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-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/ssl_both.c748
1 files changed, 748 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/ssl_both.c b/lib/libssl/ssl_both.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e556e336edf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/libssl/ssl_both.c
@@ -0,0 +1,748 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_both.c,v 1.1 2017/01/26 05:51:54 jsing Exp $ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "bytestring.h"
+
+/*
+ * Send s->internal->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+ * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC).
+ */
+int
+ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->internal->init_buf->data[s->internal->init_off],
+ s->internal->init_num);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return (-1);
+
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ /*
+ * Should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+ * we'll ignore the result anyway.
+ */
+ tls1_finish_mac(s,
+ (unsigned char *)&s->internal->init_buf->data[s->internal->init_off], ret);
+
+ if (ret == s->internal->init_num) {
+ if (s->internal->msg_callback)
+ s->internal->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->internal->init_buf->data,
+ (size_t)(s->internal->init_off + s->internal->init_num), s,
+ s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ s->internal->init_off += ret;
+ s->internal->init_num -= ret;
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int md_len;
+
+ if (s->internal->state == a) {
+ md_len = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->finish_mac_length;
+ OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ if (s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
+ S3I(s)->tmp.finish_md) != md_len)
+ return (0);
+ S3I(s)->tmp.finish_md_len = md_len;
+
+ /* Copy finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */
+ if (s->internal->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+ memcpy(S3I(s)->previous_client_finished,
+ S3I(s)->tmp.finish_md, md_len);
+ S3I(s)->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(S3I(s)->previous_server_finished,
+ S3I(s)->tmp.finish_md, md_len);
+ S3I(s)->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
+ }
+
+ p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED);
+ memcpy(p, S3I(s)->tmp.finish_md, md_len);
+ ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, md_len);
+
+ s->internal->state = b;
+ }
+
+ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
+ * so far.
+ */
+static void
+ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+{
+ const char *sender;
+ int slen;
+
+ /*
+ * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will
+ * set the appropriate error.
+ */
+ if (S3I(s)->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (s->internal->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+ sender = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+ slen = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+ } else {
+ sender = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+ slen = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+ }
+
+ S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
+ s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
+ S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+{
+ int al, ok, md_len;
+ long n;
+ CBS cbs;
+
+ /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */
+ n = s->method->internal->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 64, &ok);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
+ if (!S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+ md_len = s->method->internal->ssl3_enc->finish_mac_length;
+
+ if (n < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
+
+ if (S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md_len != md_len ||
+ CBS_len(&cbs) != md_len) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cbs, S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md, CBS_len(&cbs))) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (s->internal->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT) {
+ memcpy(S3I(s)->previous_client_finished,
+ S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len);
+ S3I(s)->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(S3I(s)->previous_server_finished,
+ S3I(s)->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len);
+ S3I(s)->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
+ * ssl->s3->internal->read_sequence zero
+ * ssl->s3->internal->read_mac_secret re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash assign
+ */
+int
+ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->internal->state == a) {
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data;
+ *p = SSL3_MT_CCS;
+ s->internal->init_num = 1;
+ s->internal->init_off = 0;
+
+ s->internal->state = b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
+}
+
+static int
+ssl3_add_cert(CBB *cbb, X509 *x)
+{
+ unsigned char *data;
+ int cert_len;
+ int ret = 0;
+ CBB cert;
+
+ if ((cert_len = i2d_X509(x, NULL)) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &cert))
+ goto err;
+ if (!CBB_add_space(&cert, &data, cert_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (i2d_X509(x, &data) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CBB *cbb, X509 *x)
+{
+ int no_chain = 0;
+ CBB cert_list;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &cert_list))
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || s->ctx->extra_certs)
+ no_chain = 1;
+
+ /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert. */
+ if (x != NULL) {
+ if (no_chain) {
+ if (!ssl3_add_cert(&cert_list, x))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, s->ctx->cert_store,
+ x, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
+ ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+
+ /* Don't leave errors in the queue. */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+ if (!ssl3_add_cert(&cert_list, x)) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Thawte special :-) */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs, i);
+ if (!ssl3_add_cert(&cert_list, x))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
+ * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
+ * the body is read in state 'stn'.
