diff options
| author |   mpi <mpi@openbsd.org> | 2017-08-11 21:24:19 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | mpi <mpi@openbsd.org> | 2017-08-11 21:24:19 +0000 |
| commit | aa28b9a6d024fc39940a8bf6e59c28dbaafc6950 (patch) | |
| tree | ad38cdfb637269384ad7ff4acea0c6e8e71932a7 /sys/netinet/ip_esp.c | |
| parent | Be consistent with goto labels, failure flag and use of FAIL macro. (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-openbsd-aa28b9a6d024fc39940a8bf6e59c28dbaafc6950.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-aa28b9a6d024fc39940a8bf6e59c28dbaafc6950.zip | |
Remove NET_LOCK()'s argument.
Tested by Hrvoje Popovski, ok bluhm@
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/netinet/ip_esp.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/netinet/ip_esp.c | 27 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet/ip_esp.c b/sys/netinet/ip_esp.c index f118e4e4583..c4a79f2f54d 100644 --- a/sys/netinet/ip_esp.c +++ b/sys/netinet/ip_esp.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ip_esp.c,v 1.149 2017/05/30 16:07:22 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ip_esp.c,v 1.150 2017/08/11 21:24:20 mpi Exp $ */ /* * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and @@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ void esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) { u_int8_t lastthree[3], aalg[AH_HMAC_MAX_HASHLEN]; - int s, hlen, roff, skip, protoff; + int hlen, roff, skip, protoff; struct mbuf *m1, *mo, *m; struct auth_hash *esph; struct tdb_crypto *tc; @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) return; } - NET_LOCK(s); + NET_LOCK(); tdb = gettdb(tc->tc_rdomain, tc->tc_spi, &tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto); if (tdb == NULL) { @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) /* Reset the session ID */ if (tdb->tdb_cryptoid != 0) tdb->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; - NET_UNLOCK(s); + NET_UNLOCK(); crypto_dispatch(crp); return; } @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) m1 = m_getptr(m, skip, &roff); if (m1 == NULL) { espstat.esps_hdrops++; - NET_UNLOCK(s); + NET_UNLOCK(); DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): bad mbuf chain, SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(&tdb->tdb_dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi))); @@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) /* Verify pad length */ if (lastthree[1] + 2 > m->m_pkthdr.len - skip) { espstat.esps_badilen++; - NET_UNLOCK(s); + NET_UNLOCK(); DPRINTF(("esp_input_cb(): invalid padding length %d for " "packet in SA %s/%08x\n", lastthree[1], ipsp_address(&tdb->tdb_dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), @@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) /* Verify correct decryption by checking the last padding bytes */ if ((lastthree[1] != lastthree[0]) && (lastthree[1] != 0)) { espstat.esps_badenc++; - NET_UNLOCK(s); + NET_UNLOCK(); DPRINTF(("esp_input(): decryption failed for packet in " "SA %s/%08x\n", ipsp_address(&tdb->tdb_dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), ntohl(tdb->tdb_spi))); @@ -748,11 +748,11 @@ esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) /* Back to generic IPsec input processing */ ipsec_common_input_cb(m, tdb, skip, protoff); - NET_UNLOCK(s); + NET_UNLOCK(); return; baddone: - NET_UNLOCK(s); + NET_UNLOCK(); m_freem(m); @@ -1041,7 +1041,6 @@ esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) struct tdb_crypto *tc; struct tdb *tdb; struct mbuf *m; - int s; tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; @@ -1057,7 +1056,7 @@ esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) } - NET_LOCK(s); + NET_LOCK(); tdb = gettdb(tc->tc_rdomain, tc->tc_spi, &tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto); if (tdb == NULL) { @@ -1073,7 +1072,7 @@ esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) /* Reset the session ID */ if (tdb->tdb_cryptoid != 0) tdb->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; - NET_UNLOCK(s); + NET_UNLOCK(); crypto_dispatch(crp); return; } @@ -1091,11 +1090,11 @@ esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) /* Call the IPsec input callback. */ if (ipsp_process_done(m, tdb)) espstat.esps_outfail++; - NET_UNLOCK(s); + NET_UNLOCK(); return; baddone: - NET_UNLOCK(s); + NET_UNLOCK(); m_freem(m); |