diff options
| author |   djm <djm@openbsd.org> | 2010-08-31 09:58:37 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | djm <djm@openbsd.org> | 2010-08-31 09:58:37 +0000 |
| commit | 867f0cfffd899a24317337f8aa094f0865eceb6f (patch) | |
| tree | da8aa0e9152490f921d4c416cddc05dc8555c8d3 /usr.bin/ssh/ssh-rsa.c | |
| parent | do not return EOPNOTSUPP for unknown activate actions (diff) | |
| download | wireguard-openbsd-867f0cfffd899a24317337f8aa094f0865eceb6f.tar.xz wireguard-openbsd-867f0cfffd899a24317337f8aa094f0865eceb6f.zip | |
Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the
string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters*
This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to
strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with
a string(3) function.
Use the new API in a few sensitive places.
* actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because
we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't
count on this to remain indefinitely.
Diffstat (limited to 'usr.bin/ssh/ssh-rsa.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | usr.bin/ssh/ssh-rsa.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-rsa.c b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-rsa.c index b29546783a2..5766582976f 100644 --- a/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-rsa.c +++ b/usr.bin/ssh/ssh-rsa.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.44 2010/07/16 14:07:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.45 2010/08/31 09:58:37 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> * @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, } buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen); - ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); + ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) { error("ssh_rsa_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype); buffer_free(&b); |