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authorderaadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>1995-10-18 08:37:01 +0000
committerderaadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>1995-10-18 08:37:01 +0000
commitdf930be708d50e9715f173caa26ffe1b7599b157 (patch)
treeaa317e49e28cb999c9cf3db7f00c20903fe6010a /sys/kern/exec_script.c
downloadwireguard-openbsd-df930be708d50e9715f173caa26ffe1b7599b157.tar.xz
wireguard-openbsd-df930be708d50e9715f173caa26ffe1b7599b157.zip
initial import of NetBSD tree
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/kern/exec_script.c')
-rw-r--r--sys/kern/exec_script.c294
1 files changed, 294 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/kern/exec_script.c b/sys/kern/exec_script.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..dfd1a405f00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys/kern/exec_script.c
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+/* $NetBSD: exec_script.c,v 1.12 1995/04/10 18:27:59 mycroft Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1993, 1994 Christopher G. Demetriou
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * This product includes software developed by Christopher G. Demetriou.
+ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#if defined(SETUIDSCRIPTS) && !defined(FDSCRIPTS)
+#define FDSCRIPTS /* Need this for safe set-id scripts. */
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/malloc.h>
+#include <sys/vnode.h>
+#include <sys/namei.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <sys/filedesc.h>
+#include <sys/exec.h>
+#include <sys/resourcevar.h>
+#include <vm/vm.h>
+
+#include <sys/exec_script.h>
+
+/*
+ * exec_script_makecmds(): Check if it's an executable shell script.
+ *
+ * Given a proc pointer and an exec package pointer, see if the referent
+ * of the epp is in shell script. If it is, then set thing up so that
+ * the script can be run. This involves preparing the address space
+ * and arguments for the shell which will run the script.
+ *
+ * This function is ultimately responsible for creating a set of vmcmds
+ * which can be used to build the process's vm space and inserting them
+ * into the exec package.
+ */
+int
+exec_script_makecmds(p, epp)
+ struct proc *p;
+ struct exec_package *epp;
+{
+ int error, hdrlinelen, shellnamelen, shellarglen;
+ char *hdrstr = epp->ep_hdr;
+ char *cp, *shellname, *shellarg, *oldpnbuf;
+ char **shellargp, **tmpsap;
+ struct vnode *scriptvp;
+#ifdef SETUIDSCRIPTS
+ uid_t script_uid;
+ gid_t script_gid;
+ u_short script_sbits;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * if the magic isn't that of a shell script, or we've already
+ * done shell script processing for this exec, punt on it.
+ */
+ if ((epp->ep_flags & EXEC_INDIR) != 0 ||
+ epp->ep_hdrvalid < EXEC_SCRIPT_MAGICLEN ||
+ strncmp(hdrstr, EXEC_SCRIPT_MAGIC, EXEC_SCRIPT_MAGICLEN))
+ return ENOEXEC;
+
+ /*
+ * check that the shell spec is terminated by a newline,
+ * and that it isn't too large. Don't modify the
+ * buffer unless we're ready to commit to handling it.
+ * (The latter requirement means that we have to check
+ * for both spaces and tabs later on.)
+ */
+ hdrlinelen = min(epp->ep_hdrvalid, MAXINTERP);
+ for (cp = hdrstr + EXEC_SCRIPT_MAGICLEN; cp < hdrstr + hdrlinelen;
+ cp++) {
+ if (*cp == '\n') {
+ *cp = '\0';
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cp >= hdrstr + hdrlinelen)
+ return ENOEXEC;
+
+ shellname = NULL;
+ shellarg = NULL;
+
+ /* strip spaces before the shell name */
+ for (cp = hdrstr + EXEC_SCRIPT_MAGICLEN; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t';
+ cp++)
+ ;
+
+ /* collect the shell name; remember it's length for later */
+ shellname = cp;
+ shellnamelen = 0;
+ if (*cp == '\0')
+ goto check_shell;
+ for ( /* cp = cp */ ; *cp != '\0' && *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t'; cp++)
+ shellnamelen++;
+ if (*cp == '\0')
+ goto check_shell;
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+
+ /* skip spaces before any argument */
+ for ( /* cp = cp */ ; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (*cp == '\0')
+ goto check_shell;
+
+ /*
+ * collect the shell argument. everything after the shell name
+ * is passed as ONE argument; that's the correct (historical)
+ * behaviour.
+ */
+ shellarg = cp;
+ shellarglen = 0;
+ for ( /* cp = cp */ ; *cp != '\0'; cp++)
+ shellarglen++;
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+
+check_shell:
+#ifdef SETUIDSCRIPTS
+ /*
+ * MNT_NOSUID and STRC are already taken care of by check_exec,
+ * so we don't need to worry about them now or later.
+ */
+ script_sbits = epp->ep_vap->va_mode & (VSUID | VSGID);
+ if (script_sbits != 0) {
+ script_uid = epp->ep_vap->va_uid;
+ script_gid = epp->ep_vap->va_gid;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef FDSCRIPTS
+ /*
+ * if the script isn't readable, or it's set-id, then we've
+ * gotta supply a "/dev/fd/..." for the shell to read.
