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Diffstat (limited to 'lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c | 2424 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2424 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c b/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3022469ea91..00000000000 --- a/lib/libssl/src/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2424 +0,0 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.88 2016/08/27 15:58:06 jsing Exp $ */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include <stdio.h> - -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/hmac.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> -#include <openssl/ocsp.h> - -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#include "bytestring.h" - -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, - SSL_SESSION **psess); - -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { - .enc = tls1_enc, - .mac = tls1_mac, - .setup_key_block = tls1_setup_key_block, - .generate_master_secret = tls1_generate_master_secret, - .change_cipher_state = tls1_change_cipher_state, - .final_finish_mac = tls1_final_finish_mac, - .finish_mac_length = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - .cert_verify_mac = tls1_cert_verify_mac, - .client_finished_label = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, - .client_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - .server_finished_label = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, - .server_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - .alert_value = tls1_alert_code, - .export_keying_material = tls1_export_keying_material, - .enc_flags = 0, -}; - -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { - .enc = tls1_enc, - .mac = tls1_mac, - .setup_key_block = tls1_setup_key_block, - .generate_master_secret = tls1_generate_master_secret, - .change_cipher_state = tls1_change_cipher_state, - .final_finish_mac = tls1_final_finish_mac, - .finish_mac_length = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - .cert_verify_mac = tls1_cert_verify_mac, - .client_finished_label = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, - .client_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - .server_finished_label = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, - .server_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - .alert_value = tls1_alert_code, - .export_keying_material = tls1_export_keying_material, - .enc_flags = SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, -}; - -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { - .enc = tls1_enc, - .mac = tls1_mac, - .setup_key_block = tls1_setup_key_block, - .generate_master_secret = tls1_generate_master_secret, - .change_cipher_state = tls1_change_cipher_state, - .final_finish_mac = tls1_final_finish_mac, - .finish_mac_length = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - .cert_verify_mac = tls1_cert_verify_mac, - .client_finished_label = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, - .client_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - .server_finished_label = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, - .server_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - .alert_value = tls1_alert_code, - .export_keying_material = tls1_export_keying_material, - .enc_flags = SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS| - SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF|SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, -}; - -long -tls1_default_timeout(void) -{ - /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec - * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ - return (60 * 60 * 2); -} - -int -tls1_new(SSL *s) -{ - if (!ssl3_new(s)) - return (0); - s->method->ssl_clear(s); - return (1); -} - -void -tls1_free(SSL *s) -{ - if (s == NULL) - return; - - free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); - ssl3_free(s); -} - -void -tls1_clear(SSL *s) -{ - ssl3_clear(s); - s->version = s->method->version; -} - - -static int nid_list[] = { - NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ - NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ - NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ - NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ - NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ - NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ - NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ - NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ - NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ - NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ - NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ - NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ - NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ - NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpoolP512r1 (28) */ -}; - -static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] = { - TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, - TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, - TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 -}; - -static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = { - 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ - 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ - 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ - 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ - 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ - 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ - 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ - 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ - 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ - 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ - 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ - 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ - 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ -}; - -int -tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id) -{ - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ - if ((curve_id < 1) || - ((unsigned int)curve_id > sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) - return 0; - return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; -} - -uint16_t -tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) -{ - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ - switch (nid) { - case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ - return 1; - case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ - return 2; - case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ - return 3; - case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ - return 4; - case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ - return 5; - case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ - return 6; - case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ - return 7; - case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ - return 8; - case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ - return 9; - case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ - return 10; - case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ - return 11; - case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ - return 12; - case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ - return 13; - case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ - return 14; - case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ - return 15; - case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ - return 16; - case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ - return 17; - case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ - return 18; - case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ - return 19; - case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ - return 20; - case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ - return 21; - case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ - return 22; - case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ - return 23; - case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ - return 24; - case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ - return 25; - case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - return 26; - case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - return 27; - case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpoolP512r1 (28) */ - return 28; - default: - return 0; - } -} - -/* - * Return the appropriate format list. If client_formats is non-zero, return - * the client/session formats. Otherwise return the custom format list if one - * exists, or the default formats if a custom list has not been specified. - */ -static void -tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, int client_formats, const uint8_t **pformats, - size_t *pformatslen) -{ - if (client_formats != 0) { - *pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - *pformatslen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - return; - } - - *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - if (*pformats == NULL) { - *pformats = ecformats_default; - *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default); - } -} - -/* - * Return the appropriate curve list. If client_curves is non-zero, return - * the client/session curves. Otherwise return the custom curve list if one - * exists, or the default curves if a custom list has not been specified. - */ -static void -tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int client_curves, const uint16_t **pcurves, - size_t *pcurveslen) -{ - if (client_curves != 0) { - *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; - return; - } - - *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; - if (*pcurves == NULL) { - *pcurves = eccurves_default; - *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default) / 2; - } -} - -/* Check that a curve is one of our preferences. */ -int -tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) -{ - CBS cbs; - const uint16_t *curves; - size_t curveslen, i; - uint8_t type; - uint16_t cid; - - CBS_init(&cbs, p, len); - - /* Only named curves are supported. */ - if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 3 || - !CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &type) || - type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || - !CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &cid)) - return (0); - - tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen); - - for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i++) { - if (curves[i] == cid) - return (1); - } - return (0); -} - -int -tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s) -{ - size_t preflen, supplen, i, j; - const uint16_t *pref, *supp; - unsigned long server_pref; - - /* Cannot do anything on the client side. */ - if (s->server == 0) - return (NID_undef); - - /* Return first preference shared curve. */ - server_pref = (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); - tls1_get_curvelist(s, (server_pref == 0), &pref, &preflen); - tls1_get_curvelist(s, (server_pref != 0), &supp, &supplen); - - for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++) { - if (pref[i] == supp[j]) - return (tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i])); - } - } - return (NID_undef); -} - -/* For an EC key set TLS ID and required compression based on parameters. */ -static int -tls1_set_ec_id(uint16_t *curve_id, uint8_t *comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) -{ - const EC_GROUP *grp; - const EC_METHOD *meth; - int is_prime = 0; - int nid, id; - - if (ec == NULL) - return (0); - - /* Determine if it is a prime field. */ - if ((grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)) == NULL) - return (0); - if ((meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp)) == NULL) - return (0); - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) - is_prime = 1; - - /* Determine curve ID. */ - nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); - id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); - - /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve. */ - if (id != 0) - *curve_id = id; - else - *curve_id = is_prime ? 0xff01 : 0xff02; - - /* Specify the compression identifier. */ - if (comp_id != NULL) { - if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) - return (0); - - if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { - *comp_id = is_prime ? - TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime : - TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; - } else { - *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; - } - } - return (1); -} - -/* Check that an EC key is compatible with extensions. */ -static int -tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, const uint16_t *curve_id, const uint8_t *comp_id) -{ - size_t curveslen, formatslen, i; - const uint16_t *curves; - const uint8_t *formats; - - /* - * Check point formats extension if present, otherwise everything - * is supported (see RFC4492). - */ - tls1_get_formatlist(s, 1, &formats, &formatslen); - if (comp_id != NULL && formats != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < formatslen; i++) { - if (formats[i] == *comp_id) - break; - } - if (i == formatslen) - return (0); - } - - /* - * Check curve list if present, otherwise everything is supported. - */ - tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &curveslen); - if (curve_id != NULL && curves != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i++) { - if (curves[i] == *curve_id) - break; - } - if (i == curveslen) - return (0); - } - - return (1); -} - -/* Check EC server key is compatible with client extensions. */ -int -tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s) -{ - CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->cert->pkeys + SSL_PKEY_ECC; - uint16_t curve_id; - uint8_t comp_id; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - int rv; - - if (cpk->x509 == NULL || cpk->privatekey == NULL) - return (0); - if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cpk->x509)) == NULL) - return (0); - rv = tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (rv != 1) - return (0); - - return tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, &comp_id); -} - -/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions. */ -int -tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s) -{ - EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; - uint16_t curve_id; - - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) { - /* Need a shared curve. */ - if (tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef) - return (1); - return (0); - } - - if (ec == NULL) { - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) - return (1); - return (0); - } - if (tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, NULL, ec) != 1) - return (0); - - return tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, NULL); -} - -/* - * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this - * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. - */ - -static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { - TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - TLSEXT_hash_streebog_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr12_512, -#endif - - TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, - - TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - TLSEXT_hash_streebog_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr12_256, - TLSEXT_hash_gost94, TLSEXT_signature_gostr01, -#endif - - TLSEXT_hash_sha224, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha224, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha224, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, - - TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, - TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, -}; - -int -tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) -{ - size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); - - if (p) - memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); - return (int)slen; -} - -unsigned char * -ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) -{ - int extdatalen = 0; - unsigned char *ret = p; - int using_ecc = 0; - - /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites. */ - if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) { - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); - unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { - SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); - - alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; - - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || - (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { - using_ecc = 1; - break; - } - } - } - - ret += 2; - - if (ret >= limit) - return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { - /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ - size_t size_str, lenmax; - - /* check for enough space. - 4 for the servername type and extension length - 2 for servernamelist length - 1 for the hostname type - 2 for hostname length - + hostname length - */ - - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 9) - return NULL; - - lenmax = limit - ret - 9; - if ((size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > lenmax) - return NULL; - - /* extension type and length */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); - - s2n(size_str + 5, ret); - - /* length of servername list */ - s2n(size_str + 3, ret); - - /* hostname type, length and hostname */ - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - s2n(size_str, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); - ret += size_str; - } - - /* Add RI if renegotiating */ - if (s->renegotiate) { - int el; - - if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + el) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } - - if (using_ecc) { - size_t curveslen, formatslen, lenmax; - const uint16_t *curves; - const uint8_t *formats; - int i; - - /* - * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message. - */ - tls1_get_formatlist(s, 0, &formats, &formatslen); - - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 5) - return NULL; - - lenmax = limit - ret - 5; - if (formatslen > lenmax) - return NULL; - if (formatslen > 255) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); - s2n(formatslen + 1, ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)formatslen; - memcpy(ret, formats, formatslen); - ret += formatslen; - - /* - * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message. - */ - tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen); - - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6) - return NULL; - - lenmax = limit - ret - 6; - if (curveslen > lenmax) - return NULL; - if (curveslen > 65532) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); - s2n((curveslen * 2) + 2, ret); - - /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for - * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. - * https://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html - * resolves this to two bytes. - */ - s2n(curveslen * 2, ret); - for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i++) - s2n(curves[i], ret); - } - - if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { - int ticklen; - if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) - ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; - else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { - ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; - s->session->tlsext_tick = malloc(ticklen); - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) - return NULL; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; - } else - ticklen = 0; - if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) - goto skip_ext; - /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len - * rest for ticket - */ - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + ticklen) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); - - s2n(ticklen, ret); - if (ticklen) { - memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); - ret += ticklen; - } - } -skip_ext: - - if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); - s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); - s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); - memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); - ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); - } - - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { - int i; - long extlen, idlen, itmp; - OCSP_RESPID *id; - - idlen = 0; - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); - if (itmp <= 0) - return NULL; - idlen += itmp + 2; - } - - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { - extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); - if (extlen < 0) - return NULL; - } else - extlen = 0; - - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 7 + extlen + idlen) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) - return NULL; - s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); - *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; - s2n(idlen, ret); - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { - /* save position of id len */ - unsigned char *q = ret; - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - /* skip over id len */ - ret += 2; - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); - /* write id len */ - s2n(itmp, q); - } - s2n(extlen, ret); - if (extlen > 0) - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); - } - - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { - /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its - * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - - if (s->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) - return (NULL); - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); - s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); - s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, - s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); - ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { - int el; - - ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); - - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + el) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - ret += el; - } -#endif - - /* - * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. - * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 - * - * Note that this seems to trigger issues with IronPort SMTP - * appliances. - * - * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing - * extensions it MUST always appear last. - */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { - int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - /* - * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages - * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the - * code in s3_clnt.c does not. - */ - if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) - hlen -= 5; - if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { - hlen = 0x200 - hlen; - if (hlen >= 4) - hlen -= 4; - else - hlen = 0; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); - s2n(hlen, ret); - memset(ret, 0, hlen); - ret += hlen; - } - } - - if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0) - return p; - - s2n(extdatalen, p); - return ret; -} - -unsigned char * -ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) -{ - int using_ecc, extdatalen = 0; - unsigned long alg_a, alg_k; - unsigned char *ret = p; - int next_proto_neg_seen; - - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || - alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL; - - ret += 2; - if (ret >= limit) - return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && - s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - - if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { - int el; - - if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + el) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } - - if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { - const unsigned char *formats; - size_t formatslen, lenmax; - - /* - * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message. - */ - tls1_get_formatlist(s, 0, &formats, &formatslen); - - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 5) - return NULL; - - lenmax = limit - ret - 5; - if (formatslen > lenmax) - return NULL; - if (formatslen > 255) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); - s2n(formatslen + 1, ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)formatslen; - memcpy(ret, formats, formatslen); - ret += formatslen; - } - - /* - * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves - * extension. - */ - - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && - !