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authormarkus <markus@openbsd.org>2002-05-31 10:30:33 +0000
committermarkus <markus@openbsd.org>2002-05-31 10:30:33 +0000
commit6e8cec495b8bb73fd7bbb37170d3227f4f612455 (patch)
tree5b9a4c54378f19c2c27775599d069d46209479b8 /usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keysign.c
parentfunction prototypes shoulnd't carry variable name (diff)
downloadwireguard-openbsd-6e8cec495b8bb73fd7bbb37170d3227f4f612455.tar.xz
wireguard-openbsd-6e8cec495b8bb73fd7bbb37170d3227f4f612455.zip
extent ssh-keysign protocol:
pass # of socket-fd to ssh-keysign, keysign verfies locally used ip-address using this socket-fd, restricts fake local hostnames to actual local hostnames; ok stevesk@
Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keysign.c')
-rw-r--r--usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keysign.c37
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keysign.c b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keysign.c
index a309852d3d7..da630708db9 100644
--- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keysign.c
+++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-keysign.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.1 2002/05/23 19:24:30 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.2 2002/05/31 10:30:33 markus Exp $");
#include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -35,16 +35,18 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.1 2002/05/23 19:24:30 markus Exp $");
#include "bufaux.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "msg.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
static int
-valid_request(struct passwd *pw, Key **ret, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, Key **ret, u_char *data,
+ u_int datalen)
{
Buffer b;
Key *key;
- u_char *p, *pkblob;
- u_int blen;
- char *pkalg;
+ u_char *pkblob;
+ u_int blen, len;
+ char *pkalg, *p;
int pktype, fail;
fail = 0;
@@ -86,11 +88,20 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, Key **ret, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
xfree(pkalg);
xfree(pkblob);
- /* chost */
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ /* client host name, handle trailing dot */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+ debug2("valid_request: check expect chost %s got %s", host, p);
+ if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
+ fail++;
+ else if (p[len - 1] != '.')
+ fail++;
+ else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
/* local user */
p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+
if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, p) != 0)
fail++;
xfree(p);
@@ -115,8 +126,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
Buffer b;
Key *keys[2], *key;
struct passwd *pw;
- int key_fd[2], i, found, version = 1;
+ int key_fd[2], i, found, version = 2, fd;
u_char *signature, *data;
+ char *host;
u_int slen, dlen;
key_fd[0] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
@@ -157,10 +169,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
fatal("msg_recv failed");
if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version)
fatal("bad version");
+ fd = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ if ((fd == STDIN_FILENO) || (fd == STDOUT_FILENO))
+ fatal("bad fd");
+ if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL)
+ fatal("cannot get sockname for fd");
+
data = buffer_get_string(&b, &dlen);
- if (valid_request(pw, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
+ if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
fatal("not a valid request");
xfree(data);
+ xfree(host);
found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {