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author | 2019-02-09 15:30:52 +0000 | |
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committer | 2019-02-09 15:30:52 +0000 | |
commit | 1c0e44493e7c9853a6edb75ddb049926c2df7288 (patch) | |
tree | 75ca37f4e4eefc801c0639e909cdfb2ffe514f04 /lib/libssl/ssl_transcript.c | |
parent | Rename tls1_handshake_hash*() to tls1_transcript_hash*(). (diff) | |
download | wireguard-openbsd-1c0e44493e7c9853a6edb75ddb049926c2df7288.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-1c0e44493e7c9853a6edb75ddb049926c2df7288.zip |
Rename the file that contains the transcript handling code.
ok inoguchi@ tb@
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libssl/ssl_transcript.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/ssl_transcript.c | 201 |
1 files changed, 201 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl_transcript.c b/lib/libssl/ssl_transcript.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e94eb8de80a --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/libssl/ssl_transcript.c @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssl_transcript.c,v 1.1 2019/02/09 15:30:52 jsing Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Joel Sing <jsing@openbsd.org> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "ssl_locl.h" + +#include <openssl/ssl.h> + +int +tls1_transcript_hash_init(SSL *s) +{ + const unsigned char *data; + const EVP_MD *md; + size_t len; + + tls1_transcript_hash_free(s); + + if (!ssl_get_handshake_evp_md(s, &md)) { + SSLerrorx(ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if ((S3I(s)->handshake_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(S3I(s)->handshake_hash, md, NULL)) { + SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &data, &len)) { + SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + if (!tls1_transcript_hash_update(s, data, len)) { + SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + return 1; + + err: + tls1_transcript_hash_free(s); + + return 0; +} + +int +tls1_transcript_hash_update(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (S3I(s)->handshake_hash == NULL) + return 1; + + return EVP_DigestUpdate(S3I(s)->handshake_hash, buf, len); +} + +int +tls1_transcript_hash_value(SSL *s, const unsigned char *out, size_t len, + size_t *outlen) +{ + EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL; + unsigned int mdlen; + int ret = 0; + + if (EVP_MD_CTX_size(S3I(s)->handshake_hash) > len) + goto err; + + if ((mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(mdctx, S3I(s)->handshake_hash)) { + SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, (unsigned char *)out, &mdlen)) { + SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (outlen != NULL) + *outlen = mdlen; + + ret = 1; + + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx); + + return (ret); +} + +void +tls1_transcript_hash_free(SSL *s) +{ + EVP_MD_CTX_free(S3I(s)->handshake_hash); + S3I(s)->handshake_hash = NULL; +} + +int +tls1_transcript_init(SSL *s) +{ + if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript != NULL) + return 0; + + if ((S3I(s)->handshake_transcript = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) + return 0; + + tls1_transcript_reset(s); + + return 1; +} + +void +tls1_transcript_free(SSL *s) +{ + BUF_MEM_free(S3I(s)->handshake_transcript); + S3I(s)->handshake_transcript = NULL; +} + +void +tls1_transcript_reset(SSL *s) +{ + /* + * We should check the return value of BUF_MEM_grow_clean(), however + * due to yet another bad API design, when called with a length of zero + * it is impossible to tell if it succeeded (returning a length of zero) + * or if it failed (and returned zero)... our implementation never + * fails with a length of zero, so we trust all is okay... + */ + (void)BUF_MEM_grow_clean(S3I(s)->handshake_transcript, 0); + + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_FREEZE_TRANSCRIPT; +} + +int +tls1_transcript_append(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t olen, nlen; + + if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript == NULL) + return 1; + + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_FREEZE_TRANSCRIPT) + return 1; + + olen = S3I(s)->handshake_transcript->length; + nlen = olen + len; + + if (nlen < olen) + return 0; + + if (BUF_MEM_grow(S3I(s)->handshake_transcript, nlen) == 0) + return 0; + + memcpy(S3I(s)->handshake_transcript->data + olen, buf, len); + + return 1; +} + +int +tls1_transcript_data(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, size_t *len) +{ + if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript == NULL) + return 0; + + *data = S3I(s)->handshake_transcript->data; + *len = S3I(s)->handshake_transcript->length; + + return 1; +} + +void +tls1_transcript_freeze(SSL *s) +{ + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_FREEZE_TRANSCRIPT; +} + +int +tls1_transcript_record(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (!tls1_transcript_hash_update(s, buf, len)) + return 0; + + if (!tls1_transcript_append(s, buf, len)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} |