| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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use that instead of global variables containing copies of it.
feedback/ok markus@
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HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, which more accurately reflects its effect.
This matches a previous change to PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous
names are retained as aliases. ok djm@
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it to make it more generally usable and testable.
ok markus@
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appending ssh_err(r) manually; ok markus@
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This is populated during signature verification with additional fields
that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is
only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags
field.
with and ok markus@
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include various system headers (mostly stdlib.h); include them
explicitly
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with & ok markus@
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almost exactly six years ago.
This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes
each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will
commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent
steps.
with & ok markus@
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which signature algorithms a CA may use when signing certificates.
In particular, this allows a sshd to ban certificates signed with
RSA/SHA1.
ok markus@
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OK dtucker@
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containing the request has been fully parsed. Reported by Dariusz Tytko
and MichaĆ Sajdak; ok deraadt
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In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
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ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.
These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the
final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC-
compliant SSH implementations.
ok markus@
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check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in the
signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@
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optionally record successful auth methods and public credentials
used in a file accessible to user sessions
feedback and ok markus@
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places that use them (authn and session code). After this, no state is
cached in canohost.c
feedback and ok markus@
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we only ever use it for strlen(pattern).
Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read
error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL
and his own tools.
ok markus@
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check sshkey_fingerprint return values;
ok markus
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options to allow sshd to control what public key types will be
accepted. Currently defaults to all. Feedback & ok markus@
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interfaces. Refactor the generic key loading API to not require
pathnames to be specified (they weren't really used).
Fixes a few other things en passant:
Makes ed25519 keys work for hostbased authentication (ssh-keysign
previously used the PEM-only routines).
Fixes key comment regression bz#2306: key pathnames were being lost as
comment fields.
ok markus@
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fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format
from hex to base64.
Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@
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may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or
both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation
of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from:
http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html
OK djm@ markus@
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obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect
with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll
deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
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the auth success/failure line; bz#2064, ok dtucker@
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"looks ok" markus@
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are trusted to authenticate users (in addition than doing it per-user
in authorized_keys).
Add a RevokedKeys option to sshd_config and a @revoked marker to
known_hosts to allow keys to me revoked and banned for user or host
authentication.
feedback and ok markus@
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report and patch from res AT qoxp.net (bz#1200); ok markus@
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ok djm, sort of ok stevesk
makes the pain stop in one easy step
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Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
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with IP based access control as noted by Mike Harding; replace with
a UseDNS option, UseDNS is on by default and includes the
VerifyReverseMapping check; with itojun@, provos@, jakob@ and deraadt@
ok deraadt@, djm@
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