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { - int el; - - ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); - - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + el) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - ret += el; - } -#endif - - if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 || - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) && - (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { - static const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { - 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ - 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ - 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, - 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, - 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, - 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 - }; - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(cryptopro_ext)) - return NULL; - memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext)); - ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext); - } - - next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; - if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { - const unsigned char *npa; - unsigned int npalen; - int r; - - r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, - s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + npalen) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); - s2n(npalen, ret); - memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); - ret += npalen; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } - } - - if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { - const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; - unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) - return (NULL); - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); - s2n(3 + len, ret); - s2n(1 + len, ret); - *ret++ = len; - memcpy(ret, selected, len); - ret += len; - } - - if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0) - return p; - - s2n(extdatalen, p); - return ret; -} - -/* - * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a - * ClientHello. - * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length. - * data_len: the number of bytes in data. - * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero - * return. - * returns: 1 on success. - */ -static int -tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - unsigned int data_len, int *al) -{ - CBS cbs, proto_name_list, alpn; - const unsigned char *selected; - unsigned char selected_len; - int r; - - if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) - return (1); - - if (data_len < 2) - goto parse_error; - - CBS_init(&cbs, data, data_len); - - /* - * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, - * length-prefixed strings. - */ - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &alpn) || - CBS_len(&alpn) < 2 || - CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) - goto parse_error; - - /* Validate data before sending to callback. */ - CBS_dup(&alpn, &proto_name_list); - while (CBS_len(&proto_name_list) > 0) { - CBS proto_name; - - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&proto_name_list, &proto_name) || - CBS_len(&proto_name) == 0) - goto parse_error; - } - - r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, - CBS_data(&alpn), CBS_len(&alpn), s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - if ((s->s3->alpn_selected = malloc(selected_len)) == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return (-1); - } - memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; - } - - return (1); - -parse_error: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return (0); -} - -int -ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, - int n, int *al) -{ - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned short len; - unsigned char *data = *p; - unsigned char *end = d + n; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - int sigalg_seen = 0; - - s->servername_done = 0; - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; - free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; - s->srtp_profile = NULL; - - if (data == end) - goto ri_check; - - if (end - data < 2) - goto err; - n2s(data, len); - - if (end - data != len) - goto err; - - while (end - data >= 4) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); - - if (end - data < size) - goto err; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, - s->tlsext_debug_arg); -/* The servername extension is treated as follows: - - - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. - - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, - in which case an fatal alert is generated. - - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. - - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order - to allow the application to position itself to the right context. - - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when - it is identical to a previously used for the same session. - Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time - set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the - case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and - a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername - presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches - the value of the Host: field. - - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION - if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, - i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. - - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. - -*/ - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { - unsigned char *sdata; - int servname_type; - int dsize; - - if (size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data, dsize); - - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - sdata = data; - while (dsize > 3) { - servname_type = *(sdata++); - - n2s(sdata, len); - dsize -= 3; - - if (len > dsize) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->servername_done == 0) - switch (servname_type) { - case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: - if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = - malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); - s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; - if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { - free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); - s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = 1; - - - } else { - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname && - strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len && - strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; - } - break; - - default: - break; - } - - dsize -= len; - } - if (dsize != