| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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makes upgrades/code sharing much easier.
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unspecified address (::) to mean "unbounded" or "unconnected",
and can be confused by packets from outside.
use of :: as source is not documented well in IPv6 specification.
not sure if it presents a real threat. the worst case scenario is a DoS
against TCP listening socket:
- outsider transmit TCP SYN with :: as IPv6 source
- receiving side creates TCP control block with:
local address = my addres
remote address = :: (meaning "unconnected")
state = SYN_RCVD
note that SYN ACK will not be sent due to ip6_output() filter.
this stays until it timeouts.
- the TCP control block prevents listening TCP control block from
being contacted (DoS).
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updates scoped address handling and checksum option.
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after 2.7 is out.
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- allow setting raw socket icmp6 filter only if it is IPPROTO_ICMPV6 socket.
(cmetz may object about above two items...)
- add rip6_ctlinput, to flush cached router properly on redirects.
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- remove net.inet6.ip6.nd6_proxyall. introduce proxy NDP code works
just like "arp -s".
- revise source address selection.
be more careful about use of yet-to-be-valid addresses as source.
- as router, transmit ICMP6_DST_UNREACH_BEYONDSCOPE against out-of-scope
packet forwarding attempt.
- path MTU discovery takes care of routing header properly.
- be more strict about mbuf chain parsing.
- nuke xxCTL_VARS #define, they are for BSDI.
- disable SIOCSIFDSTADDR_IN6/SIOCSIFNETMASK_IN6 ioctl, they do not fit
IPv6 model where multiple address on interface is normal.
(kernel side supports them for a while for backward compat,
the support will be nuked shortly)
- introduce "default outgoing interface" (for spec conformance in very
rare case)
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malicious party may try to use v4 mapped addr as source/dest to
confuse tcp/udp layer, or to bypass security checks,
for example, naive stack can mistakingly think a packet with
src = ::ffff:127.0.0.1 is from local node.
(sync with kame)
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compiles on alpha (janjaap@stack.nl)
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unnecessary ifdefs...
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replaces NRL IPv6 layer. reuses NRL pcb layer. no IPsec-on-v6 support.
see sys/netinet6/{TODO,IMPLEMENTATION} for more details.
GENERIC configuration should work fine as before. GENERIC.v6 works fine
as well, but you'll need KAME userland tools to play with IPv6 (will be
bringed into soon).
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Add an extra flag to hashinit telling if it should wait in malloc.
update all calls to hashinit.
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be mutually exclusive with the IPSEC option.
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tree so we can have a unified netinet6 directory.
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to me by US DOD officials, with the crypto already removed.
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