wireguard-openbsd - WireGuard implementation for the OpenBSD kernel

	Commit message (Collapse)	Author	Age	Files	Lines
*	Remove a long-dead skeleton found under the floorboards.	ian	2010-07-01	1	-1048/+0
\| \| \| \|	"go for it" tedu@, "kill it" deraadt@
*	use strcspn to properly overwrite '\n' in fgets returned buffer	chl	2007-10-05	1	-11/+13
\| \| \| \| \| \| \| \|	check fgets return value use sizeof (buf) instead of hardcoded value with help of moritz@ and ray@ "Those seem OK" moritz@ "OK" ray@ "Looks OK" millert@
*	Typos in comments from Jared Yanovich <jjy2+ at pitt dot edu>	otto	2003-11-09	1	-2/+2
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*	string shit; ok millert	deraadt	2003-04-06	1	-15/+15
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*	a real pid_t cleanup.	mpech	2002-06-12	1	-4/+6
\| \| \| \| \| \|	espie@ ok for make/, deraadt@ one extra eye, millert@ ok
*	kill more registers	mpech	2001-11-19	1	-2/+2
\| \| \| \|	millert@ ok
*	-Wall cleanup	pvalchev	2001-07-18	1	-1/+3
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*	correct type on last arg to execl(); nordin@cse.ogi.edu	deraadt	2001-07-09	1	-7/+7
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*	warnx?/errx? paranoia (use "%s" not a bare string unless it is a	millert	2000-06-30	1	-4/+4
\| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \|	constant). These are not security holes but it is worth fixing them anyway both for robustness and so folks looking for examples in the tree are not misled into doing something potentially dangerous. Furthermore, it is a bad idea to assume that pathnames will not include '%' in them and that error routines don't return strings with '%' in them (especially in light of the possibility of locales).
*	More <sys/file.h> vs. <fcntl.h> and open() flags fixes.	millert	1999-08-17	1	-3/+4
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*	First round of code modernization. Create playdir under /tmp, not	ian	1998-09-28	1	-52/+104
\| \| \| \|	libdir. Add man page. Add pathnames.h.
*	import BTL learn(1)	ian	1998-09-28	1	-0/+989