diff options
| author |   mestre <mestre@openbsd.org> | 2019-08-06 13:34:36 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | mestre <mestre@openbsd.org> | 2019-08-06 13:34:36 +0000 |
| commit | 0256fee778570faca198e11b52d837cd2a1b1fa1 (patch) | |
| tree | 77abf9d72375fd084b949a6f64ed22e4f8be23d0 /libexec/spamd | |
| parent | sync (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-openbsd-0256fee778570faca198e11b52d837cd2a1b1fa1.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-0256fee778570faca198e11b52d837cd2a1b1fa1.zip | |
By now we are already confident that pledge(2) "just works(tm)" and that it can
be used to effectively remove filesystem access.
That being said, in spamd(8) when I pledge(2)d it the main priv process got
"stdio inet" which means there's no fs access at all so calling
chroot(2)/chdir(2) here doesn't get us any additional protection. Just remove
them.
OK deraadt@ and no objections from schwarze@
Diffstat (limited to 'libexec/spamd')
| -rw-r--r-- | libexec/spamd/spamd.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/libexec/spamd/spamd.c b/libexec/spamd/spamd.c index 84935e9df33..446a97f57aa 100644 --- a/libexec/spamd/spamd.c +++ b/libexec/spamd/spamd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: spamd.c,v 1.155 2018/10/22 17:31:24 krw Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: spamd.c,v 1.156 2019/08/06 13:34:36 mestre Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2015 Henning Brauer <henning@openbsd.org> @@ -1519,15 +1519,6 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) } close(trappipe[1]); - if (chroot("/var/empty") == -1) { - syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot chroot to /var/empty."); - exit(1); - } - if (chdir("/") == -1) { - syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot chdir to /"); - exit(1); - } - if (setgroups(1, &pw->pw_gid) || setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) || setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid)) |