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - } - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - size_t formatslen; - uint8_t *formats; - - if (size < 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - formatslen = *(sdata++); - if (formatslen != size - 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit) { - free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - - if ((formats = reallocarray(NULL, formatslen, - sizeof(uint8_t))) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(formats, sdata, formatslen); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = formats; - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = - formatslen; - } - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - size_t curveslen, i; - uint16_t *curves; - - if (size < 2) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(sdata, curveslen); - if (curveslen != size - 2 || curveslen % 2 != 0) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - curveslen /= 2; - - if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - if ((curves = reallocarray(NULL, curveslen, - sizeof(uint16_t))) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i++) - n2s(sdata, curves[i]); - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = curves; - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = curveslen; - } - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { - int dsize; - if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sigalg_seen = 1; - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { - - if (size < 5) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; - size--; - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - const unsigned char *sdata; - int dsize; - /* Read in responder_id_list */ - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size ) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - while (dsize > 0) { - OCSP_RESPID *id; - int idsize; - if (dsize < 4) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data, idsize); - dsize -= 2 + idsize; - size -= 2 + idsize; - if (dsize < 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sdata = data; - data += idsize; - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, - &sdata, idsize); - if (!id) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (data != sdata) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids && - !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - - /* Read in request_extensions */ - if (size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize != size) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sdata = data; - if (dsize > 0) { - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { - sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, - X509_EXTENSION_free); - } - - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, - &sdata, dsize); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || - (data + dsize != sdata)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } else { - /* We don't know what to do with any other type - * so ignore it. - */ - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - } - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && - s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a - * renegotiation. - * - * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we - * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on - * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when - * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an - * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing - * anything like that, but this might change). - - * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake - * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > - * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen - * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new - * Finished message could have been computed.) */ - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } - else if (type == - TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && - s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, - size, al) != 1) - return (0); - /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; - } - - /* session ticket processed earlier */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - } -#endif - - data += size; - } - - /* Spurious data on the end */ - if (data != end) - goto err; - - *p = data; - -ri_check: - - /* Need RI if renegotiating */ - - if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; - -err: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; -} - -/* - * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No - * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill - * the length of the block. - */ -static char -ssl_next_proto_validate(const unsigned char *d, unsigned int len) -{ - CBS npn, value; - - CBS_init(&npn, d, len); - while (CBS_len(&npn) > 0) { - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&npn, &value) || - CBS_len(&value) == 0) - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -int -ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, - int n, int *al) -{ - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned short len; - unsigned char *data = *p; - unsigned char *end = d + n; - int tlsext_servername = 0; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; - free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; - - if (data == end) - goto ri_check; - - if (end - data < 2) - goto err; - n2s(data, len); - - if (end - data != len) - goto err; - - while (end - data >= 4) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); - - if (end - data < size) - goto err; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, - s->tlsext_debug_arg); - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - tlsext_servername = 1; - - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - size_t formatslen; - uint8_t *formats; - - if (size < 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - formatslen = *(sdata++); - if (formatslen != size - 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit) { - free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - - if ((formats = reallocarray(NULL, formatslen, - sizeof(uint8_t))) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(formats, sdata, formatslen); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = formats; - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = - formatslen; - } - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || (size > 0)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { - /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested - * a status request message. - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - unsigned char *selected; - unsigned char selected_len; - - /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* The data must be valid */ - if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->next_proto_negotiated = malloc(selected_len); - if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } - else if (type == - TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { - unsigned int len; - - /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - if (size < 4) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return (0); - } - - /* The extension data consists of: - * uint16 list_length - * uint8 proto_length; - * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */ - len = ((unsigned int)data[0]) << 8 | - ((unsigned int)data[1]); - if (len != (unsigned int)size - 2) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return (0); - } - len = data[2]; - if (len != (unsigned int)size - 3) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return (0); - } - free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = malloc(len); - if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return (0); - } - memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; - - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, - size, al)) - return 0; - } -#endif - - data += size; - - } - - if (data != d + n) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = - strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - - if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - } else { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } - - *p = data; - -ri_check: - - /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to - * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server - * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an - * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server - * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI - * absence on initial connect only. - */ - if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; - -err: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; -} - -int -ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) -{ - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in - * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ - /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in - * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done = 0; - default: - return 1; - } -} - -int -ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) -{ - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; - int al = 0; /* XXX gcc3 */ - - /* If status request then ask callback what to do. - * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case - * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher - * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && - s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int r; - CERT_PKEY *certpkey; - certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); - /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ - if (certpkey == NULL) { - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - return 1; - } - /* Set current certificate to one we will use so - * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. - */ - s->cert->key = certpkey; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - switch (r) { - /* We don't want to send a status request response */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* status request response should be sent */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* something bad happened */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - -err: - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - default: - return 1; - } -} - -int -ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) -{ - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher - * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension - * it must contain uncompressed. - */ - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && - (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && - (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && - (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && - ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { - /* we are using an ECC cipher */ - size_t i; - unsigned char *list; - int found_uncompressed = 0; - list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { - if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { - found_uncompressed = 1; - break; - } - } - if (!found_uncompressed) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); - return -1; - } - } - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - - /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one - * tell the callback - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) && - s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int r; - /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows - * there is no response. - */ - free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (r == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - if (r < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - } - - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - - return -1; - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - - return 1; - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done = 0; - default: - return 1; - } -} - -/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the - * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle - * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. - * - * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will - * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket - * extension, if any. - * len: the length of the session ID. - * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. - * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to - * point to the resulting session. - * - * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key - * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will - * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. - * - * Returns: - * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. - * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). - * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports - * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. - * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but - * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. - * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. - * - * Side effects: - * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue - * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support - * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have - * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if - * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. - * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. - */ -int -tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *session, int session_len, - const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) -{ - /* Point after session ID in client hello */ - CBS session_id, cookie, cipher_list, compress_algo, extensions; - - *ret = NULL; - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - - /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present - * to permit stateful resumption. - */ - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - return 0; - if (!limit) - return 0; - - if (limit < session) - return -1; - - CBS_init(&session_id, session, limit - session); - - /* Skip past the session id */ - if (!CBS_skip(&session_id, session_len)) - return -1; - - /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&session_id, &cookie)) - return -1; - } - - /* Skip past cipher list */ - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&session_id, &cipher_list)) - return -1; - - /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ - if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&session_id, &compress_algo)) - return -1; - - /* Now at start of extensions */ - if (CBS_len(&session_id) == 0) - return 0; - if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&session_id, &extensions)) - return -1; - - while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) { - CBS ext_data; - uint16_t ext_type; - - if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &ext_type) || - !