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2020-05-28x86/ioperm: Prevent a memory leak when fork failsJay Lang1-11/+11
In the copy_process() routine called by _do_fork(), failure to allocate a PID (or further along in the function) will trigger an invocation to exit_thread(). This is done to clean up from an earlier call to copy_thread_tls(). Naturally, the child task is passed into exit_thread(), however during the process, io_bitmap_exit() nullifies the parent's io_bitmap rather than the child's. As copy_thread_tls() has been called ahead of the failure, the reference count on the calling thread's io_bitmap is incremented as we would expect. However, io_bitmap_exit() doesn't accept any arguments, and thus assumes it should trash the current thread's io_bitmap reference rather than the child's. This is pretty sneaky in practice, because in all instances but this one, exit_thread() is called with respect to the current task and everything works out. A determined attacker can issue an appropriate ioctl (i.e. KDENABIO) to get a bitmap allocated, and force a clone3() syscall to fail by passing in a zeroed clone_args structure. The kernel handles the erroneous struct and the buggy code path is followed, and even though the parent's reference to the io_bitmap is trashed, the child still holds a reference and thus the structure will never be freed. Fix this by tweaking io_bitmap_exit() and its subroutines to accept a task_struct argument which to operate on. Fixes: ea5f1cd7ab49 ("x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions dropped") Signed-off-by: Jay Lang <jaytlang@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable#@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200524162742.253727-1-jaytlang@mit.edu
2020-02-17x86/iopl: Include prototype header for ksys_ioperm()Benjamin Thiel1-0/+1
.. in order to fix a -Wmissing-prototype warning. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Thiel <b.thiel@posteo.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200123133051.5974-1-b.thiel@posteo.de
2019-11-16x86/ioperm: Extend IOPL config to control ioperm() as wellThomas Gleixner1-7/+19
If iopl() is disabled, then providing ioperm() does not make much sense. Rename the config option and disable/enable both syscalls with it. Guard the code with #ifdefs where appropriate. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16x86/iopl: Remove legacy IOPL optionThomas Gleixner1-36/+11
The IOPL emulation via the I/O bitmap is sufficient. Remove the legacy cruft dealing with the (e)flags based IOPL mechanism. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> (Paravirt and Xen parts) Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16x86/iopl: Restrict iopl() permission scopeThomas Gleixner1-26/+61
The access to the full I/O port range can be also provided by the TSS I/O bitmap, but that would require to copy 8k of data on scheduling in the task. As shown with the sched out optimization TSS.io_bitmap_base can be used to switch the incoming task to a preallocated I/O bitmap which has all bits zero, i.e. allows access to all I/O ports. Implementing this allows to provide an iopl() emulation mode which restricts the IOPL level 3 permissions to I/O port access but removes the STI/CLI permission which is coming with the hardware IOPL mechansim. Provide a config option to switch IOPL to emulation mode, make it the default and while at it also provide an option to disable IOPL completely. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16x86/iopl: Fixup misleading commentThomas Gleixner1-8/+27
The comment for the sys_iopl() implementation is outdated and actively misleading in some parts. Fix it up. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16x86/ioperm: Share I/O bitmap if identicalThomas Gleixner1-9/+39
The I/O bitmap is duplicated on fork. That's wasting memory and slows down fork. There is no point to do so. As long as the bitmap is not modified it can be shared between threads and processes. Add a refcount and just share it on fork. If a task modifies the bitmap then it has to do the duplication if and only if it is shared. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions droppedThomas Gleixner1-1/+18
If ioperm() results in a bitmap with all bits set (no permissions to any I/O port), then handling that bitmap on context switch and exit to user mode is pointless. Drop it. Move the bitmap exit handling to the ioport code and reuse it for both the thread exit path and dropping it. This allows to reuse this code for the upcoming iopl() emulation. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user workThomas Gleixner1-21/+4
There is no point to update the TSS bitmap for tasks which use I/O bitmaps on every context switch. It's enough to update it right before exiting to user space. That reduces the context switch bitmap handling to invalidating the io bitmap base offset in the TSS when the outgoing task has TIF_IO_BITMAP set. The invaldiation is done on purpose when a task with an IO bitmap switches out to prevent any possible leakage of an activated IO bitmap. It also removes the requirement to update the tasks bitmap atomically in ioperm(). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16x86/ioperm: Add bitmap sequence numberThomas Gleixner1-0/+5
Add a globally unique sequence number which is incremented when ioperm() is changing the I/O bitmap of a task. Store the new sequence number in the io_bitmap structure and compare it with the sequence number of the I/O bitmap which was last loaded on a CPU. Only update the bitmap if the sequence is different. That should further reduce the overhead of I/O bitmap scheduling when there are only a few I/O bitmap users on the system. The 64bit sequence counter is sufficient. A wraparound of the sequence counter assuming an ioperm() call every nanosecond would require about 584 years of uptime. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16x86/ioperm: Move iobitmap data into a structThomas Gleixner1-13/+14
