diff options
| author |   deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> | 2015-01-16 06:39:28 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | deraadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> | 2015-01-16 06:39:28 +0000 |
| commit | b9fc9a728fce9c4289b7e9a992665e28d5629a54 (patch) | |
| tree | 72b2433e418dfa1aef5fcf8305617b97979a25d8 /usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keygen.c | |
| parent | improve checksum parsing slightly. now handles filenames with spaces. (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-openbsd-b9fc9a728fce9c4289b7e9a992665e28d5629a54.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-b9fc9a728fce9c4289b7e9a992665e28d5629a54.zip | |
Replace <sys/param.h> with <limits.h> and other less dirty headers where
possible. Annotate <sys/param.h> lines with their current reasons. Switch
to PATH_MAX, NGROUPS_MAX, HOST_NAME_MAX+1, LOGIN_NAME_MAX, etc. Change
MIN() and MAX() to local definitions of MINIMUM() and MAXIMUM() where
sensible to avoid pulling in the pollution. These are the files confirmed
through binary verification.
ok guenther, millert, doug (helped with the verification protocol)
Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keygen.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keygen.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keygen.c b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keygen.c index f90a600f876..d1337927b4b 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keygen.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keygen.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.252 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.253 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <sys/stat.h> -#include <sys/param.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/pem.h> @@ -28,6 +27,7 @@ #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> +#include <limits.h> #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" @@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) FILE *in, *out = stdout; struct sshkey *pub; char *cp, *cp2, *kp, *kp2; - char line[16*1024], tmp[MAXPATHLEN], old[MAXPATHLEN]; + char line[16*1024], tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX]; int c, skip = 0, inplace = 0, num = 0, invalid = 0, has_unhashed = 0; int r, ca, revoked; int found_key = 0; @@ -2275,9 +2275,9 @@ usage(void) int main(int argc, char **argv) { - char dotsshdir[MAXPATHLEN], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2; + char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2; char *checkpoint = NULL; - char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep; + char out_file[PATH_MAX], *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep; struct sshkey *private, *public; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; @@ -2490,7 +2490,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) fatal("Output filename too long"); break; case 'K': - if (strlen(optarg) >= MAXPATHLEN) + if (strlen(optarg) >= PATH_MAX) fatal("Checkpoint filename too long"); checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg); break; |