+ */
+long
+ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ uint32_t l;
+ long n;
+ int i, al;
+ CBS cbs;
+ uint8_t u8;
+
+ if (S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message) {
+ S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+ if ((mt >= 0) && (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != mt)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ *ok = 1;
+ s->internal->init_msg = s->internal->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->internal->init_num = (int)S3I(s)->tmp.message_size;
+ return s->internal->init_num;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* s->internal->init_num < 4 */
+ if (s->internal->state == st1) {
+ int skip_message;
+
+ do {
+ while (s->internal->init_num < 4) {
+ i = s->method->internal->ssl_read_bytes(s,
+ SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->internal->init_num],
+ 4 - s->internal->init_num, 0);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ s->internal->init_num += i;
+ }
+
+ skip_message = 0;
+ if (!s->server && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
+ /*
+ * The server may always send 'Hello Request'
+ * messages -- we are doing a handshake anyway
+ * now, so ignore them if their format is
+ * correct. Does not count for 'Finished' MAC.
+ */
+ if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0) {
+ s->internal->init_num = 0;
+ skip_message = 1;
+
+ if (s->internal->msg_callback)
+ s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version,
+ SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s,
+ s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+ }
+ } while (skip_message);
+
+ /* s->internal->init_num == 4 */
+
+ if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&cbs, p, 4);
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &u8) ||
+ !CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &l)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ S3I(s)->tmp.message_type = u8;
+
+ if (l > (unsigned long)max) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->internal->init_buf, l + 4)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ S3I(s)->tmp.message_size = l;
+ s->internal->state = stn;
+
+ s->internal->init_msg = s->internal->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->internal->init_num = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* next state (stn) */
+ p = s->internal->init_msg;
+ n = S3I(s)->tmp.message_size - s->internal->init_num;
+ while (n > 0) {
+ i = s->method->internal->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ &p[s->internal->init_num], n, 0);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ s->internal->init_num += i;
+ n -= i;
+ }
+
+ /* If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
+ * Finished verification. */
+ if (*s->internal->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ ssl3_take_mac(s);
+
+ /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
+ if (s->internal->mac_packet) {
+ tls1_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->internal->init_buf->data,
+ s->internal->init_num + 4);
+ s->internal->mac_packet = 0;
+
+ if (s->internal->msg_callback)
+ s->internal->msg_callback(0, s->version,
+ SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->internal->init_buf->data,
+ (size_t)s->internal->init_num + 4, s,
+ s->internal->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+
+ *ok = 1;
+ return (s->internal->init_num);
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+err:
+ *ok = 0;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pk;
+ int ret = -1, i;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ else
+ pk = pkey;
+ if (pk == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ i = pk->type;
+ if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+ } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ } else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 ||
+ i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc) {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+ }
+
+err:
+ if (!pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
+{
+ int al;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+ case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+ al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
+ }
+ return (al);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_setup_init_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+
+ if (s->internal->init_buf != NULL)
+ return (1);
+
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+
+ s->internal->init_buf = buf;
+ return (1);
+
+err:
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ size_t len, align, headerlen;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ else
+ headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) {
+ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH +
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
+ if ((p = malloc(len)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
+ s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
+ }
+
+ s->internal->packet = &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ size_t len, align, headerlen;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+ else
+ headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL) {
+ len = s->max_send_fragment +
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
+ if (!(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+ len += headerlen + align +
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+
+ if ((p = malloc(len)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
+ s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return 0;
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ free(s->s3->wbuf.buf);
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
+ return 1;
+}
Copyright © 1996 – 2023 Jason A. Donenfeld. All Rights Reverse Engineered.