diff options
| author |   djm <djm@openbsd.org> | 2013-11-21 00:45:43 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | djm <djm@openbsd.org> | 2013-11-21 00:45:43 +0000 |
| commit | 1edbfe239db2487faa56c5fb5877105e3018932c (patch) | |
| tree | d5cbb0444e798f9ca43091e45c4a31f1498e401f /usr.bin/ssh/dh.c | |
| parent | remove the #define b_cylinder b_resid from bufs. i hated the (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-openbsd-1edbfe239db2487faa56c5fb5877105e3018932c.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-1edbfe239db2487faa56c5fb5877105e3018932c.zip | |
Add a new protocol 2 transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com"
that combines Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC
to build an authenticated encryption mode.
Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a
second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths.
Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file.
Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC
ok markus@ naddy@
Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin/ssh/dh.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/ssh/dh.c | 38 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/dh.c b/usr.bin/ssh/dh.c index 98f0fde2f05..15a82ece843 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/dh.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/dh.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.52 2013/10/08 11:42:13 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.53 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * @@ -251,33 +251,19 @@ dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) void dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) { - int i, bits_set, tries = 0; + int pbits; - if (need < 0) - fatal("dh_gen_key: need < 0"); + if (need <= 0) + fatal("%s: need <= 0", __func__); if (dh->p == NULL) - fatal("dh_gen_key: dh->p == NULL"); - if (need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need >= BN_num_bits(dh->p)) - fatal("dh_gen_key: group too small: %d (2*need %d)", - BN_num_bits(dh->p), 2*need); - do { - if (dh->priv_key != NULL) - BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key); - if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_new failed"); - /* generate a 2*need bits random private exponent */ - if (!BN_rand(dh->priv_key, 2*need, 0, 0)) - fatal("dh_gen_key: BN_rand failed"); - if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) - fatal("DH_generate_key"); - for (i = 0, bits_set = 0; i <= BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key); i++) - if (BN_is_bit_set(dh->priv_key, i)) - bits_set++; - debug2("dh_gen_key: priv key bits set: %d/%d", - bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->priv_key)); - if (tries++ > 10) - fatal("dh_gen_key: too many bad keys: giving up"); - } while (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)); + fatal("%s: dh->p == NULL", __func__); + if ((pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0) + fatal("%s: bits(p) <= 0", __func__); + dh->length = MIN(need * 2, pbits - 1); + if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) + fatal("%s: key generation failed", __func__); + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) + fatal("%s: generated invalid key", __func__); } DH * |