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-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c8
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c20
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c11
-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/t1_enc.c66
4 files changed, 28 insertions, 77 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c b/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c
index 8c910c5f86b..a1c0ce6b908 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: s3_cbc.c,v 1.16 2017/01/23 08:08:06 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: s3_cbc.c,v 1.17 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -135,12 +135,6 @@ tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned block_size,
padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
- if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
- /* padding is already verified */
- rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
- return 1;
- }
-
good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
/* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
* then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the
diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c b/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 59c3ad5a0b1..e54fbacdd87 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_ciph.c,v 1.104 2018/09/08 14:29:52 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_ciph.c,v 1.105 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -598,12 +598,20 @@ ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
*mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
}
- if (*enc != NULL &&
- (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) &&
- (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef))
- return 1;
+ if (*enc == NULL || *md == NULL ||
+ (mac_pkey_type != NULL && *mac_pkey_type == NID_undef))
+ return 0;
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER and EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE ciphers are not
+ * supported via EVP_CIPHER (they should be using EVP_AEAD instead).
+ */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+ return 0;
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(*enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
}
/*
diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c b/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
index 163b0292af2..4e3ac7722aa 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.12 2017/05/07 04:22:24 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.13 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -739,6 +739,7 @@ do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
p += 2;
/* Explicit IV length. */
+ eivlen = 0;
if (s->internal->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->internal->enc_write_ctx);
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
@@ -746,16 +747,10 @@ do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
if (eivlen <= 1)
eivlen = 0;
}
- /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
- else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- else
- eivlen = 0;
} else if (s->internal->aead_write_ctx != NULL &&
s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record) {
eivlen = s->internal->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len;
- } else
- eivlen = 0;
+ }
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
wr->data = p + eivlen;
diff --git a/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c b/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
index 77ac5899acc..b8ebf524170 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.113 2018/09/06 16:40:45 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.114 2018/09/08 14:39:41 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -458,6 +458,7 @@ tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
const EVP_MD *mac;
int mac_type;
@@ -503,26 +504,13 @@ tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read,
s->internal->write_hash = mac_ctx;
}
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL,
- !is_read);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
- iv_len, (unsigned char *)iv);
- } else
- EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read);
-
- if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
- mac_secret, mac_secret_size);
- if (mac_key == NULL)
- goto err;
- EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key);
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- } else if (mac_secret_size > 0) {
- /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
- mac_secret_size, (unsigned char *)mac_secret);
- }
+ EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read);
+
+ if ((mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
+ mac_secret_size)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) {
int nid;
@@ -589,10 +577,6 @@ tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
} else {
key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
-
- /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
}
mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
@@ -676,10 +660,6 @@ tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
}
key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
-
- /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
- iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
}
S3I(s)->tmp.new_aead = aead;
@@ -951,28 +931,7 @@ tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
l = rec->length;
bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
- unsigned char buf[13];
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- dtls1_build_sequence_number(buf, seq,
- send ? D1I(s)->w_epoch : D1I(s)->r_epoch);
- } else {
- memcpy(buf, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
- tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq);
- }
-
- buf[8] = rec->type;
- buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
- buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
- buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
- buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
- pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf);
- if (send) {
- l += pad;
- rec->length += pad;
- }
- } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+ if (bs != 1 && send) {
i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
@@ -994,11 +953,6 @@ tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) &
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0))
return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
- rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- }
ret = 1;
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
Copyright © 1996 – 2023 Jason A. Donenfeld. All Rights Reverse Engineered.