| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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out of procfs and gets a ptrace request PT_{READ,WRITE}_{I,D} as argument;
also procfs_checkioperm() becomes process_checkioperm().
From art@ some time ago; ok kettenis@ pedro@
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the protection of the memory mapping we're doing I/O on, or if we want to
leave them as they are. This should only be necessary for breakpoint
insertion in code, so we'll only use it for ptrace requests.
Initially from art@ after discussion with kettenis@ millert@ and I,
tested by many.
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and m68k.
ok drahn@, millert@
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ok deraadt@ millert@
problem noticed by deprotect.com
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argument. old cred only calls user suser_ucred. this will allow future
work to more flexibly implement the idea of a root process. looks like
something i saw in freebsd, but a little different.
use of suser_ucred vs suser in file system code should be looked at again,
for the moment semantics remain unchanged.
review and input from art@ testing and further review miod@
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rescinded 22 July 1999. Proofed by myself and Theo.
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is set). deraadt@ and tholo@ OK.
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and procfs (and possibly more places in the future) and simply refuse to
fiddle with the execing process. This is an ugly hack, but this far we
haven't been successful in creating a race-free exec.
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same as is used in 'vslock()'. The situation when this occurs is when a
process tries to read or write to another process vm space and the _segment_
referenced have not yet been mapped. A certain way of crashing a system is
to debug a program larger than 4 Mb (yes, those critters exist!). Set a break
in an address above 4 Mb and pmap_enter panics because it can't fault in a
new ptd page since it is not the process itself that calls pmap_enter.
This is a fix, not a solution, but at least a user can't crash the kernel.
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From Alan Barrett <apb@iafrica.com> with some changes.
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Fix a reversed argument which caused procfs_checkioperm() to always
return OK". Add a few comments to avoid further confusion.
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2) Fix procfs security hole. This is basically the NetBSD fix
(which is based in part on Sean Eric Fagan's FreeBSD fix)
with a few minor changes. The change creates as function,
procfs_checkioperm(), that has check numbers 3 and 4 from sys_ptrace().
3) Make procfs_control() use procfs_checkioperm() as well (it
already had the same basic checks but some of them were incorrect).
4) Minor stylistic cleanups, including the use of the SET/CLR/ISSET
macros to aid general grokability.
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not neccecary (and actually caused some problems).
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