| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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dovetail.com via bz3269
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use that instead of global variables containing copies of it.
feedback/ok markus@
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purpose-built ssh->compat variable instead; feedback/ok markus@
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HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, which more accurately reflects its effect.
This matches a previous change to PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous
names are retained as aliases. ok djm@
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While the two were originally equivalent, this actually specifies the
signature algorithms that are accepted. Some key types (eg RSA) can be
used by multiple algorithms (eg ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-512) so the old name is
becoming increasingly misleading. The old name is retained as an alias.
Prompted by bz#3253, help & ok djm@, man page help jmc@
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method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime (coupled with X25519).
The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org method is
replaced with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com. Per the authors,
sntrup4591761 was replaced almost two years ago by sntrup761.
The sntrup761 implementaion, like sntrup4591761 before it, is public
domain code extracted from the SUPERCOP cryptography benchmark
suite (https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html).
Thanks for Daniel J Bernstein for guidance on algorithm selection.
Patch from Tobias Heider; feedback & ok markus@ and myself
(note this both the updated method and the one that it replaced are
disabled by default)
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process. No longer copy entire struct w/ pointer addresses, but
pass remaining scalar fields explicitly,
Prompted by Yuichiro NAITO, feedback Thorsten Glaser; ok dtucker@
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appending ssh_err(r) manually; ok markus@
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a supplied error code; ok markus@
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log functions receive function, filename and line number of caller.
We can use this to selectively enable logging via pattern-lists.
ok markus@
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This adds a "verify-required" authorized_keys flag and a corresponding
sshd_config option that tells sshd to require that FIDO keys verify the
user identity before completing the signing/authentication attempt.
Whether or not user verification was performed is already baked into the
signature made on the FIDO token, so this is just plumbing that flag
through and adding ways to require it.
feedback and ok markus@
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FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is
required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular
operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating
themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token.
This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where
the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the
future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds
another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that
requires a PIN before each authentication.
feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
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from https://fossies.org/linux/misc/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz/codespell.html
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While freezero() returns early if the pointer is NULL the tests for
NULL in callers are left to avoid warnings about passing an
uninitialised size argument across a function boundry.
ok deraadt@ djm@
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This replaces "security key" in error/usage/verbose messages and
distinguishes between "authenticator" and "authenticator-hosted key".
ok djm@
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This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler preventing
races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce the
potential for short read/write operations.
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Previously we didn't do this because we didn't want to expose
the attack surface presented by USB and FIDO protocol handling,
but now that this is insulated behind ssh-sk-helper there is
less risk.
ok markus@
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extension for certificates. This option disables the default
requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched
their key to authorize them.
feedback deraadt, ok markus
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This directive has a single valid option "no-touch-required" that
causes sshd to skip checking whether user presence was tested before
a security key signature was made (usually by the user touching the
key).
ok markus@
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This is populated during signature verification with additional fields
that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is
only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags
field.
with and ok markus@
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verification fails.
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U2F signatures.
Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
change is mechanically adding that.
Suggested by / ok markus@
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value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all (most?)
callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this strictness
helps us in the future.
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from markus@ ok djm@
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from markus@ ok djm@
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from markus@ ok djm@
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using the Streamlined NTRU Prime 4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP
coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not enabled by default.
introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods.
from markus@ feedback & ok djm@
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with & ok markus@
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with & ok markus@
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with & ok markus@
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almost exactly six years ago.
This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes
each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will
commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent
steps.
with & ok markus@
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If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types were specified, then authentication would
always fail for RSA keys as the monitor checks only the base key (not the
signature algorithm) type against *AcceptedKeyTypes.
bz#2746; reported by Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker
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feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@
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legacy one.
Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
between key file lines.
feedback and ok markus@
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ok djm
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ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.
These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the
final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC-
compliant SSH implementations.
ok markus@
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too much software generates inconsistent messages, so we need a
better plan.
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check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in the
signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@
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managed by xrecallocarray, removing some arbitrary (though large)
limits and saving a bit of memory; "much nicer" markus@
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