No point in having all the data in thread_struct, especially as upcoming changes add more. Make the bitmap in the new struct accessible as array of longs and as array of characters via a union, so both the bitmap functions and the update logic can avoid type casts. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16x86/tss: Move I/O bitmap data into a seperate structThomas Gleixner1-2/+2
Move the non hardware portion of I/O bitmap data into a seperate struct for readability sake. Originally-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16x86/io: Speedup schedule out of I/O bitmap userThomas Gleixner1-0/+4
There is no requirement to update the TSS I/O bitmap when a thread using it is scheduled out and the incoming thread does not use it. For the permission check based on the TSS I/O bitmap the CPU calculates the memory location of the I/O bitmap by the address of the TSS and the io_bitmap_base member of the tss_struct. The easiest way to invalidate the I/O bitmap is to switch the offset to an address outside of the TSS limit. If an I/O instruction is issued from user space the TSS limit causes #GP to be raised in the same was as valid I/O bitmap with all bits set to 1 would do. This removes the extra work when an I/O bitmap using task is scheduled out and puts the burden on the rare I/O bitmap users when they are scheduled in. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16x86/ioperm: Avoid bitmap allocation if no permissions are setThomas Gleixner1-0/+3
If ioperm() is invoked the first time and the @turn_on argument is 0, then there is no point to allocate a bitmap just to clear permissions which are not set. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16x86/ioperm: Simplify first ioperm() invocation logicThomas Gleixner1-29/+26
On the first allocation of a task the I/O bitmap needs to be allocated. After the allocation it is installed as an empty bitmap and immediately afterwards updated. Avoid that and just do the initial updates (store bitmap pointer, set TIF flag and make TSS limit valid) in the update path unconditionally. If the bitmap was already active this is redundant but harmless. Preparatory change for later optimizations in the context switch code. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16x86/iopl: Cleanup include mazeThomas Gleixner1-12/+4
Get rid of superfluous includes. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-08-19x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked downMatthew Garrett1-2/+5
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock it down by default. This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and KDDISABIO console ioctls. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2018-04-02x86/ioport: add ksys_ioperm() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_ioperm()Dominik Brodowski1-1/+6
Using this helper allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to the sys_ioperm() syscall. The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function is meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscall. In particular, it uses the same calling convention as sys_ioperm(). This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls. On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-07x86/syscalls: Use proper syscall definition for sys_ioperm()Dominik Brodowski1-1/+1
Using SYSCALL_DEFINEx() is recommended, so use it also here. Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: luto@amacapital.net Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-12-17x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-onlyAndy Lutomirski1-1/+1
The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it read-only on x86_64. On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations without double fault handling. [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for confirmation. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman1-0/+1
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-03-04Merge tag 'kvm-4.11-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds1-1/+7
Pull more KVM updates from Radim Krčmář: "Second batch of KVM changes for the 4.11 merge window: PPC: - correct assumption about ASDR on POWER9 - fix MMIO emulation on POWER9 x86: - add a simple test for ioperm - cleanup TSS (going through KVM tree as the whole undertaking was caused by VMX's use of TSS) - fix nVMX interrupt delivery - fix some performance counters in the guest ... and two cleanup patches" * tag 'kvm-4.11-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: KVM: nVMX: Fix pending events injection x86/kvm/vmx: remove unused variable in segment_base() selftests/x86: Add a basic selftest for ioperm x86/asm: Tidy up TSS limit code kvm: convert kvm.users_count from atomic_t to refcount_t KVM: x86: never specify a sample period for virtualized in_tx_cp counters KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't use ASDR for real-mode HPT faults on POWER9 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix software walk of guest process page tables
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/task_stack.h>Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
We are going to split <linux/sched/task_stack.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task_stack.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-01x86/asm: Tidy up TSS limit codeAndy Lutomirski1-1/+7
In an earlier version of the patch ("x86/kvm/vmx: Defer TR reload after VM exit") that introduced TSS limit validity tracking, I confused which helper was which. On reflection, the names I chose sucked. Rename the helpers to make it more obvious what's going on and add some comments. While I'm at it, clear __tss_limit_invalid when force-reloading as well as when contitionally reloading, since any TR reload fixes the limit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-02-21x86/kvm/vmx: Defer TR reload after VM exitAndy Lutomirski1-0/+5
