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authoritojun <itojun@openbsd.org>1999-12-21 15:41:07 +0000
committeritojun <itojun@openbsd.org>1999-12-21 15:41:07 +0000
commite22543b469bbe9aa998f66c3273f52b01184c1fc (patch)
tree9d348f7512bf6a0fc71e19452b597b042d71329f /sys/netinet/tcp_input.c
parentenable SACK again (diff)
downloadwireguard-openbsd-e22543b469bbe9aa998f66c3273f52b01184c1fc.tar.xz
wireguard-openbsd-e22543b469bbe9aa998f66c3273f52b01184c1fc.zip
be paranoid about malicious use of v4 mapped addr on v6 packet.
malicious party may try to use v4 mapped addr as source/dest to confuse tcp/udp layer, or to bypass security checks, for example, naive stack can mistakingly think a packet with src = ::ffff:127.0.0.1 is from local node. (sync with kame)
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/netinet/tcp_input.c')
-rw-r--r--sys/netinet/tcp_input.c9
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c b/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c
index f4195de21a1..81362ad1b37 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: tcp_input.c,v 1.54 1999/12/15 16:37:20 provos Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: tcp_input.c,v 1.55 1999/12/21 15:41:07 itojun Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: tcp_input.c,v 1.23 1996/02/13 23:43:44 christos Exp $ */
/*
@@ -489,6 +489,13 @@ tcp_input(m, va_alist)
ti = NULL;
ipv6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
+ /* Be proactive about malicious use of IPv4 mapped address */
+ if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ipv6->ip6_src) ||
+ IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ipv6->ip6_dst)) {
+ /* XXX stat */
+ goto drop;
+ }
+
if (in6_cksum(m, IPPROTO_TCP, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), tlen)) {
tcpstat.tcps_rcvbadsum++;
goto drop;