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-rw-r--r--lib/libssl/t1_lib.c173
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 139 deletions
diff --git a/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c b/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
index eb2314ac26a..e3046fec099 100644
--- a/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.117 2017/05/07 04:22:24 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.118 2017/07/16 18:14:37 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
@@ -117,7 +117,9 @@
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
#include "bytestring.h"
+#include "ssl_tlsext.h"
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
@@ -678,6 +680,8 @@ ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
int extdatalen = 0;
unsigned char *ret = p;
int using_ecc = 0;
+ size_t len;
+ CBB cbb;
/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites. */
if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
@@ -699,43 +703,21 @@ ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
}
ret += 2;
-
if (ret >= limit)
return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- size_t size_str, lenmax;
-
- /* check for enough space.
- 4 for the servername type and extension length
- 2 for servernamelist length
- 1 for the hostname type
- 2 for hostname length
- + hostname length
- */
-
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 9)
- return NULL;
-
- lenmax = limit - ret - 9;
- if ((size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > lenmax)
- return NULL;
-
- /* extension type and length */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
-
- s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
-
- /* length of servername list */
- s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
-
- /* hostname type, length and hostname */
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- s2n(size_str, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
- ret += size_str;
+ CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ret, limit - ret);
+ if (!tlsext_clienthello_build(s, &cbb)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &len)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return NULL;
}
+ if (len > (limit - ret))
+ return NULL;
+ ret += len;
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
if (s->internal->renegotiate) {
@@ -997,6 +979,8 @@ ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
unsigned long alg_a, alg_k;
unsigned char *ret = p;
int next_proto_neg_seen;
+ size_t len;
+ CBB cbb;
alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
@@ -1007,14 +991,18 @@ ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
if (ret >= limit)
return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
- if (!s->internal->hit && s->internal->servername_done == 1 &&
- s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
+ CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, ret, limit - ret);
+ if (!tlsext_serverhello_build(s, &cbb)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return NULL;
}
+ if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &len)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (len > (limit - ret))
+ return NULL;
+ ret += len;
if (S3I(s)->send_connection_binding) {
int el;
@@ -1241,6 +1229,7 @@ ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
unsigned char *end = d + n;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
int sigalg_seen = 0;
+ CBS cbs;
s->internal->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
@@ -1269,106 +1258,12 @@ ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
if (s->internal->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->internal->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
s->internal->tlsext_debug_arg);
-/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
-
- - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
- in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- the value of the Host: field.
- - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
- i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
- - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
-
-*/
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- unsigned char *sdata;
- int servname_type;
- int dsize;
- if (size < 2) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- n2s(data, dsize);
-
- size -= 2;
- if (dsize > size) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- sdata = data;
- while (dsize > 3) {
- servname_type = *(sdata++);
-
- n2s(sdata, len);
- dsize -= 3;
-
- if (len > dsize) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->internal->servername_done == 0)
- switch (servname_type) {
- case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
- if (!s->internal->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
- malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
- s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
- if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
- free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- s->internal->servername_done = 1;
-
-
- } else {
- s->internal->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname &&
- strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len &&
- strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- dsize -= len;
- }
- if (dsize != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- }
+ CBS_init(&cbs, data, size);
+ if (!tlsext_clienthello_parse_one(s, &cbs, type, al))
+ return 0;
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
unsigned char *sdata = data;
size_t formatslen;
Copyright © 1996 – 2023 Jason A. Donenfeld. All Rights Reverse Engineered.