Intel's VMX is daft and resets the hidden TSS limit register to 0x67 on VMX reload, and the 0x67 is not configurable. KVM currently reloads TR using the LTR instruction on every exit, but this is quite slow because LTR is serializing. The 0x67 limit is entirely harmless unless ioperm() is in use, so defer the reload until a task using ioperm() is actually running. Here's some poorly done benchmarking using kvm-unit-tests: Before: cpuid 1313 vmcall 1195 mov_from_cr8 11 mov_to_cr8 17 inl_from_pmtimer 6770 inl_from_qemu 6856 inl_from_kernel 2435 outl_to_kernel 1402 After: cpuid 1291 vmcall 1181 mov_from_cr8 11 mov_to_cr8 16 inl_from_pmtimer 6457 inl_from_qemu 6209 inl_from_kernel 2339 outl_to_kernel 1391 Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> [Force-reload TR in invalidate_tss_limit. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2016-03-17x86/iopl: Fix iopl capability check on Xen PVAndy Lutomirski1-3/+9
iopl(3) is supposed to work if iopl is already 3, even if unprivileged. This didn't work right on Xen PV. Fix it. Reviewewd-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8ce12013e6e4c0a44a97e316be4a6faff31bd5ea.1458162709.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-03-06x86/asm/entry: Rename 'init_tss' to 'cpu_tss'Andy Lutomirski1-1/+1
It has nothing to do with init -- there's only one TSS per cpu. Other names considered include: - current_tss: Confusing because we never switch the tss. - singleton_tss: Too long. This patch was generated with 's/init_tss/cpu_tss/g'. Followup patches will fix INIT_TSS and INIT_TSS_IST by hand. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/da29fb2a793e4f649d93ce2d1ed320ebe8516262.1425611534.git.luto@amacapital.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-02-03x86: get rid of pt_regs argument of iopl(2)Al Viro1-1/+2
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-02-17x86: Use bitmap library functionsAkinobu Mita1-15/+5
Use bitmap_set()/bitmap_clear() to fill/zero a region of a bitmap instead of doing set_bit()/clear_bit() each bit. This change has been tested with ioperm() and there's no change in behavior. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> LKML-Reference: <1297867715-20394-1-git-send-email-akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-12-09x86-64, paravirt: Call set_iopl_mask() on 64 bitsH. Peter Anvin1-2/+0
set_iopl_mask() is a no-op on 64 bits, but it is also a paravirt hook, so call it even on 64 bits. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> LKML-Reference: <1260403316-5679-3-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com>
2009-12-09x86: Merge sys_ioplBrian Gerst1-23/+5
Change 32-bit sys_iopl to PTREGSCALL1, and merge with 64-bit. Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> LKML-Reference: <1260403316-5679-3-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-03-02x86-32: use non-lazy io bitmap context switchingJeremy Fitzhardinge1-11/+0
Impact: remove 32-bit optimization to prepare unification x86-32 and -64 differ in the way they context-switch tasks with io permission bitmaps. x86-64 simply copies the next tasks io bitmap into place (if any) on context switch. x86-32 invalidates the bitmap on context switch, so that the next IO instruction will fault; at that point it installs the appropriate IO bitmap. This makes context switching IO-bitmap-using tasks a bit more less expensive, at the cost of making the next IO instruction slower due to the extra fault. This tradeoff only makes sense if IO-bitmap-using processes are relatively common, but they don't actually use IO instructions very often. However, in a typical desktop system, the only process likely to be using IO bitmaps is the X server, and nothing at all on a server. Therefore the lazy context switch doesn't really win all that much, and its just a gratuitious difference from 64-bit code. This patch removes the lazy context switch, with a view to unifying this code in a later change. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-02-11x86: use regparm(3) for passed-in pt_regs pointerBrian Gerst1-1/+2
Some syscalls need to access the pt_regs structure, either to copy user register state or to modifiy it. This patch adds stubs to load the address of the pt_regs struct into the %eax register, and changes the syscalls to take the pointer as an argument instead of relying on the assumption that the pt_regs structure overlaps the function arguments. Drop the use of regparm(1) due to concern about gcc bugs, and to move in the direction of the eventual removal of regparm(0) for asmlinkage. Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2009-02-11x86: pass in pt_regs pointer for syscalls that need itBrian Gerst1-3/+1
Some syscalls need to access the pt_regs structure, either to copy user register state or to modifiy it. This patch adds stubs to load the address of the pt_regs struct into the %eax register, and changes the syscalls to regparm(1) to receive the pt_regs pointer as the first argument. Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-01-04x86: ioport.c fix style problemsJaswinder Singh Rajput1-2/+2
Impact: cleanup Fix: ERROR: "foo * bar" should be "foo *bar" total: 2 errors, 0 warnings Signed-off-by: Jaswinder Singh Rajput <jaswinderrajput@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-22x86: Introducing asm/syscalls.hJaswinder Singh1-0/+1
Declaring arch-dependent syscalls for x86 architecture Signed-off-by: Jaswinder Singh <jaswinder@infradead.org>
2008-01-30x86: refactor ioport unificationChris Wright1-19/+21
Refactor ioport unification to pull out common code. Cc: mboton@gmail.com Cc: Kevin Winchester <kjwinchester@gmail.com> Cc: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30x86: fix ioport unification on 32-bitChris Wright1-2/+4
ioport unification was broken for 32-bit; it was missing the acutal pushf/popf EFLAGS manipulation (set_iopl_mask()). Also, use of volatile looks like leftover cruft. Cc: mboton@gmail.com Cc: Kevin Winchester <kjwinchester@gmail.com> Cc: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-01-30x86: ioport_{32|64}.c unificationmboton@gmail.com1-0/+150
ioport_{32|64}.c unification. This patch unifies the code from the ioport_32.c and ioport_64.c files. Tested and working fine with i386 and x86_64 kernels. Signed-off-by: Miguel Botón <mboton@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>