret = 0;
+	long n;
+	int type = 0, i, j;
+	X509 *peer;
+	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+	EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
+	n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
+	    SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
+	if (!ok)
+		return ((int)n);
+
+	if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
+		peer = s->session->peer;
+		pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
+		type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
+	} else {
+		peer = NULL;
+		pkey = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+		S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+		if (peer != NULL) {
+			al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		ret = 1;
+		goto end;
+	}
+
+	if (peer == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+		    SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
+		al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+	if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+		    SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
+		al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+	if (S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+		    SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+		al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+	/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
+	p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_msg;
+	/*
+	 * Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites.
+	 *
+	 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is a bare
+	 * signature without length field.
+	 */
+	if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
+	    pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) {
+		i = 64;
+	} else {
+		if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+			/* Should never happen */
+			if (sigalg == -1) {
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+			}
+			if (2 > n)
+				goto truncated;
+			/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+			if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+				    SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+				al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+			}
+			md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
+			if (md == NULL) {
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+				    SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+				al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				goto f_err;
+			}
+			p += 2;
+			n -= 2;
+		}
+		if (2 > n)
+			goto truncated;
+		n2s(p, i);
+		n -= 2;
+		if (i > n)
+			goto truncated;
+	}
+	j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+	if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+		    SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+		long hdatalen = 0;
+		void *hdata;
+		hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+		if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
+		    !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+
+		if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
+			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	} else
+	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+		i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md,
+		    MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+		    pkey->pkey.rsa);
+		if (i < 0) {
+			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		if (i == 0) {
+			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	} else
+	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+		j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+		    &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+		    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
+		if (j <= 0) {
+			/* bad signature */
+			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	} else
+	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+		j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+		    &(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+		    SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
+		if (j <= 0) {
+			/* bad signature */
+			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	} else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+	if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
+	    pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+		long hdatalen = 0;
+		void *hdata;
+		unsigned char signature[128];
+		unsigned int siglen = sizeof(signature);
+		int nid;
+		EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+
+		hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+		if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
+				!(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+					ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+		if (!pctx) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
+		    !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
+		    !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signature, &siglen) ||
+		    (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) ||
+		    (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) ||
+		    (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
+				       EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT,
+				       GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE,
+				       NULL) <= 0)) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+
+		if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, p, i, signature, siglen) <= 0) {
+			al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+			    SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+
+		EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+	} else
+#endif
+	{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+		    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+
+	ret = 1;
+	if (0) {
+truncated:
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+f_err:
+		ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+	}
+end:
+	if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer) {
+		BIO_free(S3I(s)->handshake_buffer);
+		S3I(s)->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+		s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+	}
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+	CBS cbs, client_certs;
+	int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
+	X509 *x = NULL;
+	long n;
+	const unsigned char *q;
+	STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+
+	n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
+	    -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+	if (!ok)
+		return ((int)n);
+
+	if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+		if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+		    (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+		    	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+			    SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If tls asked for a client cert,
+		 * the client must return a 0 list.
+		 */
+		if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_request) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+			    SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
+			    );
+			al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+		return (1);
+	}
+
+	if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+		al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+		    SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+		goto f_err;
+	}
+
+	if (n < 0)
+		goto truncated;
+
+	CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
+
+	if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+		    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) ||
+	    CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
+		goto truncated;
+
+	while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) {
+		CBS cert;
+
+		if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) {
+			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+			    SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+
+		q = CBS_data(&cert);
+		x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert));
+		if (x == NULL) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+			    ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
+			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+			    SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		x = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
+		/*
+		 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned.
+		 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate.
+		 */
+		if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
+		    (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+			    SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+		/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+		if (S3I(s)->handshake_buffer && !tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	} else {
+		i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+		if (i <= 0) {
+			al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+			    SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
+			goto f_err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	X509_free(s->session->peer);
+	s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
+	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+	/*
+	 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
+	 * when we arrive here
+	 */
+	if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
+		SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+		if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+			    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+		}
+	}
+	sk_X509_pop_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
+	SSI(s)->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
+
+	/*
+	 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
+	 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
+	 */
+
+	sk = NULL;
+
+	ret = 1;
+	if (0) {
+truncated:
+		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+		    SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+f_err:
+		ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+	}
+err:
+	X509_free(x);
+	sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+	CBB cbb, server_cert;
+	X509 *x;
+
+	/*
+	 * Server Certificate - RFC 5246, section 7.4.2.
