| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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value. Makes things work again on the rpi3.
ok jsg@
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ok deraadt@, jsg@
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the od1000 that I built myself seems to use the FPU when setting the RTC,
and the UEFI standard allows this.
ok drahn@
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(physical) address such that acpidump(8) can read it and dump the tables
on arm64 systems.
ok deraadt@
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enforce W^X for runtime services. Do respect the bits that indicate that
mappings can be non-readable, non-executable or read-only though.
ok patrick@
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Skip these mappings during the remap-pahse as they are likely to be in
a different 512G bloch as memory and SetVirtualAddressMap() shouldn't need
them. But do assign a new virtual address and let efi(4) create a mapping.
Add a PMAP_DEVICE flag such that pmap_enter() can continue to be used
to create these mappings.
ok patrick@
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is running. This provides protection against meltown on cores that are
vilnerable (just Cortex-A75 so far) but also seems to be an essential to
protect against spectre-like attacks against the kernel.
This implementation only exposes a single treampoline page that does not
contain any kernel virtual addresses and also hides the real virtual address
of the exception vectors, which helps on cores vulnerable to "variant 3a"
(Cortex-A57, Cortex-A72). The implementation is inspired by the work done
by Will Deacon for Linux, but there are no knobs to turn it off. The
overhead is fairly limited: around 3-4% slowdown on Cortex-A57.
ok patrick@, deraadt@
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a time-of-day clock device based on the GetTime() and SetTime() services.
The virtual memory mappings for the runtime services calls are implemented
through a separate pmap that is only activated when we make a runtime services
call.
ok tom@, visa@
tested by naddy@
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jsg
kettenis