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authorbcook <bcook@openbsd.org>2014-12-07 15:48:02 +0000
committerbcook <bcook@openbsd.org>2014-12-07 15:48:02 +0000
commit31a3a711f2fbe8e417eca0e2bdbfc443ec2a72ff (patch)
treee5fdc0cda36e19fe0e102c29e0fc46cfdedd4d37 /lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
parentRevert to the use of C code for the basic BN routines (bn_add_words, (diff)
downloadwireguard-openbsd-31a3a711f2fbe8e417eca0e2bdbfc443ec2a72ff.tar.xz
wireguard-openbsd-31a3a711f2fbe8e417eca0e2bdbfc443ec2a72ff.zip
revert previous change for now, adjusting based on comments from jsing@
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libtls/tls_verify.c')
-rw-r--r--lib/libtls/tls_verify.c35
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c b/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
index 0252e205752..35a18202a9f 100644
--- a/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
+++ b/lib/libtls/tls_verify.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tls_verify.c,v 1.2 2014/12/07 15:00:32 bcook Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tls_verify.c,v 1.3 2014/12/07 15:48:02 bcook Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Jeremie Courreges-Anglas <jca@openbsd.org>
*
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@
#include "tls_internal.h"
int tls_match_hostname(const char *cert_hostname, const char *hostname);
-int tls_check_subject_altname(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *host);
-int tls_check_common_name(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *host);
+int tls_check_subject_altname(X509 *cert, const char *host);
+int tls_check_common_name(X509 *cert, const char *host);
int
tls_match_hostname(const char *cert_hostname, const char *hostname)
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ tls_match_hostname(const char *cert_hostname, const char *hostname)
}
int
-tls_check_subject_altname(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *host)
+tls_check_subject_altname(X509 *cert, const char *host)
{
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altname_stack = NULL;
union { struct in_addr ip4; struct in6_addr ip6; } addrbuf;
@@ -123,11 +123,10 @@ tls_check_subject_altname(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *host)
if (ASN1_STRING_length(altname->d.dNSName) !=
(int)strlen(data)) {
- tls_set_error(ctx,
- "error verifying host '%s': "
- "NUL byte in subjectAltName, "
- "probably a malicious certificate",
- host);
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s: NUL byte in "
+ "subjectAltName, probably a "
+ "malicious certificate.\n",
+ getprogname());
rv = -2;
break;
}
@@ -136,7 +135,10 @@ tls_check_subject_altname(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *host)
rv = 0;
break;
}
- }
+ } else
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s: unhandled subjectAltName "
+ "dNSName encoding (%d)\n", getprogname(),
+ format);
} else if (type == GEN_IPADD) {
unsigned char *data;
@@ -158,7 +160,7 @@ tls_check_subject_altname(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *host)
}
int
-tls_check_common_name(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *host)
+tls_check_common_name(X509 *cert, const char *host)
{
X509_NAME *name;
char *common_name = NULL;
@@ -184,9 +186,8 @@ tls_check_common_name(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *host)
/* NUL bytes in CN? */
if (common_name_len != (int)strlen(common_name)) {
- tls_set_error(ctx, "error verifying host '%s': "
- "NUL byte in Common Name field, "
- "probably a malicious certificate.", host);
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s: NUL byte in Common Name field, "
+ "probably a malicious certificate.\n", getprogname());
rv = -2;
goto out;
}
@@ -212,13 +213,13 @@ out:
}
int
-tls_check_hostname(struct tls *ctx, X509 *cert, const char *host)
+tls_check_hostname(X509 *cert, const char *host)
{
int rv;
- rv = tls_check_subject_altname(ctx, cert, host);
+ rv = tls_check_subject_altname(cert, host);
if (rv == 0 || rv == -2)
return rv;
- return tls_check_common_name(ctx, cert, host);
+ return tls_check_common_name(cert, host);
}