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &ext_data)) - return -1; - - if (ext_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - int r; - if (CBS_len(&ext_data) == 0) { - /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't - * currently have one. */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 1; - } - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { - /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be - * decrypted rather than generating the session - * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated - * handshake based on external mechanism to - * calculate the master secret later. */ - return 2; - } - - r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, CBS_data(&ext_data), - CBS_len(&ext_data), session, session_len, ret); - - switch (r) { - case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 2; - case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ - return r; - case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 3; - default: /* fatal error */ - return -1; - } - } - } - return 0; -} - -/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. - * - * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. - * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. - * sess_id: points at the session ID. - * sesslen: the length of the session ID. - * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to - * point to the resulting session. - * - * Returns: - * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. - * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. - * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. - * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. - */ -static int -tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) -{ - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned char *sdec; - const unsigned char *p; - int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; - unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - HMAC_CTX hctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; - SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ - if (eticklen < 48) - return 2; - /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { - unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; - int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, - &ctx, &hctx, 0); - if (rv < 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; - } - if (rv == 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return 2; - } - if (rv == 2) - renew_ticket = 1; - } else { - /* Check key name matches */ - if (timingsafe_memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) - return 2; - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); - } - /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and - * integrity checks on ticket. - */ - mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); - if (mlen < 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; - } - eticklen -= mlen; - /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ - HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - if (timingsafe_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return 2; - } - /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ - /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ - p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - sdec = malloc(eticklen); - if (!sdec) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; - } - EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); - if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { - free(sdec); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return 2; - } - slen += mlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - p = sdec; - - sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); - free(sdec); - if (sess) { - /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to - * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to - * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero - * as required by standard. - */ - if (sesslen) - memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); - sess->session_id_length = sesslen; - *psess = sess; - if (renew_ticket) - return 4; - else - return 3; - } - ERR_clear_error(); - /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new - * ticket. */ - return 2; -} - -/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ - -typedef struct { - int nid; - int id; -} tls12_lookup; - -static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { - {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, - {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, - {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, - {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, - {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, - {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gost94}, - {NID_id_tc26_gost3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_streebog_256}, - {NID_id_tc26_gost3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_streebog_512} -}; - -static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { - {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, - {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, - {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}, - {EVP_PKEY_GOSTR01, TLSEXT_signature_gostr01}, -}; - -static int -tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) -{ - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { - if (table[i].nid == nid) - return table[i].id; - } - return -1; -} - -int -tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) -{ - int sig_id, md_id; - if (!md) - return 0; - md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, - sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); - if (md_id == -1) - return 0; - sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); - if (sig_id == -1) - return 0; - p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; - p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; - return 1; -} - -int -tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) -{ - return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, - sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); -} - -const EVP_MD * -tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) -{ - switch (hash_alg) { - case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: - return EVP_sha1(); - case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: - return EVP_sha224(); - case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: - return EVP_sha256(); - case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: - return EVP_sha384(); - case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: - return EVP_sha512(); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - case TLSEXT_hash_gost94: - return EVP_gostr341194(); - case TLSEXT_hash_streebog_256: - return EVP_streebog256(); - case TLSEXT_hash_streebog_512: - return EVP_streebog512(); -#endif - default: - return NULL; - } -} - -/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ - -int -tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) -{ - int idx; - const EVP_MD *md; - CERT *c = s->cert; - CBS cbs; - - /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - return 1; - - /* Should never happen */ - if (!c || dsize < 0) - return 0; - - CBS_init(&cbs, data, dsize); - - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].digest = NULL; - - while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) { - uint8_t hash_alg, sig_alg; - - if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &hash_alg) || - !CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &sig_alg)) { - /* Should never happen */ - return 0; - } - - switch (sig_alg) { - case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: - idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; - break; - case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: - idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; - break; - case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: - idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; - break; - case TLSEXT_signature_gostr01: - case TLSEXT_signature_gostr12_256: - case TLSEXT_signature_gostr12_512: - idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; - break; - default: - continue; - } - - if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { - md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); - if (md) { - c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; - } - } - - } - - /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not - * supported it stays as NULL. - */ - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); - } - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].digest) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].digest = EVP_gostr341194(); -#endif - return 1; -} |