+	 */
+
+	memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
+
+	if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
+		if ((x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s)) == NULL) {
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+		if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start_cbb(s, &cbb, &server_cert,
+		    SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE))
+			goto err;
+		if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &server_cert, x))
+			goto err;
+		if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish_cbb(s, &cbb))
+			goto err;
+
+		s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+	}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
+
+ err:
+	CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
+int
+ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+{
+	unsigned char *d, *p, *macstart;
+	unsigned char *senc = NULL;
+	const unsigned char *const_p;
+	int len, slen_full, slen;
+	SSL_SESSION *sess;
+	unsigned int hlen;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+	HMAC_CTX hctx;
+	SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+	unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+	unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+	if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
+		/* get session encoding length */
+		slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+		/*
+		 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ 		 * too long
+ 		 */
+		if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
+			goto err;
+		senc = malloc(slen_full);
+		if (!senc)
+			goto err;
+		p = senc;
+		i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+		/*
+		 * Create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to
+		 * clean up
+		 */
+		const_p = senc;
+		sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+		if (sess == NULL)
+			goto err;
+
+		/* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+		sess->session_id_length = 0;
+
+		slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+		if (slen > slen_full) {
+			/* shouldn't ever happen */
+			goto err;
+		}
+		p = senc;
+		i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
+		SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+		/*
+		 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ 		 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+ 		 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ 		 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ 		 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ 		 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ 		 */
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->internal->init_buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) +
+		    22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+		    EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+			goto err;
+
+		d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET);
+
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+		HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+
+		/*
+		 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+		 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+		 * from parent ctx.
+		 */
+		if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+			if (tctx->internal->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s,
+			    key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) {
+				EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+				goto err;
+			}
+		} else {
+			arc4random_buf(iv, 16);
+			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+			    tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+			HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+			    16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+			memcpy(key_name, tctx->internal->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
+		 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session
+		 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
+		 * sessions will live as long as their sessions.
+		 */
+		l2n(s->internal->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
+		/* Skip ticket length for now */
+		p += 2;
+		/* Output key name */
+		macstart = p;
+		memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+		p += 16;
+		/* output IV */
+		memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+		p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+		/* Encrypt session data */
+		EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+		p += len;
+		EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, p, &len);
+		p += len;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+		HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+		HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+		HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+		p += hlen;
+
+		/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+		/* Total length */
+		len = p - d;
+
+		/* Skip ticket lifetime hint. */
+		p = d + 4;
+		s2n(len - 6, p); /* Message length */
+
+		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, len);
+
+		s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+
+		explicit_bzero(senc, slen_full);
+		free(senc);
+	}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
+
+ err:
+	if (senc != NULL)
+		explicit_bzero(senc, slen_full);
+	free(senc);
+
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+{
+	unsigned char *p;
+
+	if (s->internal->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
+		/*
+		 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ 		 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ 		 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ 		 * + (ocsp response)
+ 		 */
+		if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->internal->init_buf, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 4 +
+		    s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+			return (-1);
+
+		p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS);
+
+		*(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
+		l2n3(s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+		memcpy(p, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+
+		ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4);
+
+		s->internal->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+	}
+
+	/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
+	return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
+ * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
+ */
+int
+ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
+{
+	CBS cbs, proto, padding;
+	int ok;
+	long n;
+	size_t len;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
+	 * extension in their ClientHello
+	 */
+	if (!S3I(s)->next_proto_neg_seen) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
+		    SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* 514 maxlen is enough for the payload format below */
+	n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+	    SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
+	if (!ok)
+		return ((int)n);
+
+	/*
+	 * s->internal->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
+	 * in this handshake, but S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
+	 * by ssl3_get_finished).
+	 */
+	if (!S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
+		    SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (n < 2)
+		return (0);
+	/* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+
+	CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, s->internal->init_num);
+
+	/*
+	 * The payload looks like:
+	 *   uint8 proto_len;
+	 *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
+	 *   uint8 padding_len;
+	 *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
+	 */
+	if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &proto) ||
+	    !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &padding) ||
+	    CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX We should not NULL it, but this matches old behavior of not
+	 * freeing before malloc.
+	 */
+	s->internal->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+	s->internal->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+
+	if (!CBS_stow(&proto, &s->internal->next_proto_negotiated, &len)) {
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
+		    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	s->internal->next_proto_negotiated_len = (uint8_t)len;
+
+	return (1);
+}