+ * Note that stupid shells (csh) do the wrong thing, and
+ * close all open fd's when the start. That kills this
+ * method of implementing "safe" set-id and x-only scripts.
+ */
+ if (VOP_ACCESS(epp->ep_vp, VREAD, p->p_ucred, p) == EACCES
+#ifdef SETUIDSCRIPTS
+ || script_sbits
+#endif
+ ) {
+ struct file *fp;
+ extern struct fileops vnops;
+
+#if defined(DIAGNOSTIC) && defined(FDSCRIPTS)
+ if (epp->ep_flags & EXEC_HASFD)
+ panic("exec_script_makecmds: epp already has a fd");
+#endif
+
+ if (error = falloc(p, &fp, &epp->ep_fd))
+ goto fail;
+
+ epp->ep_flags |= EXEC_HASFD;
+ fp->f_type = DTYPE_VNODE;
+ fp->f_ops = &vnops;
+ fp->f_data = (caddr_t) epp->ep_vp;
+ fp->f_flag = FREAD;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* set up the parameters for the recursive check_exec() call */
+ epp->ep_ndp->ni_dirp = shellname;
+ epp->ep_ndp->ni_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
+ epp->ep_flags |= EXEC_INDIR;
+
+ /* and set up the fake args list, for later */
+ MALLOC(shellargp, char **, 4 * sizeof(char *), M_EXEC, M_WAITOK);
+ tmpsap = shellargp;
+ MALLOC(*tmpsap, char *, shellnamelen + 1, M_EXEC, M_WAITOK);
+ strcpy(*tmpsap++, shellname);
+ if (shellarg != NULL) {
+ MALLOC(*tmpsap, char *, shellarglen + 1, M_EXEC, M_WAITOK);
+ strcpy(*tmpsap++, shellarg);
+ }
+ MALLOC(*tmpsap, char *, MAXPATHLEN, M_EXEC, M_WAITOK);
+#ifdef FDSCRIPTS
+ if ((epp->ep_flags & EXEC_HASFD) == 0) {
+#endif
+ /* normally can't fail, but check for it if diagnostic */
+ error = copyinstr(epp->ep_name, *tmpsap++, MAXPATHLEN,
+ (size_t *)0);
+#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
+ if (error != 0)
+ panic("exec_script: copyinstr couldn't fail\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef FDSCRIPTS
+ } else
+ sprintf(*tmpsap++, "/dev/fd/%d", epp->ep_fd);
+#endif
+ *tmpsap = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * mark the header we have as invalid; check_exec will read
+ * the header from the new executable
+ */
+ epp->ep_hdrvalid = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * remember the old vp and pnbuf for later, so we can restore
+ * them if check_exec() fails.
+ */
+ scriptvp = epp->ep_vp;
+ oldpnbuf = epp->ep_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_pnbuf;
+
+ VOP_UNLOCK(scriptvp);
+
+ if ((error = check_exec(p, epp)) == 0) {
+ /* note that we've clobbered the header */
+ epp->ep_flags |= EXEC_DESTR;
+
+ /*
+ * It succeeded. Unlock the script and
+ * close it if we aren't using it any more.
+ * Also, set things up so that the fake args
+ * list will be used.
+ */
+ if ((epp->ep_flags & EXEC_HASFD) == 0)
+ vn_close(scriptvp, FREAD, p->p_ucred, p);
+
+ /* free the old pathname buffer */
+ FREE(oldpnbuf, M_NAMEI);
+
+ epp->ep_flags |= (EXEC_HASARGL | EXEC_SKIPARG);
+ epp->ep_fa = shellargp;
+#ifdef SETUIDSCRIPTS
+ /*
+ * set thing up so that set-id scripts will be
+ * handled appropriately
+ */
+ epp->ep_vap->va_mode |= script_sbits;
+ if (script_sbits & VSUID)
+ epp->ep_vap->va_uid = script_uid;
+ if (script_sbits & VSGID)
+ epp->ep_vap->va_gid = script_gid;
+#endif
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* XXX oldpnbuf not set for "goto fail" path */
+ epp->ep_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_pnbuf = oldpnbuf;
+fail:
+ /* note that we've clobbered the header */
+ epp->ep_flags |= EXEC_DESTR;
+
+ /* kill the opened file descriptor, else close the file */
+ if (epp->ep_flags & EXEC_HASFD) {
+ epp->ep_flags &= ~EXEC_HASFD;
+ (void) fdrelease(p, epp->ep_fd);
+ } else
+ vn_close(scriptvp, FREAD, p->p_ucred, p);
+
+ FREE(epp->ep_ndp->ni_cnd.cn_pnbuf, M_NAMEI);
+
+ /* free the fake arg list, because we're not returning it */
+ tmpsap = shellargp;
+ while (*tmpsap != NULL) {
+ FREE(*tmpsap, M_EXEC);
+ tmpsap++;
+ }
+ FREE(shellargp, M_EXEC);
+
+ /*
+ * free any vmspace-creation commands,
+ * and release their references
+ */
+ kill_vmcmds(&epp->ep_vmcmds);
+
+ return error;
+}